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He is wintering out 
the back-end of a bad year, 
swinging a hurricane-lamp 
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a jobber among shadows.
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barons: resentful 
and impenitent, 
carrying the warm eggs.
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PREFACE
The following study is an examination of the question of social 
change in Ireland over recent decades. Since the early nineteen 
sixties there had been a general feeling in Ireland that society 
was in some form of transition from a traditional to a modern 
world. The door had been closed on the past and a new era was 
being ushered in. This no doubt partly had to do with the social 
and economic changes which Ireland experienced during this time. 
It was also related to Ireland's colonial history and the 
feeling that the promise of independence was at last being 
achieved.
- In the 1980s however this belief in the advance of modernization 
has suffered a reversal. These were the years of the two 
referenda on abortion and divorce and the beginning of the 
present economic crisis. What was particularly interesting about 
this time was the way in which these events, over a very short 
space of time, seemed to undermine or reverse everything that 
had been taken for granted in Ireland for two decades. In view of 
the reappearance of many of these old problems, the following 
work represents a contribution towards a critique of this model 
of modernization.
Looking back on the period since the early sixties one of the 
most salient features of intellectual debate has been the 
interpretation of problems in Ireland in terms of the modern and 
the traditional. This is itself, of course, part of the larger
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question of the relationship of the present to the past which has 
been central to the question of change in Ireland. The social 
change since the sixties placed the past in an unfavourable 
light, not only materially but intellectually as well. The 
prosperity which followed the abandonment of the policy of 
economic self-sufficiency seemed to undermine the philosophical 
basis upon which the state rested. This essentially was the old 
nationalist belief that economic independence was the sine qua 
non of political independence and vice versa. As a consequence, 
a major part of the intellectual effort of the sixties and after 
went into a reinterpretation of history or a demythologizing of 
it, as some writers would have had it.
When one looks closely at this recent "revisionist" turn in 
Irish history, one of the interesting things about it is the way 
in which the terms within which contemporary change was being 
interpreted reappeared in historical interpretations. The 
conceptualization of Irish history in terms of the transition 
from traditional to modern is probably one of its most prominent 
characteristics. This contemporary interpretation of social 
change now seems to have been projected back onto the past so 
that ever since the onset of colonization Ireland seems to have 
been involved in a modernization process.
The collapse, or at least standstill, of this supposed 
transition now calls into question the philosophical basis upon 
which the interpretations were based. This is to say it calls 
into question the theoretical framework of Irish history which
underpinned or accompanied the contemporary belief in 
modernization. For example the modernization view had suggested 
that development was a product of integration into the capitalist 
system. This identification of communications and integration 
with development became a theme in modernization theory. 
Contemporary experience however suggests that integration and 
close communication with capitalism does not necessarily lead to 
development.
This may then call for a reappraisal of the historical role of 
integration and communication. Closer integration with the 
metropolitan centre may indeed have lead to underdevelopment. The 
theoretical analysis of the historical evidence in relation to 
the Irish colonial experience, suggests that this is the case. 
The work here then represents a contribution towards what might 
be called a "revision of revisionism".
Discussion about the problem of social change quickly leads on 
to the general historical debate about the emergence of modern 
society. It does not take long to realize that the debate in 
Ireland about the transition can, and indeed must, be situated 
within this much broader frame of reference. Furthermore it is 
clear that there were concrete political and economic issues
r
which placed the problem of development in Ireland very much as 
part of the international pattern of development.
The present work is an attempt to situate the debate in Ireland 
about the transition to modern society in the context of these 
international debates. The concept of modernization is commonly
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used to describe this passage from traditional to modern 
society. These concept itself derives largely from the thinking 
of classical political economy about development. Marxism 
emerged as a critique of classical political economy and in a 
similar fashion neo-Marxism in turn offers a critique of
vy
modernization theory. The present work situates the question of 
development in Ireland within the contrasting perspectives of 
"modernization" and "neo-Marxist” models of social change.
I have approached this problem starting from the present, 
making a detour through "revisionist" historiography, and 
finishing up with a fresh perspective on the present. This
involves both describing recent change and tracing the origin of 
particular interpretations of this change to their source in 
Western social theory. The next stage in this plan involves a 
closer look at how the transition actually occurred in Britain 
and how classical models of social change were based on the
British experience. Having identified the key elements of the
transition we will be in a better position to examine the Irish 
case. The following chapters in the work are devoted to precisely 
this problem.
The issue of the transition is divided into three areas or 
themes which illustrate the argument. These are the economy,
politics and the church. The argument operates on two levels. 
Firstly, on the theoretical level, the theories of transition are 
explained and the arguments of various historians and social 
theorists are situated within the terms of this. Accordingly this 
work does not claim to make a contribution to Irish history in
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the sense of producing any original empirical research on a 
particular area of study. It is confined, in the main to a 
critical examination of the large corpus of research already 
published. In this sense it is more an exercise in social theory 
or historiography, than of history as it is commonly understood.
My objective is to make explicit, where appropriate, the 
theoretical presuppositions which govern interpretations of the 
evidence. To take an example, it is not proposed to question the 
validity of, say, Louis Cullen's contention that in the course of 
the seventeenth century: "From a woodland society Ireland was 
emerging as an agricultural region with a substantial 
agricultural surplus"(1972.9). What I do wish to question is the 
sense in which this change can be properly interpreted as a 
"transition from medieval to modern"(1981.26).
If by modern is meant, as Cullen suggests, that Ireland was 
coming to resemble England in important ways, then this 
contention can be challenged on a number of fronts. It can be 
challenged firstly from a comparative analysis of English and 
Irish society. Secondly, it can be challenged through an internal 
analysis of Cullen's work by showing, for example, that the 
author evades the question of why, if Ireland was modern, it did 
not become capitalist. Ultimately it can be challenged on 
theoretical grounds by locating Cullen's theory within the 
modernization perspective, which is shown to be mistaken about 
the prerequisites for economic development. The limitations of 
modernization theory are in turn delineated through a critique 
from the perspective of the Marxist theory of transition.
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An important philosophical issue arises here. This concerns the 
relationship between the social context and historical 
interpretation. Having posited a relationship between revisionist 
history and the social context out of which it originated I may 
have committed myself to the conclusion that all history, my own 
included, consists in projecting onto the past the prejudices of 
the present. In that case I would have to abandon Lord Acton's
stricture that history should be our deliverer, "not only from 
the undue influence of other times, but from the undue influence 
of our own" (Acton 1960:44). However if I may enlist the support 
of another eminent historian on my side I hold that my own
position has the benefit of precisely this self awareness of the 
undue influence of our time. As E.H. Carr put it, "the historian 
who is most conscious of his own situation is also more capable
of transcending it, and more capable of appreciating the
essential nature of the differences between his own society and 
outlook and those of other periods or other countries" (1964:44).
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ABSTRACT
The first chapter situates debate on social change in Ireland 
within the context of the debate on the transition. There are 
three aspects of this, the economic, the political and the 
cultural, which provide three themes running through each 
chapter. I begin by situating Ireland within the international 
socio-political context. The economic expansion in Ireland is 
related to the international expansion and the the emergence of 
revisionism is related to the emergence of modernization theory. 
This is to say that the basic characteristics of the Irish 
situation are related to the international one.
I then go on to situate these factors within the larger 
historical context of the development of capitalism and the 
emergence of bourgeois political economy. The reversal of social 
change in Ireland is in turn described and related to the 
international situation. This international situation has 
promoted the development of a neo-Marxist theory of imperialism 
as a critique of modernization. The terms of this critique are 
outlined in terms of mode of production and the conditions for 
the transition. This sets the scene for the second chapter.
The second chapter deals with the debate on the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism. On an empirical level the case of the 
transition in England is used. The basic characteristics of the 
feudal mode of production in England are described. Following 
this the process of historical change is described and within the 
context of the theoretical debate an attempt is made to locate
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the determining influences. The debate basically turns upon 
whether commercialization or class conflict was the determining 
factor. The evidence in comparison to other countries would seem 
to suggest that the transformation of class relations was the 
decisive factor.
Having clarified this issue the next step is to look at Ireland 
historically within the context of this transition. This involves 
firstly a reconstruction of the mode of production in Ireland 
prior to colonization and secondly a delineation of the new mode 
of production which resulted from a merger with the embryonic 
capitalist mode. On the basis of the theory of transition we can 
then set out to explain how the social relations of colonial 
society obstructed the conditions whereby capital accumulation 
could take place. The social relations which forced an increase 
in relative surplus value were not created. Instead the 
commercialization of society saw a huge increase in output and 
upon this increase a rentier class developed. In the north-east 
social relations were different and thus also the form of 
economic development.
Chapter four examines how the accumulation of industrial 
capital created areas of different levels of productivity. In 
Britain the increase in relative surplus value led to a 
concentration and centralization of production and a massive
expansion of output. In Ireland, on the other hand, the social 
relations enabled no increase in absolute surplus value and
created no capital accumulation. The fall in the rate of surplus
value reduced the share of surplus available for peasants which
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eventually lead to a famine followed by mass emigration and a 
restructuring of Irish agriculture. This created the social 
conditions for the Irish land war.
The dual structure which modernization theorists take to be 
evidence of transition is explained in terms of this question of 
surplus value. In the North-East social conditions led to an
increase in relative surplus value and an accumulation of 
capital. The logic of concentration and centralization which this 
involved eventually led to industrialization. This created a 
further element in the opposition to nationalism.
Chapter five looks at the movement towards the secession of
Ireland from Britain within the context of Imperialism or Finance 
Capital. The logic of industrial concentration and centralization 
led to the development of national trusts and created intense 
national rivalry. This led to an international conflict in 1914 
and to a subsequent break-up of empires. Ireland was part of this 
process. The effect of this industrial concentration on Irish 
agriculture was the centralization of certain agricultural 
processes combined with the creation of peasant proprietorship. 
This provided the social basis for the war of independence. In 
the North-east, on the other hand, capital accumulation had meant 
a closer integration of the economy and society into 'Britain 
which culminated in the successful opposition to Republicanism.
Chapter six brings the debate up to the era of the
multinationals and Ireland's reintegration into the international 
economy. The major feature here is the move away from the export
XVII
of primary products to the export of manufactured goods through 
multinational companies. The effect of this was a 
commercialization of the economy without the creation of the 
conditions of capital accumulation. The logic of capital 
accumulation marginalized Irish industry rather than 
revolutionizing it. The result was that in the next phase of 
concentration Ireland was effectively bypassed.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
The past is such a curious Creature 
To look her in the Face 
A transport may receipt us 
or a Disgrace
Unarmed if any meet her 
I charge him fly 
Her faded Ammunition 
Might yet Reply
Emily Dickinson
1
the struggle of man against 
power is the struggle of memory 
against forgeting.
Milan Kundera.
I. IRELAND IN TRANSITION
The last decade has seen Irish society being rapidly overtaken 
by its own past. With unemployment on the island now standing at 
roughly 380,000 and with emigration again reaching haemorrhage 
proportions, the decades of "development" seem to have sunk into 
oblivion. Ireland, from this angle, hardly looks European. As for 
the future, the prospect seems even bleaker. With a state debt, 
in the Republic, of something in the order of 22,000 million, 
pounds it takes approximately one third of government revenue to 
pay the interest alone (Tansey 1987). The strategy of -cutting 
public expenditure to reduce this debt seems only guaranteed to 
accelerate the upward spiral of unemployment which has already 
passed the crisis point. In spite of this however, there is 
little on the political front to indicate that the old consensus 
reflected in the broad-based political parties is being
1
undermined; class differences have yet to find a clear expression 
in Irish politics. On top of all this, society is still reeling
from a conservative backlash which has seen the defeat of
referenda on abortion and divorce and the general ascendency of a 
cultural conservatism. Of course there is nothing new about these
problems in Ireland. The past few decades simply offered a brief
respite from the age-old problems, Farming, Faith and Fatherland. 
It is this continuity in the three areas of economy, politics 
and the Church that the following work attempts to explain.
The general sense of bewilderment which people still feel 
about this situation is symptomatic of the gulf between people's 
expectations about the nineteen eighties and the harsh reality. 
The nineteen sixties, the "best of decades", was popularly 
interpreted as the time when Ireland had at last shaken off its 
colonial heritage of economic backwardness and cultural isolation 
as the country' moved to take its place among the developed 
nations of the world. Ireland, as contemporary intellectuals 
interpreted it, was in a transition from being a provincial 
backwater to becoming a modern consumerist society. David 
Thornley, a socialist luHTtnary of the time, eulogized the role in 
this task of "a devoted handful of twentieth-century men" in the 
uphill struggle: "the period in which we are now living in
Ireland seems to me a transitional one...We are for the first 
time at the threshold of a delayed peaceful social revolution" he 
declared. In future, he continued, "our social habits and our 
politics will take on a flavour that is even more urban and as a 
consequence even more cosmopolitan". (1964:16)
2
This evolutionary idea of transition informed most peoples' 
thinking about change during this time. It was largely based on 
the idea that as Ireland became more industrialized it would 
increasingly assume the characteristic features of industrial
society. The mushrooming of industrial plants all over the
country had made this industrialization process seem inevitable 
so that the major task was to bring social institutions into line 
with this. Political pundits never wearied of pronouncing the end 
of "civil war politics" and the begining of class politics based 
on real bread and butter issues. They were, no doubt, encouraged 
in this belief by the appearance for the first time of the word 
socialism in the Labour party programme and by assurances that 
the "seventies would be socialist"[1].
l.The planned economy: "the loveliest garden you ever saw"
The beginning of this economic development in Ireland is 
usually dated from 1958, the year when the first Programme for 
Economic Expansion was launched. This programme, along with the 
publication of the document Economic Development by the 
Department of Finance, represented "the turning of the tide" as 
Garret Fitzgerald, "an economic commentator of rigorous 
intellectual detachment"[2] called it. This programme basically 
recommended a rejection of the economic policies of protectionism 
which had prevailed since the early thirties in favour of a 
liberalization of import and export laws.
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The background to this change was the economic crisis of the
nineteen fifties which had seen some 400.000 people emigrate
during the decade (Blackwell 1982:47). Such was the country's
state of dependence on Britain that a team of economic experts,
called in to assess the situation, found it to be incompatible
with political sovereignty (Rumpf 1977:119). The basic problem as
diagnosed by economic advisors at the time was that protection
had prevented the price mechanism from ensuring the most
efficient use of resources through competition. Furthermore, it
was argued that the home market was too small to provide a basis 
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for large manufacturing operations and capital investment
required to increase exports (Bew 1982:135). The capital required 
for increasing the productivity of the economy could only be 
acquired, it was argued, through a liberalization of trade
restrictions.
This turnabout in policy was not as sudden as it appeared to 
be. The Irish government had received Marshall aid after the war 
and was under increasing pressure during the fifties to open up 
to foreign capital [3], A number of agencies had also been
established in line with contemporary ideas about economic 
development. The Industrial Development Authority was established 
in 1949, An Foras Tionscail in 1952 and the Institute of Public 
Administration in 1957. The very idea of a Programme for Economic 
Expansion, with its emphasis upon "productive" investment and 
integration into the capitalist economy, was characteristic of 
this new attitude. In the words of Kenneth Whitaker, a (sagacious^ 
economist at the the Department of Finance, it was necessary to
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formulate: "An integrated programme of national development for
the next five or ten years which I believe will be critical years 
for the country's survival as an economic entity" (Dept of 
Finance 1958:227).
The wide acceptance of this interventionist philosophy in 
political circles was evidenced some years later in a speech by 
the then Taoiseach, Sean Lemass who accepted "the proposition 
that national, economic and social progress will not happen of 
its own accord, that it has to be planned and organized" (Bew & 
Patterson 1982:167). The 1958 plan for development had a dual 
focus on agriculture and industry. An increase in the 
productivity of agriculture was to provide the basis for an 
industrial development programme. Agricultural productivity would 
be increased through mechanization and the consolidation of 
holdings. The increased exports that this would generate could 
then be used for investment in industry. Pursuing a policy of 
"industrialization by invitation", foreign companies were to be 
offered tax concessions and other incentives to establish 
branches in Ireland. The people displaced in the agricultural 
modernization programme would then be able to find employment 
locally in industry.
i
The changes which followed the 1958 Programme were dramatic and 
while they hardly transformed Ireland into Dr Fitzgerald's 
vision of "the loveliest garden you ever saw", they nevertheless 
seemed to represent a substantial departure from the past. 
Because of the suddeness of this change, the 
post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning applied to the programme,
however misleading, becomes easier to understand. For example 
while in 1958 there were 433,000 people or 38% of the workforce 
employed in agriculture, by 1980 employment in this sector had 
fallen to 220,000 or 19% (Blackwell 1982:47). This was partly 
offset by an increase in industrial employment from 257,000 in 
1961 to 319,000 in 1978 (Rothman-0'Connell 1982:67). Out of the 
200,000 employed in manufacturing in 1979, 80,000 of these were
employed by foreign firms based in Ireland (Wickham 1983:168).
This economic change was reflected demographically in increased 
urbanization and especially in the growth of the population of 
Dublin which increased by 18% between 1971 and 1981(Rothman- 
O'Connell 1982:81). More historic was the recording of the first 
sustained population growth since the Famine. The total 
population of the area comprising the twenty-six counties having 
declined from 6.5 million in 1841 to 2.8 million in 1961, grew to 
3.4 million by 1981 (Rothman-0'Connell 1982:76).
2.Revisionism
The intellectual ferment that this change generated in the 
sixties lead to a questioning of the nationalist ethos which had 
prevailed in the country since independence. The fundamental 
tenet of Irish nationalism was the belief that Ireland's 
problems, social and economic, were rooted in British 
colonialism. "A free Ireland", Patrick Pearse had argued, "would 
not and could not have hunger in her fertile vales and squalour 
in her cities" (1952:180).In support of this thesis, George 
O'Brien (1921) the nationalist economist had attributed the
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failure of Irish industry during the nineteenth century to the 
malevolence of British policy. The failure of the Irish Free 
State to develop after independence seemed to question this but 
what finally seemed to undermine it was the relative ease with 
which Ireland seemed to progress during the sixties.
The idea that development in Ireland was incompatible with
integration with the international capitalist system now seemed 
unfounded. Indeed, the argument now went, it was Ireland's 
isolationism which had retarded development. Debate in the 
sixties then tended to resolve itself into an opposition between 
protectionism, and nationalism on the one hand as opposed to the 
open economy and internationalism on the other. Indeed this 
intellectual division seemed to be embodied in the very division 
of Irish society itself into a backward peasant sector and a 
progressive industrial one. As Ireland became more closely 
integrated into the international economy this backward sector, 
it was argued, would be gradually replaced and Ireland would 
"catch up" with the rest of Europe. Part of the task of
development then from this perspective seemed to require a
systematic asault on nationalism.
The emerging reinterpretation of the post-independence period 
clearly shows this. The removal of moral censorship, arid other 
legislation of the post-independence period was transformed into 
a kulturkampf against cultural and economic protectionism which 
were believed to stand in the way of development. The opening 
salvoes in this long siege were delivered by Garret Fitzgerald in 
an attack on "the crippling burden of restraint, subsidies,
feather-bedding and back-scratching" in Irish society (Bew & 
Patterson (1982:131) [4],
Politically, the civil war gerontocracy passed on, to be 
replaced by a no nonsense type of politician, personified by Sean 
Lemass. "Beat the crisis, let's get cracking" was the slogan 
under which the new leadership seemed to have achieved, by dint 
of entrepreneurial brashness, what the dreams of de Valera could 
never have done. "It was to be the historical achievement of Sean 
Lemass" argued historian Joseph Lee, "to lay the foundations of a 
new Ireland perhaps destined to endure as long as its immediate 
predecessor"(Lee 1979:170) This was The Achieving Society in 
which, by means of an invisible hand, personal success was 
transformed into a social one. Thus the fact that many of the new 
leaders made personal fortunes for themselves "making a quarry 
out of the city",as one writer put it,(Me Donald 1985:105) only 
seemed to lend credibility to the association of individual with 
national success.
The Catholic Church too, the last bastion of traditional 
Ireland was believed to be on the retreat. Despite the assurances 
of Archbishop Me Quaid to the faithful that "No change will worry 
the tranquillity of your Christian lives " (Lyons 1973:690), it 
was nevertheless accepted that with the ending of his 
patriarchate, a new era of secularism would be ushered in. Mass 
communications, especially television, would play an important 
part in this by exposing people to ideas in conflict with 
Catholic teaching. The role that the popular "Late Late Show" was
to play in this process is now an established part of Irish 
revisionist mythology. The evolution in education was also 
believed to be an important part of this secularization process. 
The growing complexity of the economy was believed to be 
ultimately incompatible with the influence of the Church in 
education. This sense of euphoria of course is only intelligible 
against the background of depression and disillusion of the 
fifties. How this was interpreted is important for understanding 
the later era.
This spirit of revision was soon directed towards Irish history 
in what F.S.L.Lyons later called "a revolution in Irish 
historiography" (1973:7). In view of the recent economic upturn, 
the events of the nationalist canon seemed to be of less 
contemporary relevance than factors hitherto ignored. Nationalist 
historiography had generally viewed Irish history in terms of the 
development of the nationalist movement in the struggle for 
independence from Britain, "the history of the disposessed". 
"What we must endeavour never to forget is this" urged Douglas 
Hyde "that the Ireland of today is the descendent of the Ireland 
of the seventh century, then the school of Europe" (Brown 
1981:55). This continuity within Irish history could be seen in 
the resistance to British rule right from the Gaelic chieftains 
through to the United Irishmen, to Young Ireland, the Fenians and 
finally Sinn Fein. The essence of The Separatist Idea was 
expressed by Tone, Davis, Lalor and Mitchel; "the four gospels of 
the new testament of Irish nationality" as Pearse called them 
(1967:183).
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From the perspective of the new historiography this tended to 
obscure the internal developments in Irish society which were of 
much greater importance in the modernization of society: the
development of state structures, the railways, newspapers, 
education and political parties, or what nationalists took to be 
Anglicization. Joseph Lee, in the classic text of this new 
historiography, argued that Ireland's failure to develop 
economically during the nineteenth century, had less to do with 
British policy than with the lack of native initiative or 
entrepreneurial talent [6]. Lee takes this entrepreneurial 
function to be one of the key factors in economic development. 
Despite the accepted belief that this economic development was 
the result of indigenous factors alone it really cannot be 
understood outside .of the international expansion of capitalism.
II. THE TRANSITION INTERNATIONALLY: THE
PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY
The post-war international political settlement is the proper 
starting point for an analysis of the current economic situation. 
The war itself had resulted partly from the increasing 
contradiction between the international expansion of German 
capitalism and the development policies of other states. The 
conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 attempted to 
lay the basis for international free trade through the 
establishment of a number of regulatory institutions. The two 
most important of these were the International Monetary Fund and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the 
World Bank). These agencies were established with the purpose of
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facilitating the expansion of international trade through the 
elimination of foreign exchange restrictions and the promotion of 
exchange stability [6]. This itself required a massive investment 
of funds to get the international economy moving after the war, 
and in Europe, Marshall aid was the principal means whereby this 
was done. By 1950 Ireland had received some $150 million in 
exchange for "efforts to make currency freely convertible, to 
liberalize trade and to integrate into the European economy" 
(0'Hearn 1986:4)
The decade following the war saw a rapid expansion of output in 
capitalist countries as recovery got underway. Between 1949 and 
1956 GNP in the European Community increased by 42% as against 8% 
in Ireland during the same period (Rothman & O'Connell 1982:65). 
One aspect of this expansion was the penetration of capitalist 
products and capitalist methods of production into the non­
capitalist world, especially through the agency of the 
multinational corporation. The direct investments of US-based 
enterprise in manufacturing in Latin America, for example, 
increased sixfold between 1950 and 1970 (Warren 1973:25) This 
meant a shift in importance in the indigenous economy away from 
export of primary commodities to the export of manufactured 
goods. In Latin America, manufacturing exports as a percentage of 
the total increased from 10% in 1955, to 40% by 1975 (Hoogvelt 
1982:29). The- transformation of the Irish economy was to be part 
of this international process.
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1.Modernization: Rapid Transition.
This expansion itself coincided with the movement towards 
political independence of the former colonial countries. In the 
first six years of the sixties alone, 38 nations achieved 
independence. The combination of these political and economic 
changes led to heightened expectations about the prospects for 
full scale industrialization along the lines of the already 
industrialized countries. These expectations were themselves 
fuelled by capitalist governments supplying technical and 
economic assistance through the IMF and World Bank in the form of 
"aid". A phalanx of aid agencies , UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, ILO, 
emerged in the capitalist world to tackle the problem of third 
world development.
Planning agencies were established in many "developing" 
countries, with financial assistance, whose role it was to draw 
up "programmes" for national development. The ESRI, established 
with the assistance of the Ford Foundation, is an example. Formal 
trade agreements between capitalist and underdeveloped countries 
such as The Alliance for Progress between the United States and 
Latin America in 1961, involved an investment of an estimated $20 
billion of American capital in Latin America in exchange for 
guarantees for the security of American enterprise in those 
countries (Horowitz 1970:45)
This prospect of planned economic development for whole 
continents, along with the provision of material aid also 
involved a theoretical component which eventually gave rise to a
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whole new academic discipline of "Development Studies" concerned 
with the broad issues of development. The basic premise 
underlying this discipline, and one which inspired development 
assistance, was the belief, expressed succinctly by one of its 
major protagonists Daniel Lemer, that "The model of western 
modernization has universal applicability and relevance, it shows 
certain components and sequences whose relevence is global" 
(1958:46) .
The idea here then is that the manner in which modern capitalist 
society evolved out of pre-capitalist society, the modernization 
process, is a sequence of logical stages through which all 
modernizing societies must pass. Pre-capitalist or "traditional" 
societies as they became known, once integrated into the world 
capitalist market, would follow the course of the already 
industrialized countries. The task of the development expert then 
is to draw up a simple outline of western economic development 
which can act as a blueprint for development elsewhere. The 
characteristics of each underdeveloped country are matched 
against the ideal typical features of development and the extent 
to which each country falls short of the ideal is the distance of 
development to be travelled. The most influential of such 
attempts is undoubtedly Walter Rostow's The Stages of Economic 
Growth (1960). In this book Rostow attempted to set out in simple 
form, the sequence of stages on the path to modern development. 
"The stages", argued Rostow, "are not merely descriptions. They 
have an analytic bone-structure rooted in the dynamic theory of 
production"(1960:12).
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III. BOURGEOIS SOCIAL THEORY AND THE TRANSITION
This conceptualization of historical development in terms of a 
series of evolutionary stages, each with its own distinct 
worldview, does not originate with modernization theory. The 
contrast between what are taken to be the characteristics of 
modern society and those of pre-modem society, underlies much 
modern social theory. Auguste Comte, considered to be the 
founding father of sociology, divided the history of mankind into 
three stages; the theological, the metaphysical and the 
scientific. Later social theorists attempted to describe more 
clearly those characteristics which distinguish modern from pre­
modern society. In terms of social integration, Ferdinand Tonnies 
distinguished between "Community" in traditional society and 
"Association" in modern society. Max Weber similarly drew a 
distinction between the objective form of rationality governing 
behavour in modern society and the value form governing 
traditional society.
These distinctions themselves derive from the vast amount of 
research into the transition from pre-modern to modern industrial 
society. This transition involves a combination of economic, 
political and cultural development each of which is seen to have 
its own evolution. Certain broad, common characteristics are 
evident however and leave their imprint on modernization theory. 
There is Liberalism in the general political and economic sense 
which involves a rejection of the authority of tradition in 
favour of rationalized authority. Politically this means the 
democratization of society, the transfer of power from the few to
the many, and the involvement of the masses in the political 
process. Related to this is economic liberty, the freedom of the 
market and the absence of restraint upon the purchase and sale of 
goods and labour.
This combination of developments is believed to be part of the 
logic of the evolution of modern society regardless of time or 
place. Because it has no concept of development other than that 
which is believed to characterize western industrial society,
it offers a misleading explanation of changes occurring in 
countries like Ireland. Policies which lead to development in one 
era or country can prevent development in another country, and 
because of the uneveness of development, the concepts of 
traditional and modern lose any explanatory value. A critique of 
the evolutionary aspect of development must be preceded by a 
closer examination of each of the key aspects.
l.The Sovereignty of The Market.
Economically the origin of modern society is believed to begin 
with the operation of the free market. Adam Smith argued that 
given the right circumstances of political liberty, a natural 
effort of everyone to better their condition materially will, 
combined with "a propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one 
thing for another", lead inevitably to an increase in the wealth 
of nations (1974:117). Smith's reasoning here was that self 
interest acts as a driving power to guide men to whatever work 
society is willing to pay for. However, a community activated
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only by self interest would quickly become a despotism. 
Competition in Smith's view was what prevented this. A man who 
lets his self interest run away with him by charging too much 
will find that competitors have moved in to take his trade from 
him. The result then, of self interest tempered by competition, 
is the provision of those goods society wants, in the quantities 
it desires and at the prices it is prepared to pay.
This inevitably in Smith's view would lead to an accumulation 
of capital because this was, he argued, the best way to reduce 
costs. Competition then inevitably leads to an increase in the
wealth of society by increasing the productivity of labour
through its division into specialized tasks. Thus by the 
operation of an "invisible hand" the selfish motives of 
individuals are transformed into the common good. Extend this 
theory onto the international level and we get an explanation of 
the development of capitalism. The basic problem here, as Robert 
Brenner points out, is that the theory presupposes the existence 
of capitalist social relations (1977:35). It assumes firstly a 
free mobility of labour and competition which forces an increase 
in the productivity of labour and secondly that through continued 
specialization productivity will continued to be improved.
2.Civil Society.
Politically the beginning of modern society is marked by the 
overthrow of the absolutist state and the gradual 
democratization of the political process. Liberty in the market
place is connected with political liberty. The kind of economic
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organization that provides economic freedom also promotes 
political freedom, argues Milton Friedman, because it separates 
economic power from political power (1962:9) [7]. A society with 
an increasingly complex economy needs a non-arbitrary system of 
government. What was established through revolutionary action in 
England, and later in other countries, was a system whereby the 
government was placed in a form of market situation. The 
government was treated as the supplier of goods necessary for the 
smooth operation of the free market capitalist economy. The
government could then be made responsive to the demands of those 
it was expected to cater for, by making them subject to periodic 
elections at which they could be "cashiered for misconduct" in 
the immortal words of Dr Price [8],
Thus the liberal state was a system of multiple parties whereby 
governments could be held responsible to different sections of 
society who had a vote. The job of the competitive party system
was to keep the government responsive to changes in the nature of
market society. To make the choice an effective one, certain
other liberties were required; freedom of association, freedom to 
form political parties, freedom of the press, freedom of speech 
etc. It was these freedoms which insured the gradual 
incorporation of all sections of society into the political 
process. The gradual accumulation of capital then had as its
eventual result the political confrontation of the two leading
economic interests in society, the bourgeoise and the working
class.
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Political democracy however was not the basis upon which 
liberalism or civil society developed. The opposite was the
case. Democracy did not come until after the liberal state was
established and the capitalist market was in operation. The
function of democracy was to ensure the reproduction of
capitalist social relations and the operation of the free 
market. However in a situation where long-term structural 
transformations to lay the basis for economic development are 
required, liberal democracy may prove an obstacle. The extension 
of this political scenario outside of the industrial European 
countries depended upon a similar type of economic development.
However, as nineteenth century European history shows us, the 
extension of the capitalist market into non-capitalist areas did 
not result in the establishment of capitalist relations of 
production. In Ireland, for example, integration into the British 
capitalist economy did not lead to a development similar to that 
which was occurring in Britain. This created a different set of 
social relations and different interests which in turn became the 
basis for a different politics. Because of this, Irish politics 
cannot be understood within the same framework as the politics of 
industrial society.
IV. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE TRANSITION IN IRELAND
1.Economic.
The application of this modernization model to Irish 
development presupposed, as we explained, the smooth transition 
to industrial society. Unfortunately however, the expected
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transition has not occurred in the manner in which the planners 
and intellectuals thought it would. For well over a decade it has 
become evident that while dramatic changes have occurred, their 
effects have been much more uneven than was anticipated. Taking 
the twin aspects of the economic plan we can see this clearly. 
The dramatic decrease of 19% in the agricultural workforce was 
only partly compensated by a 7% increase in industrial workers 
(Blackwell 1982:47). The result was that the extra workers were 
absorbed into the service and state sectors. Between 1960 and 
1980 public service employment expanded by 62% (Rothman & 
0"Connel 1982:67). The task of financing this, combined with the 
provision of huge financial incentives to the multinationals who 
caused this displacement, involved the state in a massive 
increase in public spending. For example, between the years 1958 
and 1972, the ratio of state expenditure (current and capital) to 
GNP rose from 27% to 42% (Parker & Driver 1975:2).
This decrease in productive workers combined with an increase 
in public spending made possible by foreign borrowing ran totally 
counter to government planning programmes. Indeed the extent to 
which later development diverged from the economic programme
makes questionable the exact function of economic planning in
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Ireland. The 1958 Programme for Economic Expansion had' stated 
that in future "Any external borrowing will be confined to the 
financing of productive projects" (Backwell 1982:53). In fact a 
lot of the government investment of this era went into 
establishing the infrastructure for multinational investment; 
telephone systems, roads, etc. The expected linkages that these
multinationals were to generate with the local economy never 
really developed. Only 16% of inputs on average are purchased 
locally while in some cases the figure is as low as 3% (Kelly 
1984:17).
When this type of investment began to go elsewhere, the state 
was involved in massive financial commitments with a decreasing 
economic base from which to pay it. The governments ability to 
reverse this downward spiral was negligible, given its dependence 
on the international situation. Irish exports as a percentage of 
total manufacture rose from 17.1% in 1958 to 54.4% in 1980.
| Whiled on the other hand the overall labour force was 50,000 less 
in 1979 than in 1951 (Rottman & O'Connell 1982:69). The 
possibility of planning economic development within this 
framework became very unlikely. Indeed such was Ireland's 
dependence that as one economist had it, economic development 
became less a matter of good planning than "a matter of good 
marketing"(0'Hearn 1986:10).
The impact of these changes upon the Irish social structure was 
not quite what was envisaged either. Society undoubtedly became 
more urbanized but the urban proletariat which was supposed to 
develop on this basis has not materialized. In fact the 
multinational penetration has contributed to a shift in the 
balance of employment away from working class and small 
farmer,towards lower middle class white collar jobs (Rottman & 
O'Connell 1982:72). This itself is a symptom of a much more 
fundamental shift in the Irish economy away from a basis in
agrarian radicalism and native industry towards large farmers, 
merchants, state functionaries and foreign capital. This new 
economic situation expresses itself in a cleavage between the 
modern hi-tech economy and the traditional agricultural economy 
which seem to have little connection with each other. The 
connection only becomes apparent when some crisis lays bare the 
skeleton of Irish society. The crisis caused by poor harvests of 
1984 and 1985 revealed the almost pre-Newtonian character of the 
Irish economy. Similarly the "aid" package which accompanied the 
Hillsborough agreement was another example of Ireland's Homeland 
status within the European Community [9].
2.Political.
The cleavage in Irish society fails to find expression in 
class terms and is expressed instead in the division between 
the so-called modern progressive elements in society, based on 
the hi-tech economic enclave and having a definite interest in 
the dominance of foreign capital, and the traditional elements, 
workers, small farmers etc supporting native enterprise. Ireland 
is seen as a dual society in which a transition to modern 
society depends upon the extension of the values of the core or 
modern area to the outlying traditional periphery. Ireland, in 
the considered view of political theorist Tom Garvin is a 
"periphery dominated centre". Normal political development in 
Ireland is, he argues, "complicated by the tendency of Westerners 
to move East and to bring their political culture and loyalties 
with them" (1974:313). What is at basis an economic problem 
then, has been displaced, in typical Irish fashion, on to the
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cultural level.
The shortcomings of this evolutionary theory of modernization 
in Ireland can be seen in relation to the question of 
nationalism. A major tenet of modernization, as was explained 
earlier } is the idea that nationalism or "civil war politics" is 
an anachronism in the era of European integration when the nation 
state is allegedly becoming obsolete. Nationalism is 
anachronistic because it places outworn cultural ideals above 
material self interest. It supposedly fails to appreciate that 
economic self interest is furthered through international 
integration and not through struggles between nations.
Nationalism in the Republic is seen from this perspective as a 
sentiment of those traditional elements yet to be converted to a 
modern outlook. The understanding of the situation in Ireland 
then seems to constantly resolve itself into the two extremes of 
nationalism and modernization. The irony is of course that the 
current crisis is beginning to be seen as a direct result of 
those policies of international integration and nationalism is 
being seen again in a positive role. Beyond the antinomies of 
nationalism and modernization however intellectual life in 
Ireland ceases to exist.
Yet while a historical analysis will show that nationalism 
offers no long term solution to problems in Ireland it will also 
show that nationalism was not the cause of those problems.
Nationalism, it will be argued here, was a response, albeit an
inadequate one, to the problem of colonialism which confronted
Ireland during the emergence of modern society. In industrial
22
society, as we saw, once the accumulation of capital had attained 
a momentum of its own, a complex of subsidiary institutions 
developed around it competing for influence. These institutions 
themselves acted as a buffer between the state and the mass of 
the people. It was on the basis of these that political parties 
developed.
In the pre-industrial formation, the social basis for these 
types of institution did not exist. In these social formations 
state action was virtually unmediated. It is into this vacuum 
that the nationalist movement as a mediator between people and 
colonial state originates. The extent to which class politics 
supercedes nationalism then will depend upon the extent to which 
the social basis for nationalism is replaced. One part of the 
analysis of the transition will be concerned with the extent to 
which this occurred.
The situation in the North is further overdetermined by the 
colonial issue. The Unionist population there defends a dependent 
relationship with Britain in order to secure a dominant position 
within the society. The modernization process in the North has 
undermined this dominant position and provoked a reaction by 
Unionists. This further exacerbates nationalism because the 
nationalist working class in the North recognize that the only 
way they will achieve basic liberties is through a defeat of 
Unionism which means British withdrawal.
3.Catholic Church.
The continuing importance of religion and the Church is the
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other aspect which modernization has failed to properly explain. 
The power of the Catholic Church to mobilize people against the 
abortion and divorce issues came as an embarrassment to people 
long schooled in modernization theory. No doubt the spectacle of 
the faithful from the "thin faced parishes" of rural Ireland 
flocking to see moving statues, reassuared them that Irish 
Catholicism is after alT"’ a peasant phenomenon. All the 
indications however are to the contrary. The Catholic Church is 
very much part of the fabric of Ireland of the multinationals. 
Indeed, in an era when the other great cohesive force in Irish 
society, nationalism, is becoming a divisive issue, Catholicism 
as a cross class ideology becomes all the more important. The 
fracturing of society in the modernization process creates the 
need for a binding force which Catholicism attempts to be.
Can it be said therefore that the Catholic Church is an 
obstacle to change. The question we are concerned with here is 
the extent to which the Catholic Church affected the transition 
to capitalist society. The Protestant ethic thesis of capitalist 
development expressed by Max Weber and others before him holds 
that the Catholic Church acts as an obstacle to development of a 
vigorous bourgeois economic outlook. In Ireland, one version of 
this thesis was argued by Horace Plunkett at the turn -of the 
century. Plunkett held that Catholicism retarded the development 
of an achieving ethos which was, in his view, an essential 
precondition for the development of capitalism: "the reliance of
that religion on authority, its repression of individuality, and 
its complete shifting of what I may call the moral centre of
gravity to a future existence... appear to me calculated , unless 
supplemented by other influences, to check the growth of the 
qualities of initiative and self-reliance"(1905:101). Another 
version of this argument was put forward by Emmett Larkin (1976) 
who attributed the lack of capital accumuation in nineteenth 
century Ireland to the appropriation of surplus by the church in 
its building programme.
The power of the Catholic church in Ireland however cannot be 
taken as evidence of an obstructionary role even if one accepts 
Smith's idea about the importance of the entreprenurial ethos 
The colonial situation in Ireland effectively prevented the 
emergence of a native bourgeoisie and its characteristic
institutions which had in capitalist countries deposed the 
church. The church was then in the position of power due to the 
colonial position, which at the same time threatened this
position by total integration. To become totally British would 
secularize society while independence and the development of
bourgeois society would also challenge its influence. Either a 
total colonization or total independence then threatened the 
powerful mediating position of the church.
This contradiction within the church can be seen in its role in
the educational system where a process of colonization was 
combined with the maintainance of a separate identity. If we
accept Robert Brenner's contention (1977:78)that the development 
of capitalism required initially the creation of the social
conditions for capitalist development then the question of the 
role of the church must focus on the extent to which it helped to
maintain existing social relations.
4.Nationalism: The Return of The Repressed.
Despite the collapse of the economic, political and cultural 
expectations generated by the "development era" there has as yet 
been no serious attempt to reappraise the intellectual premises 
upon which they stood. Economic policy is still based upon an 
open market philosophy despite Ireland's obvious competitive 
disadvantage and the consequences of this disadvantage. 
Politically the five major parties in the Republic have been 
unable to formulate a vision of any alternative future for their 
society.
They have not been helped in this by an intelligentsia 
which remains imprisoned within a theory of social development 
which is of little relevance to the Irish situation. The idea of 
'Ireland "catching up" with the rest of Europe is still the 
dominant image. There seems to be implicit faith in the idea that 
closer integration with Europe will necessarily mean a similar 
type of development. And yet if anything is evidenced from the 
study of Irish history it is that closer integration with 
economically more advanced areas does not guarantee a similar 
type of development. The Union of Ireland and Britain in 1801 was 
not followed by a similar form of development in both countries. 
The failure of the policies of recent decades shows a structural 
continuity with the past.
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It was precisely this argument, as was indicated above, which 
was fundamental to nationalist historiography in that it 
attributed Ireland's underdevelopment to British imperialism. "A 
nation cannot" argued Arthur Griffith, "promote and further its 
civilization and its social progress equally as well by 
exchanging agricultural products for manufactured goods as by 
establishing a manufacturing power of its own"(Probert 1978.38) 
The source of Griffith's inspiration was the German economist 
Fredrich List who had argued that German economic development and 
the principles of classical political economy were not 
compatible. Griffith founded Sinn Fein to further this argument 
in Ireland. The movement of Irish nationalism then carried with 
it an alternative vision of development to that of the accepted 
capitalist one.
In this sense Irish nationalism is bound up with the anti- 
colonial movement of this century and the struggle against 
imperialism and can only be understood in this context. The 
struggle against modernization philosophy in the present era is 
in many ways an extension of this anti-imperialist struggle. The 
same issues are involved here, namely, whether the development of 
underdeveloped countries, cultural, political and economic is
f
promoted by integration into the capitalist system. The struggle 
in Ireland is again very much part of the international one and 
the whole discourse of modernization in Ireland cannot be 
understood outside of this international context. It is to this 
international context we must now turn to locate the Irish 
debate.
The impact that the capitalist model of development has had 
upon Irish intellectual life through modernization theory is all 
pervasive. The image of the free market as the agent of progress 
is one example. There is a failure among historians and 
economists in Ireland to understand the contradictory nature of 
the impact of the market on an underdeveloped country such as 
Ireland. This contradiction means that the availability of the 
products and services of capitalist society is incompatible with 
the requirements of capitalist accumulation.
Politically the influence of the modernization model is evident 
in the inability to account for the anomalies of the Irish 
situation. Despite the ostensible existence of a liberal 
democratic system, many aspects of the Irish political process 
contradict this. The persistence of brokerage or clientelist type 
politics in Ireland and the failure of class politics to find 
institutional expression points to a more fundamental structural 
difference in Irish society. This structural difference derives 
from the contradiction between the integration of Ireland into 
the international capitalist system and the requirements of 
economic development. Ireland's integration into the system has 
produced a^  form of liberal democracy. This form of political 
process evolved as part of the development of capitalist society. 
Whether this political system is compatible with the long term 
planning requirements of underdeveloped countries is debatable.
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V. UNDERDEVELOPMENT, THE COLLAPSE OF MODERNIZATION
AND THE MARXIST THEORY OF TRANSITION.
One could show further examples of where the modernization 
model of development has been unable to explain the uneven 
character of development in Ireland. The development of the Irish 
economy and society has followed a path different from that of 
the developed industrial countries and requires a different 
theoretical model to adequately understand it. Ireland is not 
alone in this development. Despite the expectations generated by 
development experts, it has for a long time been obvious that in 
the so-called developing world, the type of development expected 
is not actually taking place. Of an estimated four billion people 
in the world in 1978, 2,200 million lived in 39 countries whose
per capita income was less than $360 per annum. The American 
figure at this time was $9,590 (Hoogvelt 1982:17). Instead of 
following the path already traced by the developed countries, 
they are, as one economist put it, going through "a process that 
economies that have achieved a high level of development have not 
necessarily passed" (Furtado 1973:34) This is to say that 
underdeveloped countries are not simply at the stage that the 
developed countries were at two centuries ago, but are rather 
going through a particular type of development process themselves 
which can be described as underdevelopment.
Economically, underdevelopment is characterized by
underemployment, both quantitively in terms of unemployment and 
qualitively in terms of low productivity of labour. In the 
underdeveloped economy agriculture and raw materials exporting
29
tends to predominate, while manufactured goods in general tend to 
be imported. The other side of this is the importance of 
multinational enclaves within the economy, exporting high 
productivity goods. The underdeveloped economy then tends to 
divide between a modern and a traditional sector. Politically, 
underdevelopment is characterized by the incorporation of the 
masses into the political project of the ruling class, and the 
absence of an institutionalized socialist opposition. Culturally, 
underdevelopment is often characterized by the dominance of other 
loyalties other than class, whether they be regional, linguistic 
or religious. In this case a church or a quasi-nationalist 
movement can provide the framework within which people 
collectively express their differences.
The idea that capitalism and development can be incompatible is 
not new. We have already identified it as an aspect of early 
Irish nationalism. The success of the communist revolutions in 
Russia, China and Cuba, in avoiding the path of underdevelopment 
lent weight to this argument. In the aftermath of the second 
world war when modernization theory was in the ascendent, an 
attempt was made to link the political and economic struggle in 
the colonies. It was argued that development could not follow 
unless economic independence was combined with political 
independence. The Bandung conference of African and Asian 
countries in 1955 established a non-aligned block of countries 
outside of the East-West confrontation. Leaders like Abdul Gamel 
Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru of India, as leaders of this 
movement, became internationally powerful.
In theoretical support of this position the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA.) argued that 
conventional economic theory as expounded in developed capitalist 
countries was inadequate for dealing with the problems of 
underdevelopment. Its president Raul Prebisch argued that primary 
products, upon which underdeveloped countries depended, were 
faced with a long-term secular decline in their terms of trade. 
This resulted partly from the fact that the industrial countries' 
income elasticity for these exports was declining while the 
underdeveloped countries' income elasticity for manufactured 
goods was increasing (Prebisch 1950).
It was this political development and especially the colonial 
wars of the 1950s and 1960s that lead to a refocusing of anti­
imperialist theory on the non-capitalist world. The increasing 
contrast between the industrial west and underdeveloped third 
world and the contrast between the militancy of sections of the 
underdeveloped world and the quiescent workers movements in the 
west, led to a revision of socialist economics and an emphasis 
upon the "third world" as the possible source of international 
change. The most prominent among the earliest of these economists 
were Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran. Baran in his 
The Political Economy of Growth (1957), working within a Marxist 
framework, attempted to explain the failure of the transition to 
capitalist society in the underdeveloped world in terms of a 
modern theory of imperialism. To understand the basis of this we 
must understand the basis of Marxist political economy.
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1.Marxist political economy.
The object of analysis of Marx' major work, Capital, was the 
capitalist mode of production. Marx saw the evolution of society 
in terms of a succession of modes of production. A mode of 
production is characterized by the manner in which the surplus 
produced in society is appropriated and distributed. Upon this 
basis the social relations within which people live are 
determined [10]. The capitalist mode of production is 
characterised by generalized commodity production in which 
society is divided into two classes, the bourgeoisie, owning the 
means of production, and the proletariat owning nothing but their 
labour power.
Marx saw capitalism as a historically specific mode of
production which was preceded by feudalism and would be succeeded
by communism. In contrast to Smith and other bourgeoise
economists Marx saw the entrepreneurial ethos as a product of
capitalism and not as its basis. Because of this historical
approach, an important part of the analysis of capitalism in
Capital was the dynamic or dialectic which impelled the system
forward. Because he was dealing with capitalism in Britain, Marx
in Capital was concerned specifically with the transition from
/
feudalism to capitalism and from capitalism to communism. 
Elsewhere he looked at the problem of the transition of non- 
Feudal societies to capitalism. This difference is of great 
importance in the Irish case where Feudal society never really 
existed.
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The transition from feudalism to capitalism has traditionally 
been a subject of debate among Marxist historians. Controversy 
has centered on the relative importance of economic and political 
factors in the transformation. The first approach represented by 
Paul Sweezy (1975) and others, emphasizes the corrosive effect 
of mercantile activity atlfl commercialization upon the feudal 
system. "The root cause of the decline of feudalism was the 
growth of trade" he argued. The alternative approach represented 
by Maurice Dobb (1975) and Robert Brenner (1974) among others
emphasizes the importance of the transformation of production 
relations, the creation of a proletariat and bourgeoisie. 
Mercantile activity can explain how more of what is produced is 
turned into commodities, but it does not- explain how and why 
labour itself should become a commodity.
This seems to have been the position adopted by Marx on the 
question. "The process therefore which creates the capital- 
relation" Marx argued "can be nothing other than the process 
which divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of 
his own labour; it is a process which operates two
transformations, whereby the social means of subsistence and 
production are turned into capital, and the immediate producers 
are turned into wage-labourers". In Chapter 2 the question of
how the transition occurred in England is discussed in more
detail.
The transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe involved 
the expansion of European influence worldwide. This automatically
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raises the question of the worldwide expansion of the capitalist 
system. That this was a logical development was accepted by the 
early classical economists and even Marx himself. In 
The Communist Manifesto he argued that capitalism "creates a 
world after its own image". "England has to fulfill a double 
mission in India" he argued in Capital vol 3 "one destructive, 
the other regenerating --the annihilation of old Asiatic society 
and the laying of the material foundation of Western society in 
Asia"(1972:327).
However if we accept that feudalism did not exist in the areas 
where the European powers colonized, we must also accept that the 
contradiction within the feudal system which laid the basis for 
capitalism would be absent. The agent for the transformation, in 
this case, Marx argued would be commercialization. "The cheap 
prices of its [capitalism's] commodities are the heavy artillery 
with which it batters down all Chinese walls"(1967:84). This idea 
that commercialization alone could lead to a transition to 
capitalist society was of course precisely the argument he had 
opposed in relation to European society.
2.World System Theorists: The Primacy of Exchange.
Within Marx's own model of capitalist expansion it has-however 
been possible to explain the failure of the capitalist mode of 
production to develop in colonial societies. Several versions of 
this neo-Marxist theory of underdevelopment have been in 
currency. These can be distinguished from each other by the 
manner in which they define the capitalist system itself. The
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first group are what can be called the "world system" theorists, 
among whom Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank are the 
best known. Wallerstein defines the world system as "a single 
division of labour comprising multiple systems, multiple 
political entities and even different modes of surplus 
appropriation"(1980:5). The basic concept Wallerstein and Frank 
are working with here is that of surplus utilization on which 
Paul Baran had founded his theory of capitalist development. 
Baran's argument was that the rate and direction of economic 
development in a country depends on the size and mode of 
utilization of the economic surplus (1957:158). The economic 
surplus is the difference between a society's output and its 
consumption.
Baran’s basic argument was that in underdeveloped countries, 
imperialism had created a wide gap between the "actual" surplus 
and the "potential" surplus which could be mobilized to generate 
an independent economic development (1957:132). Starting from 
this proposition the world system theorists argue that capitalism 
is an international system of exchange divided into a core of 
developed countries and a periphery of underdeveloped countries. 
The core countries have developed because they have appropriated 
the surplus of the underdeveloped countries. As Frank puts it 
"the metropolis expropriates economic surplus from its 
satellites and appropriates it for its own economic development. 
The satellites remain underdeveloped for lack of access to their 
own surplus"(1971:33). Development and underdevelopment then are 
part of a single economic structure and process which we call
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capitalism.
A number of conclusions follow from this analysis which are 
relevant for the Irish situation. Firstly this theory of 
underdevelopment agrees in certain respects with the nationalist 
theory which attributed Ireland's underdeveloped state to the 
transfer of the economic surplus out of the country by absentee 
landlords in the past and through the national debt today. 
Secondly, following from this, it is argued that breaking the 
connection with international capitalism will lead to an 
independent capitalist development. Frank argues that the 
underdeveloped countries experience "their most classically 
capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to the 
metropolis are weakest"(1970:10).
3.Mode of Production: The Primacy of Class Struggle.
The world system theory then by emphasizing the importance of 
exchange in the process of development and underdevelopment uses 
a similar argument to that which explained the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in terms of the growth of trade. As 
against this other Marxist political economists such as Robert 
Brenner, Maurice Dobb and Ernesto Laclau, have emphasized the 
importance of the transformation of social relations <as the 
motive force behind economic development. Laclau's criticism of 
Frank is that he "totally dispenses with relations of production 
in his definitions of capitalism and feudalism"(1977:23).The idea 
that development depends upon the appropriation of surplus 
through colonialism is not compatible with the Marxist view of
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capitalist development as a function of the tendency towards 
capital accumulation via an increase in the productivity of 
labour, which is itself a product of the class relations of free 
wage labour.
Thus the mode of utilization of the surplus is itself
determined by the manner in which the surplus is appropriated 
from the direct producers. Only by explaining the obstacles to
the transition to the conditions of competitive wage labour, or
in other words to a different form of surplus appropriation, will 
we explain the causes of underdevelopment. Thus the development 
of capitalism is determined by the outcome of a class struggle in 
which, as Brenner puts it, "the methods the extractors were 
obliged to use to increase their surplus corresponded..to the 
needs of development of the productive forces"(1977:68).
Our essential task then, in the following chapters, is to
construct a critique of the modernization theory of transition 
from a Marxist perspective. The first stage in this will be an 
analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in 
England and the various theories offered to explain this. The 
next step is to look at the colonization of the Gaelic clan 
society in Ireland and the creation of colonial society out of a 
fusion of two different social formations. Having done this we 
can examine different explanations of this period in terms of 
the debate between Marxists and classical theorists on the 
question of the transition to capitalism. Within this broad 
framework the contributions of Irish historians, nationalists and 
modernizationists, can be situated. Once the terms of this debate
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are established, the succeeding chapters will seek to build the 
argument against the modernization approach in terms of specific 
conditions in Ireland and the failure of the transition to 
industrial society.
NOTES
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[1] The Labour party even dropped the phrase "Workers Republic" 
from its constitution in the 1930s on request of the Hierarchy. 
(Donal Nevin "Labour and the Political Revolution" in F.Mc Manus 
ed 1968 p.65)
[2], See B.Chubb and P.Lynch (1969) for the civil service view of 
this era. The quotation is from Lynch, page 118.
[3] "In 1948, the Americans made Ireland an offer it couldn't 
refuse: ECA counterpart funds, or "Marshall Aid". Before any 
dollars were committed, negotiations took place about the 
preconditions that would make Ireland "worthy" of aid... In order 
to receive Marshall Aid treland had been forced to join the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)" (O'Hearn 
1986.3-5).
[4] By a strange irony what may have been the final assault in 
that siege, "Constitutional Crusade", was also lead by the 
Taoiseach Garrett Fitzgerald.
[5] "it was less the lack of mineral than of mental resources 
that inflicted on Ireland the slowest rate of growth of national 
income in western Europe"(Lee 1973.35).
[6] Hayter (1971) provides a comprehensive overview of the 
political nature of these institutions. "The Fund (IMF) clearly 
promoting the United States' point of view began to see its major 
objective not as the provision of additional international 
liquidity freely available to members, but as the achievement of 
the multilateralization of trade and the elimination of currency 
restrictions." (1971.38).
[7] "The kind of economic organization that provides economic 
freedom directly, namely competitive capitalism, also promotes 
political freedom because it separates economic power from
political power and in this way enables one to offset the other."
(Friedman 1962.9).
[8] This demand was quoted disapprovingly by Edmund Burke in his 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1975.279). It was taken 
up again and supported by Thomas Paine in his Rights of Man 
(1969) in opposition to Burke and what Paine called "The vanity 
and presumption of governing beyond the grave" (1969.63)
[9] "Aid", says Hayter, "is in general available to countries 
whose internal political arrangements, foreign policy alignments, 
treatment of foreign private investment, debt-servicing record, 
export policies, and so on, are considered desirable, potentially
desirable, or at least acceptable, by the countries or
institutions providing aid" (1971.15).
[10] "The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour 
is pumped out of the direct producers determines the relations of 
rulers and ruled. (Marx 1974.791)
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THE TRANSITION FROM FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM:
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CLASS STRUGGLE 
AND COMMERCIALIZATION.
Wealth, howsoever got, in England makes 
Lords of Mechanics, gentlemen of rakes.
Antiquity and birth are needless here,
'Tis impudence and money makes a peer.
-D.DEFOE, The True-born Englishman
I. TRANSITION DEBATE
Because the nature of the pre-capitalist mode of production is 
an important determinant of the type of development which follows 
it, an understanding of the mode of production prior to the 
development of capitalism is of crucial importance. In England, 
where the transition first occurred, feudalism was the dominant 
mode of production. Much of the subsequent debate about the 
transition therefore has tended to use England as the model for 
future development. The work of Karl Marx is a case in point. It 
is important in this context to bear in mind however that because 
England was the first society to make the transition its 
development was in fact in many respects unique. Alone of all the 
capitalist societies the transition there was not confronted by 
another developed capitalist society. It differs further from 
colonial societies because combined with the fact that those 
countries are attempting to develop in competition with 
capitalist countries it must also be remembered that modes of 
production other than feudalism preceded colonialism in those 
societies.
CHAPTER 2 .
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The point at issue here in the debate on the transition is 
whether commercialization, the increase in trade and the power of 
merchants, was the motive force of the transition or whether it 
was itself the result of other more fundamental developments. 
Paul Sweezy (1976) holds that "the root cause of the decline of 
feudalism was the growth of trade (1976:41). As against this it 
is argued that that these developments were the outcome of a 
struggle between the landed interest and the peasantry in which 
landlords were forced to increase relative rather than absolute 
surplus value. The enormous increase in labour productivity, 
which was what capitalism essentially was, was brought about by a 
combination of circumstances which meant that such an increase
was the only option for those wishing to increase their surplus.
In other words, as Robert Brenner points out, the new mode of 
surplus appropriation forced an accumulation of capital.
It was this contradiction whereby the thwarting of the 
landlord interest lead to a development of the productive forces 
which, it is argued, was the motor force behind the other 
developments. The commercialization of society which occurred 
during this era, which Sweezy (1976) and Moore (1966) holds to be 
the determinant of change, was in Brenner's and Dobb's view, 
simply the result of a more fundamental change in-' social 
relations. Moore argues that, "Among the most decisive
determinants influencing the course of subsequent evolution are 
whether or not the landed aristocracy has turned to commercial 
agriculture and, if so, the form this commercialization has
taken"(1966:419). This, in Brenner’view, is to mistake an effect
for a cause. In other words production for the market in itself 
does not necessarily lead to an increase in agricultural 
productivity and the development of industry.
The contrast between the transition in capitalist society and 
the failure of development in colonial society clearly shows 
this. The basic difference according to the Dobb-Brenner thesis 
is that the contradiction or conflict between the classes in 
society did not lead to an accumulation of capital. After 
colonial society was established, the power of the landed 
interest was such that the surplus could be increased by 
forcefully squeezing the peasantry: in other words by increasing
the absolute as opposed to the relative surplus value. Thus, in 
this sense the transition or what Marx described as the era of 
primitive accumulation was less the accumulation of money than 
the creation of the social relations of capitalist development.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LORD AND PEASANT IN
THE DESTRUCTION OF FEUDALISM.
The origins of feudalism in Britain date back to the demise of 
the Roman colony there. The Roman Empire, through its military 
apparatus, had imposed a degree of centralization and unification 
within the territories it controlled. After its breakup in the 
early Middle Ages, this centralized authority which had ti'ed most 
of Western Europe together, disintegrated. In its aftermath was 
left a multiplicity of parcelized statelets each operating in a 
more or less autonomous manner. The basic unit of the feudal 
system was the manor. Around this nucleus a subject peasantry 
cultivated the soil, the surplus from which was appropriated by
the Lord or vassel. Around this basic structure a complex social 
system developed the chief characteristic of which was its 
ecclesiastical nature [1].
Brenner's and Dobb's argument now is that within this feudal 
system, a basic contradiction between landlords and serfs or 
peasantry was developing which was eventually to undermine the 
whole system and to create the conditions for capitalist 
development. The resolution of this contradiction in England 
involved the gradual commercialization and demilitarization of 
the English landed aristocracy, the enclosure of land and the 
expulsion of the peasantry. It involved the centralization of 
state structures and the usurpation of ecclesiastical authority. 
As against this Sweezy and others argue that it was the prior 
expansion of trade, first after the Crusades and later after the 
colonization of the Americas, which lead to the dissolution of 
feudalism by offering an escape route for oppressed peasants; 
"the rise "of towns, which were the centres and breeders of 
exchange economy, opened up to the servile population of the 
countryside the prospect of a freer and better life"(1976:43).
1.Growth of the cash nexus and peasant power.
Until the early middle ages no significant economic 
developments had taken place since the end of the Neolithic 
revolution, circa 2500 B.C. Society then suddenly began to find 
its way out of this impasse. The water wheel began to be applied 
to a number of industrial processes. Sailing, printing, spinning 
and agriculture were all revolutionized. Indeed the Middle Ages,
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suggests one writer, "introduced machinery into Europe on a scale 
no civilization had previously known"(Gimpel 1976:1) The extent 
of this revolution can be gauged partly from its effect on the 
population which is estimated to have doubled between 1000 and 
1300 A.D (Hunt& Sherman 1981:13). Its impact upon relations 
between Lord and serf was complex. The general increase in output 
made a larger surplus available to the Lords. This promoted 
commercialization and the consumption of luxury goods, spices 
etc, which were available as a result of the crusades.
This increase in commercialization lead to a substitution of 
money rents for labour services required of the serf or a 
"commutation of dues" as it is called. It also increased the 
demand for English wool, "the most sought after wool in 
Europe"(Gimpel 1975:46), which competed with serfs for use of 
land and thus placed the nobility in a strong position relative 
to the serfs.As the population increased there was an increase in 
the demand and the price of food due to demand and a lowering of 
the price of labour due to its abundance. An increase in the 
overall wealth therefore, was combined with an immiseration of a 
large section of the population. This circumstance more than any 
accounts for the devastation of the Black Plague which in 1348 
claimed an average of 40% of the population of Europe -(Gimpel 
1975:211).
The century following the plague was something of a golden age 
for those who survived. The population was virtually halved and 
the stock of capital doubled. The price of wheat was halved in 
some areas while the price of labour was increased which meant a
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significant increase in incomes (Abel 1968:216). This high cost 
of labour combined with the low cost of food considerably 
strengthened the position of serfs as against landlords. This 
situation prompted the feudal class to use its military 
superiority to re-impose feudal conditions. Such a reaction was 
indeed tried all over feudal Europe and the frequency of peasant 
rebellion during this time is a testimony to this. One of the 
most famous of such rebellions was the 1381 peasant uprising in 
England. "Things cannot go well in England" proclaimed John Ball 
"til everything be made common".
Although the peasants were defeated feudalism was only 
reimposed in certain parts of Europe, mostly in the East. The 
reason for this is a matter of debate. Robert Brenner argues that 
this reaction failed in Western Europe in general because of the 
entrenched position of the peasantry there. No doubt other 
factors were involved here such as the low population in England. 
However the major factor, as Brenner an Dobb see it, was that 
because landlords were unable to increase the surplus 
appropriated from peasants by tying them to the land, they 
instead opted to increase their income through an increase in 
productivity. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, landlord 
dominance lead precisely to a second serfdom because landlords 
were in a position to squeeze more out of peasants through an 
increase in absolute surplus value. While the market principle 
therefore was related to the decline of serfdom in the West, in 
Eastern Europe, by contrast, an established market in the West 
allowed the production of a single crop from a Latifundist type
economy: a second serfdom.
In England a number of factors converged which explain its 
precocious development. Firstly there was the demand for English 
wool on the continent, the most sought after wool in Europe, 
which made sheep farming a lucrative enterprise. Sheep farming 
was however a land extensive and labour extensive enterprise 
which required the enclosure of land formerly used for communal 
grazing. The landed upper classes in England, unlike their 
European counterparts, "wanted, not men, but land for sheep 
raising"(Moore 1966:460). This was made possible in England 
firstly because the population had been reduced from 4 to 2.5 
million as a result of the plague (Hunt&Sherman 1981:18). 
Secondly, England being an island, a numerous peasantry was less 
important for defence purposes than on the continent where the 
build up of troop-strength was an indispensable condition of 
survival for Renaissance monarchies. This absence of a standing 
army meant also that "taxation was relatively light by the 
standards of the continent where crown and aristocracy combined 
to lay heavy burdens on the peasantry" (Hill 1969:101).
II. THE ABSOLUTIST STATE
Ultimately however the transformation of feudal relationships 
in England required the conversion of the political and 
juristictional relationships of feudalism into purely economic 
ones. This involved the enforcement of a new concept of private 
property and the right to enclose common land. In place of the 
rights and duties of feudalism, the creation of landed
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proprietorship in England reduced the relationship between Lord 
and peasant to a purely monetary one. Private property in land 
enabled the owner to devote it to the most profitable use which 
was at this time sheep rearing. This new relationship however 
could only be granted and maintained by a superior authority 
above the lord of the manor. It was this necessity which lead to 
a transformation of feudal relationships through a realignment of 
power in which feudal lords relinquished their local military 
power to the central monarchy, in return for more autonomous 
economic power. The result was as Raymond Crotty puts it, that 
"The price that England's feudal lords paid to be transformed 
from an obsolete and unprofitable feudal lordship into a 
profitable landed proprietorship was the creation of an absolute 
Tudor monarchy" (Crotty 1986:27).
1. Reformation.
As things stood however the absolute sovereignty of the king 
himself was challenged by the church. In the Middle Ages the 
Church aquired about one third of all the land in England(Elton 
1955:27). The church applied its literate skills to agricultural 
improvement and this was especially true of the Cistercians who
specialized in developing marginal land. Fountains Abbey in
/
Yorkshire is estimated to have had up to 18,000 sheep '(Gimpel 
1975:46). In addition to this, the church stood as a rival to the 
power of the state. The property titles bestowed by the monarch 
would have been less absolute and possibly subject to papal 
disapproval without the English Reformation. Henry Tudor's 
success in this venture resulted from the fact that the erstwhile
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feudal lords, turned landed proprietors, were prepared to support 
him in a move which secured their own positions.
This was especially the case when Henry's costly military 
adventurism forced him to sell most of the church land he had 
confiscated. This transfer not only weakened the the power of the 
absolutist state in England: it also greatly strengthened the
gentry who formed the main purchasers of these lands. Thus in 
England the landlord peasant struggle forced a gradual 
conversion of the aristocracy to commercial activity long before 
any comparable rural class in Europe. This in turn lead to a 
favourable taxation system and political stability. The result 
was an accumulation of capital in agriculture and the gradual 
investment of the surplus in the rural cloth industry which was 
contiguous with it and provided a profitable outlet for 
investment. It was in this way that a path was opened up from 
commercial farming to industry which laid the basis for the 
industrial revolution.
2. Naval Dominance.
All over Europe the late medieval period was an age of chaos 
resulting from the erosion of feudal ties. Out of this chaos 
emerged, as in England, an absolute monarchy which overcame 
feudal particularism. The consolidation of the new monarchies of 
Henry II in France, Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain, and 
Maximillian in Austria was an important step on the road to 
territorial integration and the creation of a centralized state. 
The difference with England was that whereas there the absolutist
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state was in a sense a compensation for the disappearance of 
serfdom, in other areas, such as Austria, it represented the 
consolidation of serfdom. This development, combined with the 
communications revolution, saw the first phase of colonial 
expansion and the creation of"‘European empires in Asia and 
America, with Spain becoming the dominant European power.
With the communications revolution, naval strength now 
superseded territorial armies as the principal mode of aggression 
and England's isolated position no longer ensured safety from 
invasion. It was only after the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 
1588 that security was temporarily ensured and with it dominance 
of the high seas. English naval dominance in Europe was to have 
important consequences over the next .few centuries. For as Perry 
Anderson points out, "while the army always remained a single 
purpose institution, the navy was by its nature a dual 
instrument, bracketed not only on war, but on trade" (1974:134). 
The fact that the British navy was not only an instrument of 
military aggression but that these same vessels could double as 
cargo ships was to be an important factor in the development of 
the British empire. It was not however the determining factor. If 
this were the case then Spain, with its vast empire, should have 
occupied the dominant position. The crucial factor in England was 
the social relations which promoted an increase in the 
productivity of agriculture which in turn laid the basis for the 
emergence of industry.
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3. The Colony and Absolutism.
Despite the relative strengthening of the landed gentry in 
England as against the monarchy as a result of the Reformation, 
the monarchy nevertheless retained a powerful position. The Tudor 
state in England had through its attempt to consolidate its power 
speeded up territorial integration and by centralizing economic 
institutions contributed significantly to economic development. 
It thus contributed to the development of a bourgeoise whose 
intrests would eventually be opposed to those of the Tudor state. 
The position of the monarchy was considerably strengthened by the 
revenue which the crown received from undertakers and merchant 
companies on the colonies. This revenue enabled the king to 
maintain an army which he would otherwise have been unable to do 
given his inability to levy enough tax. This growing strenght of 
the monarchy at home, combined with the resurgence of Catholicism 
on the continent, threatened to undo the whole Reformation 
settlement in England. The fragile consensus broke down in 1642 
when the landed gentry under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell 
deposed the king and established the supremacy of parliament.
III. THE FIRST BOURGEOIS STATE
The outcome of the civil war in England was to strengthen
/
greatly the power of parliament in England and hence the' landed 
and mercantile intrest who controlled it. The power of merchant 
capital in England now made possible a coherent economic policy 
where one had not existed previously. The external aspect of this 
policy involved the creation of an international empire and the 
defeat of other rival European powers. Internally it involved the
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consolidation of the British state and the creation of an 
economic infrastructure, communications and other services. This 
interaction between the expansion of overseas trade and the 
commercialization of the British economy, which eventually 
stimulated the growth of manufacturing in Britain and an 
accumulation of capital in agriculture and industry was itself 
the result of a prior transformation of the social relations.
1. Mercantilism.
The central preoccupation of mercantilism was the question of 
the balance of trade. If a nation's exports exceeded its imports 
then it was believed a nation would grow rich by virtue of the 
influx of bullion that would result. Out of this concept emerged 
a series of policies enforced by parliament which were designed 
to protect native interests from cheap imports and to foster 
exports. Among these the Cattle Acts of 1663-1666, the Wollen Act 
of 1699 and the Navigation Acts of 1650 and 1651 were some of the 
most important. The former two acts were designed to protect the 
interests of producers in England against cheap imports from 
Ireland which, according to a contemporary, "brought down the 
price of both our home-bred cattle and our land"(Crotty 1966:41).
The Navigation Act, which Adam Smith was to call the wisest of 
all commercial regulations, laid down that colonies should be 
subordinated to parliament and that trade with the colonies 
should be monopolized by English shipping. These acts, says 
Christopher Hill, represented the victory of a national trading 
interest over the separate interests and privileges of the
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companies which had previously represented English
interests(1969:157). Supremacy on the high seas now became a 
primary objective and the victory over the Dutch in the wars of 
1652-1674 laid the foundation for the establishment of English 
territorial power in India. Naval supremacy further enabled
Britain to gain control of the slave trade and it was to this
trade that Liverpool and Bristol originally owed their
prosperity.
2. Social Relations of Agricultural Modernization.
Nevertheless, as the experience of Spain showed, the influx of 
wealth from abroad is not in itself a guarantee of capital
accumulation. "The common denominator of those development paths 
successful in the long run", says Dieter Senghaas, "was broad- 
based agricultural modernization with its interrelated 
industrialization, both of which supplied the basis for an 
opening up of the domestic market" (1985:57). For an indigenous 
industrial revolution to occur agriculture had to produce both 
enough food for a growing urban population while shedding labour
to industry and also produce raw materials for industrial
processing. This in turn required the establishment of social
relations conducive to capital accumulation: social relations
that is which encouraged an increase in agricultural productivity 
and not simply an increase in absolute output.
It was this process whereby the social relations conducive to 
capitalist development were created, that Marx called primitive 
Accumulation. "The process which creates the capital-relation can 
be nothing other than the process which divorces the worker from
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the ownership of the conditions of his own labour; it is a 
process which operates two transformations, whereby the social 
means of subsistence are turned into capital, and the immediate 
producers are turned into wage labourers (Marx 1976:874). In 
places where this transformation occurred such as England, 
Catalonia, Bohemia and the Netherlands, industrial development 
followed. In places where it did not occur such as Ireland, 
Hungary, and Transalvania no development took place.
Prior to the eighteenth century the level of agricultural 
productivity had not allowed extensive industrialization. The 
average worker produced foodstuffs roughly 25% in excess of 
family consumption which meant that the most developed society 
still had to keep 75% to 80% of its workforce employed in 
agriculture (Bairoch 1969). In England this situation changed 
rapidly in the early eighteenth century. The immediate reason for 
this change lies in the recent application, in relatively 
sparcely populated England, of techniques which had been 
developed in densely populated Holland; "the Mecca of 
agricultural experts". These methods could be applied profitably 
in England because much of the land had been cleared by enclosure 
which in turn had created a demand for agricultural products from 
the increasing urban population. The independence of the 'English 
farmer further meant that accumulation was not stifled by 
crippling taxes. Thus, between 1700 and 1800, productivity per 
agricultural worker in England increased by 100% (Bairoch 
1969:492) .
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This modernization of agriculture now stimulated other 
supporting services particularly the production of iron. And as a 
result of this increased demand from agriculture the major 
technical innovation in the iron industry came to be introduced, 
the use of coal instead of wood as the basic combustible for 
blast-furnaces. Demand ultimately reduced the cost and without 
the low cost of iron it would have been impossible to extend 
widely the use of machines to increase the productivity of 
manufacture. This was especially so in the manufacture of those 
materials which lent themselves to mechanical treatment such as 
cotton. The increase in the productivity of agriculture therefore 
gave a stimulus to industrial production which in turn stimulated 
agriculture. It was here in this metabolic process between 
agriculture and industry that the industrial revolution 
developed. P. Mantoux, investigating the origins of textile 
industrialists confirms this: "most of them came from the
countryside; they came from that half- industrial, half- 
agricultural class that till then formed a notable, perhaps a 
majority of the English population"(Bairoch 1969:492).
An understanding of this contrast between the simple 
commercialization of society and the transformation of' social 
relations is fundamental to understanding the problem of the 
transition. This involves distinguishing between causes and 
effects, how factors which can appear to be determining change 
are themselves symptoms of a more fundamental change. The 
emergence of international trading and the increasing
3. Transition to Manufacture.
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commercialization of English society from the fifteenth to the 
Seventeenth century had increased greatly the percentage of that 
which was produced which entered the market and decreased the 
percentage produced purely for subsistence. It had increased the 
use of money as a medium of exchange and it had also increased 
the power of merchants and commercial fanners in society. The 
commercialization of English agriculture around the production of 
wool had meant that land had to be cleared of peasants to make 
way for sheep. This involved the breakup of the local subsistence
economy and its replacement by one based upon a monetary
relationship. This commercialization involved the creation of a 
modern state infrastructure which could represent the interests 
of the propertied class. The nature of commercialization in 
England was such that agriculture became the basis for
manufacturing agricultural products and thus a cycle of 
production developed. The crucial factor however is that this 
itself was a result of the earlier revolution in social 
relations. It was this which created both the necessity and the 
possibility of increasing agricultural productivity.
IV. THE ROLE OF SURPLUS TRANSFER FROM THE COLONIES
IN THE EARLY EXPANSION OF CAPITALISM.
The question now arises as to what extent extraction of 
surplus from the colonies was a necessary aspect of this
expansion. Gunder Frank argues that capitalism is by definition a 
system of transferring wealth from one area or country to another 
through a chain of metropolis satellite relations: "Each of these
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connections between satellite and metropolis is in general a 
channel through which the centre appropriates part of the 
economic surplus of the satellites... the economic surplus from 
each of the minor and major satellites gravitates up or into the 
capitalist world's metropolitan centre"(1971:44). Certainly, if 
imports and exports are any indication then their role would seem 
to have been crucial. Between 1700 and 1780 British imports of 
cotton increased from approximately one million to approximately 
thirty two million pounds. In two decades alone, between 1750 and 
1770, the export of British cotton goods increased tenfold(Hill 
1969:253).
The success of this policy of increasing imports of raw 
materials and increasing exports of manufactured goods depended 
upon the absence of rival industries on the colonies supplying 
the home market. This depended on the ability of the emerging 
industrialists in England to control the state. We have already 
seen how, in relation to the Navigation laws, the English ruling 
class used the state to pursue its own economic interests. 
British policy everywhere attempted to suppress rivals on the 
colonies and the various restrictions imposed on Irish industry 
can be understood in this context. "The rise of the British 
economy", says Hill, "was based historically on the conscious 
and successful application of strength"(1969:232).
The question remains to be answered however whether this 
colonial expansion was the cause or the result of economic 
development in England. A comparison between British and French 
or Spanish foreign policy shows clearly that different forms of
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colonial expansion were related to different internal class 
relations. The fora of colonial policy reflected very much the 
dominant economic intrests within each country. In England
colonial policy had always reflected the interests of 
manufacturers as well as merchants. Unlike Spain or France the 
development of the English economy was not dependent upon a 
continuous extraction of goods and wealth from overseas. "What 
distinguishes English development from those in other places" 
says Brenner "was the continuity of industrial growth throughout 
the period, in the face of stagnating, even declining overseas 
markets"(1977:76).
An example of the importance of class relations in economic 
development was the exchange with France of Guadeloupe for Canada 
at the Peace of Paris in 1673. With the development of 
manufacture, new political and economic- interests began to 
express themselves in state policy. "The Peace of Paris was a
turning point in English colonial policy; henceforth greater 
stress was laid on colonies as markets than as sources of 
supply"(Hill 1969:233). The textile manufacturers rightly saw the 
advantages of Canada as a market over the slave based sugar
plantations of the West Indies. In other words colonial expansion
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only caused development in Britain because the class relations in 
Britain has determined that colonial expansion would take a 
certain form; namely the exchange of raw materials for 
manufactured goods. However once colonial expansion did take 
place, its effect upon the social formation in Britain was
extremely important. This can be seen in relation to the
transition to the politics of industrial society.
V. THE COMPACT OF ARISTOCRACY AND BOURGEOISE:
CIVIL SOCIETY AND LIBERALISM IN BRITAIN
The ease with which this transition to fully fledged capitalism 
occurred in Britain, in contrast to France where a revolution was 
needed, has lead to speculation about the political 
circumstances obtaining there and their implications for later 
developments. For Marxists at any rate, Britain presents a 
problem in that the scenario pictured in the Communist Manifesto 
for the Bourgeois revolution was not as clear as elsewhere. Marx 
had suggested that the development of the bourgeoisie necessarily- 
involved a conflict with the aristocracy leading to their 
eventual overthrow. We saw that something like this occurred in 
England in 1642. The extent to which this actually involved a 
defeat of the aristocracy is a matter of debate however.
Capitalism in Britain, due to its priority was distinct, argues 
Tom Nairn, "it is a case, and really the only case, where 
oligarchy engendered democracy through an organic social strategy 
that preserved its own nature"(1977:35). This is explained by 
reference to a complex of circumstances, internal and external, 
which made it possible. Due to the existence of a large- empire 
the potential conflict between merchant and industrial capital 
never came to a head and thus the peculiar aristocratic character 
of British capitalism was maintained. The commercial character of 
English agriculture had created a community of interests between 
landlords and bourgeoisie. "A very important instance of
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convergent interests between major segments of the landed 
aristocracy and the upper ranks of the town dwellers occurred in 
Tudor and Stuart England" argues Barrington Moore (1966:424).
The existence of an empire had made it possible for merchant 
capital to co-exist successfully with the industrial bourgeoisie. 
This inevitably left its stamp on the character of British 
politics. The compact between merchant and industrial capital 
obviated the necessity of popular mobilization against 
aristocracy such as occurred in France. This enabled political 
liberalism to become established in Britain long before other 
countries. The price that Britain was later to pay for forgoing 
this revolution, argues Anderson, was the preservation of a 
landed aristocracy and a financial oligarchy whose interests were 
never quite those of an industrial bourgeoisie. This separation 
of the financial and industrial sectors he argues, meant that 
"The city did not raise venture capital for investment in 
provincial manufacturing. Its strictly banking functions were 
effectively divorced from the accumulation of industrial capital" 
(1987:34). This persistence of the aristocracy within the social 
formation in Britain was to have important implications for 
relations with Ireland.
To sum up then, the transition it must be stressed, depended 
upon a number of factors. It depended on a unified home market 
protected from cheap foreign imports. It depended upon the 
availability of cheap raw materials. It depended upon an increase 
in the productivity of agriculture which could provide a surplus 
to feed those released from agriculture working in industry and
supply raw materials for industry. This in turn depended upon the 
free mobility of labour. Where labour was tied to the land there 
was no compulsion to increase productivity through capital 
accumulation, while free mobility also ensured a supply of 
surplus labour for industry. It depended upon the presence of 
competition to enable the law of value to operate. In other words
as Dieter Senghaas points out "Whether individual factors
promoted or retarded development depended crucially on the socio- 
structural and institutional context within which they operated"
(1985:58). This goes for the role of natural resources,
population, territorial integration, infrastructure, foreign 
investment etc. Without these prior social conditions the 
transition to the capitalist mode of production would not have 
been possible.
It was the manner in which these conditions combined which 
brought into being the capitalist mode of production proper. Once 
the social conditions for the development of capitalism had been 
created, the accumulation of capital was a necessary consequence. 
It is important to keep in mind before we go on to consider the 
question of colonialism that the conditions for the expansion of 
capitalism were made possible by a prior revolution in the social 
relations of society. The accumulation of capital in Britain now 
created the conditions for the commercialization of society 
internationally. Goods from British and later European factories 
could flood the world. This however was no guarantee that 
capitalism would develop. We saw that in relation to the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism the flood of wealth from
the colonies and commercialization did not cause this transition 
in Spain. This debate has relevance for the question of the 
possibility of a transition to capitalism on the colonies, a 
problem to which we must now turn.
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CHAPTER 3.
COLONIAL SOCIETY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSITION
If Henry the II had or could have brought over 
all the people of Ireland into England, 
declining the benefit of their Land; he had 
fortified, beautified and enriched England, 
and done real Kindness to the Irish. But the 
same work is near four times as hard now as
then; but it could be done even now with
advantage to all parties... If an exchange were 
made of but about 200,000 Irish and the like 
number of British brought over in their rooms, 
then the natural strength of the British would 
be equal to that of the Irish; but their 
political and artificial strength three times 
as great; and so voicable, that the Irish
would never stir upon a National or Religious 
account.
WILLIAM PETTY: The Political Anatomy of Ireland(1690)
Aisling ghear do dhearcas fein 
ar leaba's me go lagbhrioch 
an ainm sheimh darbh ainm Eire
ag teacht im ghaor ar marcaiocht, 
a suile glas, a cul tiubh casta, 
a com ba gheal's a maili 
da mhaiomh go raibh ag tiocht 'na gar 
a diogras, Mac an Cheannai.
Aogan 0 Rathaille: Mac an Cheannai 
I. THE MODE OF PRODUCTION IN GAELIC CLAN SOCIETY
For reasons not fully known, the Roman empire never extended to 
Ireland and this was a factor which was to have far reaching 
implications for the development of Irish society. Feudalism, the 
socio-economic system which developed out of the collapse of the 
Roman empire, never really developed in Ireland. The initial 
invasion of Ireland by the Anglo-Normans had established, in the 
long term, a weak and regionally isolated feudal regime which 
over time either retreated or became partially assimilated into 
native society. Gaelic clan society had consolidated itself by
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the time of colonization. An understanding of the nature of this 
society in terms of its dominant mode of production at the time 
of colonization is essential if we are to understand later 
developments. We saw that the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism in England resulted from the outcome of a class 
conflict within the feudal mode which created the social 
relations of capitalist society.
The question in relation to Ireland then is why a similar 
conflict did not create the social relations of capitalist 
society there. The scientific study of Irish society during this 
time in terms of political economy has hardly yet begun. There 
has as yet been no serious attempt to construct an 
anthropological model of Gaelic economy and society during this 
era. Any characterization of this society therefore in terms of a 
mode of production is bound to be controversial. Rey's (1975) 
concept of a lineage mode of production seems to approximate 
closest to the actual social structure of Gaelic society.
l.The Clan.
The basic unit of Irish society was the clan, defined as "a 
patrilineal descent group forming a definite corporate entity 
with political and legal functions"(Nicholls 1972:8). The clan 
occupied a particular area called an "oireacht" which referred 
both to the territory and the people occupying it. Membership of 
the clan was conferred by descent and an important aspect of this 
system was the expansion of the clan when the leader died. 
Because the lineage system was based on extended kinship rather
than on property as such, it differed totally from feudalism. The 
greater part of the humbler classes belonged to no clan, but 
were nevertheless subject to exactions or tribute by one or more 
clans. The system of land tenure known as Irish gavelkind meant 
that "the unit of proprietorship was not the individual as such 
but the family group viewed as a corporation and the consequent 
fact that the holdings of the various members of the group were 
liable to redistribution from time to time"(Nicholls 1972:59).
2. Property.
This shifting of shares was a strong disincentive to the holder
to improve his holding. With no system of tenant right property
was insecure and as Senghaas reminds us: "the establishment of
security of ownership and tenure,(property rights)- belonged (and
still belong) among the fundamental prerequisites for the
production of an increased agricultural surplus" (1985:54). A
result of this was that agriculture was in a primitive state with
such distinctive practices as ploughing by means of the draught
animal's tail. This backwardness was no doubt contributed to by
the insecurity generated by the expansion of the clan system and
the struggles this gave rise to. The predominance of pastoralism
and the practice of cattle raiding were also related to this.
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Factionalism in general prevented any centralization or 
commercialization of the economy. The country was heavily wooded, 
communications were difficult, bridges were rare, and the use of 
the wheel-less slide car common. Towns were few and trade was 
confined mainly to the export of hides and the import of luxury
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goods. What towns there were, existed in an uneasy relationship 
with the countryside. "Many Gaelic lords demanded a black rent or 
a share in the custom from towns situated near their lordship. 
Others ruthlessly preyed on travelling merchants who often had 
to pay protection money"(O'Dowd 1986:131).
3. Church.
Perhaps in no respect did Irish society differ from Feudalism 
more than in the area of religion. The clan system uniquely 
survived religious conversion without political centralization: 
the church adapted to the local social order by abandoning 
episcopal authority for monastic organization. In Ireland, as 
Nicholls points out, "Christianity does not seem to have been 
more than a religion, whereas in the remainder of Christendom, 
both Latin and Orthodox, it became a whole social 
system"(1972:3). In no field is this more apparent than in that 
of marriage. Right down to the Elizabethan conquest secular 
marriage remained the norm. This separation was a necessity 
within the lineage mode as the clan practice of marrying kinfolk 
was forbidden by the church.
This has important implications for, as John Hall points out, 
the church under feudalism, by its attacks on concubinage, 
marriage between close affines and so on, created a situation in 
which the family became detached from the larger kinship system, 
nuclearised and thereby in a position whereby primogeniture 
could operate and land could be granted to the church (1985:131). 
In other areas too the church was absorbed into the system. The 
clerical profession like others in Gaelic society was hereditary:
John O'Grady Archbishop of Cashel 1332-1335 was the father of 
John O'Grady Archbishop of Tuam 1365-1371. Similarly the 
inauguration rituals of Irish chiefs were of purely pre-Christian 
character(Nicholls 1972:93).
II. SURRENDER AND REGRANT: ENGLISH PROPERTY AND IRISH LAND.
The developing international situation during the sixteenth 
century forced the Tudor monarchy to reconsider its relatively 
weak position in Ireland. This position gave currency to the 
dictum of the time "he who would England win, let him in Ireland 
first begin". Incapable of a successful invasion of the 
continent, the Tudors attempted to secure their other flank by
throwing their army against "the King's Irish enemies" in an
attempt to colonize what was perhaps the most archaic society on 
the continent: "The last of the children of Europe", in Francis
Bacon's phrase. The social formation which resulted from this 
encounter bore the imprint of both societies. The establishment 
of an English colony in Ireland involved a contradiction in that 
while it ostensibly attempted to reproduce a replica of the 
English social system in Ireland, the results were in fact
totally different. In three key areas, economic, political and 
religious, the colonial society which emerged from colonization 
differed from that in England. While the transition to capitalism 
occurred in Britain, the consolidation of colonial society was 
preventing such a transition in Ireland.
On the eve of colonization then, clan society in Ireland 
differed in fundamental ways from the social formation in
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England. Both societies were based on different concepts of 
property; private property in England versus clan property in 
Ireland. This gave rise to two fundamentally different systems of 
social relations which in turn determined very different 
political systems. The conflict between peasants and lords within 
the feudal system which gave rise to an increase in agricultural 
productivity and the centralization of state power was not a 
feature of Gaelic clan society, which had a low productivity and 
was politically fragmented.
1.Commercialization of Agriculture.
Economically the colonization involved the extension of the 
market and the replacement of subsistence farming more and more 
by production for the market. The colonization itself was largely 
the work of private adventurers in search of a good return on 
their investment. Indeed such was believed to be the wealth of 
the country that Francis Bacon argued that "no usurer is so sure 
in seventeen years space to double his principal and interest 
upon interest, as that kingdom is within the same time to double 
the stock of both wealth and people"(Anderson 1974:131). An 
important aspect of this was the imposition of the institution of 
private property through the system of "Surrender and Regrant". 
"To make a- commonweal in Ireland", argued Sir John 'Davies, 
necessitated establishing "lawful patrimony to the end the might 
have lawful heirs"(Hill 1985:35). This enabled the right of the 
individual to profit to come before the rights of the larger 
social group. In this way, it was believed the productivity of 
agriculture would be increased and thereby the general wealth of
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society. By 1640 it is estimated that the total land of the 
country was divided between 6,000 proprietors (Clarke 1976:170). 
An aspect of this commercialization was the creation of towns and 
markets, indeed as Louis Cullen observed "most Irish villages can 
trace their origin to this period"(1981.61).
The effects of this system were soon apparent. While in 1600 
Ireland's exports were "among the most unsophisticated in 
Europe"(Cullen 1981:25), by 1640 some 45,000 cattle and 35,000 
sheep were being exported annually (Clarke 1976:178) and 
similarly with other raw materials. The growth of the iron and 
shipbuilding industries was increasing home timber consumption 
and causing alarm in England. One of the most immediately 
exploitable resources in Ireland was timber. Walter Raleigh, one 
of the early colonizers initiated a large-scale trade in the 
timber of the Blackwater woods where he had an estate (Quinn 
1973:118). This commercialization was made possible by a new 
system of social relations in which society was divided into 
carpetbagger estate owners from England, on the one hand and 
native Irish tenants on the other. This however in no way 
signified a rise in the productivity of Irish agriculture. 
Instead it simply lead to a greater amount of that which was 
being produced being sold on the market.
This new system of social relations, however, differed 
radically from the system of free labour which was developing in 
England. In the context of the expansion of the European empires 
during the seventeenth century this was not unusual. As John 
Taylor points out: "The major economic effect of penetration
68
under merchants'capital [mercantilism] is the reinforcement of 
already existing forms of extra-economic coercion in agricultural 
production in the non-capitalist mode of production (1979:187). 
Indeed the new situation in Ireland had less in common with 
England than it had with the estate system of Eastern Europe a 
fact which is supported by de Maddelena who argues that the Irish 
estate system with its strongly repressive aspects "in many ways 
resembled that in the Grunderrschaft territories east of the 
Elbe"(1974:300).
This of course leads us back to the debate about the relative 
importance of commercialization or class struggle in the 
transition to capitalism. The increased production for the market 
was undoubtedly connected with the transformation of the social 
relations in Irish society the question remained to be answered 
however whether this would by itself lead to development similar 
to that which had occurred in England. Marx himself was in no 
doubt as to the answer to this question. "On the one hand", he 
argued, "all development of merchant capital tends to give 
production more and more the character of production for exchange 
value and to turn products more and more into commodities. Yet 
its development... is incapable by itself of promoting and 
explaining the transition from one mode of production to 
another"(1972:327).
2. The Crown, Catholicism and Military Conquest.
While the colonization of Ireland was initially undertaken by 
private adventurers the wealth generated there nevertheless
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benefitted the Monarchy in England. The relative power of the 
gentry had, as we said earlier, reduced the Crown's power to 
overtax. This in turn had prevented the king from maintaining a 
large army and thereby wielding absolute power. The revenue 
received from Ireland now placed the king in a more powerful 
position. Wentworth was building up an army in Ireland whose 
ultimate allegiance was in question. On the Continent the advance 
of the cause of Catholicism left Britain more isolated and this 
was combined with Charles' own doubtful religious position. 
Matters came to a head with the 1641 rebellion in Ireland when 
neither king nor parliament would trust each other with command 
of the army and in the struggle which followed Charles was 
deposed.
The end of the European war in 1648 made it esential to settle 
the question in Ireland. Cromwell who had, in the words of Andrew 
Marvel, "Cast the kingdom old\ into another mold",landed in 1649 
to "maintain the lustre and glory of English liberty" (Hill 
1985:43). Ireland proved vitally important for England as a 
source of plundered wealth. The vast land fund available after 
the expropriation of the Irish paid not only the adventurers but 
also the army and it was this strong army which secured the 
Commomwealth. The position of Ireland had now changed radically 
in relation to England. The victory of the Gentry in the civil 
war now ensured the dominance of parliament under their control. 
This dominance made itself felt through policy towards Ireland 
which was subordinated to the interests of the developing English 
economy.
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3. Dualism:"Two Worlds".
Militarily the Cromwellian and Williamite campaigns secured the 
grip of merchant capital on Ireland. The colonial nature of the 
Irish situation however meant that the conditions for the 
development of industrial capitalism never developed due to both 
internal and external circumstances. An understanding of the 
Irish situation during this period requires an understanding of 
the inherent contradiction within Irish colonial society which 
created the circumstances for capitalist society without being 
able to complete the transition.
In Ireland of this time development was characterized by a 
peculiar uneveness in that while many of the structures of 
modern society were created other aspects of it remained 
primitive. The traditional explanation of this was in terms of 
the opposition of two "worlds", the Gaelic and the Saxon. More
recent explanations have tended to see it in terms of a
transition from pre-modern to modern society. "Few countries" 
says Louis Cullen "had experienced as complex a cultural change 
as did Ireland in the eighteenth century, and none one so 
compounded of elements of the archaic and the modern"(1981:24). 
The failure of this transition however suggests that something 
different was occurring.
4. Colonial Social Relations and Agriculture.
Modern Ireland was essentially a creation of the seventeenth
century, in contrast to France and England, as Cullen observes,
"where a long established pattern of stable rural settlements,
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villages and fairs existed since medieval times"(1980:196). In 
Ireland such a pattern was only in the process of creation 
between 1600 and 1800" (1980:196). The institution of private
property in land was completed during this time. Between 1640 and
1680 the amount of land held by new settlers almost doubled to
78% of the total (Regan 1980:4).
The extent to which this involved the expulsion of the native 
Irish to the less fertile areas varied from region to region 
depending upon the numbers of new settlers and the density of the 
already existing population. In general, however, its extent has 
been exaggerated as the expulsion order was confined mainly to
Irish lords who had supported the Royalist cause. The majority of 
the common Irish remained on the lands where they were, working 
for new masters. In places where the natives were removed and the 
area occupied by settlers the implications were however far 
reaching. In those areas where settlers were most numerous, social 
relations approximated more closely to those in England and were 
likely to lead to a similar type of development. The later 
contrast between the north-east and the rest of Ireland dates 
from this circumstance.
In Ireland outside of Ulster colonization had taken the-form of 
a creation of large estates tenanted by native Irish for the most 
part. The objective of .these landlords was to appropriate as much
rent as possible which meant exporting as much as possible of
what was produced. The volume of exports did indeed increase as
we showed earlier to such an extent that they conflicted with the
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interests of the English Gentry who promptly enforced the Cattle 
and Woollen Acts. The dramatic fall in cattle prices, from forthy 
shillings per head in 1663 to ten shillings in 1667, that this 
caused redirected agriculture to the provisioning trade (Crotty 
1966:10).
The establishment of slave plantations in the Americas had 
called into being a whole new industry supplying them with food 
and other necessities and Ireland was heavily involved in this 
trade. This industry was in turn attended by a whole complex of 
subsidiary trades, cooperage, tanning and tallow manufacturing 
among others. The result was that instead of exporting 70,000 
head of live cattle to England at 40s per head Ireland now 
exported beef to the value of 20,000 pounds more and butter worth 
an extra 200,000 pounds. This was combined with an extra 70,000 
raw hides and 70,000 pounds worth of tallow (Crotty 1966:16).
5. Eighteenth Century.
Ireland during the eighteenth century then seems to have been a 
relatively prosperous society. Rent rolls increased tenfold 
between 1670 and 1800 (Crotty 1984:42). The overall agricultural 
output increased dramatically and the economy was in many 
respects modernized. Yet the dependence of this economy on 
exports made it especially vulnerable to fluctuations in 'foreign 
markets and government policy; British government policy in 
particular. The example of the cattle acts has already been 
mentioned. The woolen act of 1699 prohibiting the export of 
woolen goods from Ireland is another example. The export of 
woolen goods from Ireland was opposed by, among others, the
weavers of Barnstable who pushed for restrictions so "that Irish 
woolen manufactures may not come cheaper to foreigners than to 
English nor English fall into decay by the flourishing state of 
Ireland" (Regan 1980:7).
Despite this fact, however, the landed interest continued to 
prosper and with the beginning of war on the continent and in 
America, the price of goods increased and thus also profits. The 
wealth that this new commercial economy generated created no 
sustained economic growth however. Instead, over the space of a 
few decades of the nineteenth century, the economy simply 
collapsed. An explanation for this can be found within the terms 
of the debate on the transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist 
society.
III. MODERNIZATION OR UNDERDEVELOPMENT? IRELAND
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE
The "world system" theorists Wallerstein and Gunder Frank see 
capitalism as a system of international exchange between the
developed core and the periphery dating from the sixteenth
century. Wallerstein and Frank agree with Sweezy that the origin
of the capitalist system dates from the increase in
commercialization and international trade during the sixteenth
century. They go on to argue that exploitation of colonial
economies, which dates from this time, is very much part of the
development of capitalism, although it does not lead to the
development of capitalism on the colony. Development in the core
countries depends upon the extraction of surplus from the
periphery and for this reason "The satellites remain
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underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus"(Frank 
1971:33). The only way to escape this process of 
underdevelopment, to invest the surplus locally, is to sever
links with the international capitalist system.
1. Crotty and Cullen.
The colonization of Ireland during the sixteenth century saw a 
dramatic increase in commercialization and production for the 
market. Frank is critical of the modernization position adopted 
by Cullen who sees this commercialization of the economy as 
beneficial (1972:37). Cullen starts from a position opposed to 
nationalist historiography by arguing that the malevolent intent 
claimed for English policy towards Ireland has been greatly
overstated: "English policy was not... inimical in intent towards 
Ireland"(1972:37). He argues that the volume of output from the 
Irish economy was dramatically increased during this time which 
in turn created a commercial infrastructure approximating more
closely to the European model. Frank's argument against this
position is that this commercialization, while it increases the
surplus produced, it does not lead to an indigenous accumulation 
of capital.
A somewhat similar argument to the world system theorists has 
formed the basis of Irish economist Raymond Crotty's work [1]. 
Crotty contrasts the prosperity of the eighteenth century with 
the century before and after it as evidence of the connection 
between the weakning of links with the capitalist economy and
economic development. He argues that agricultural production
during the time "expanded at a faster rate than it has done over
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any prolonged period subsequently" (1966:15). This idea that 
severing the political links with capitalist countries would lead 
to development was a pillar of Irish nationalist philosophy as
expresed by Sinn Fein in the early years of the twentieth
century. The nationalist economist George O'Brien (1921) argued 
that because the Act of Union was the direct cause of the demise 
of the Irish economy, the only way to undo the damage was to 
establish an independent parliament and economic protection.
A number of problems arise here. Firstly if the development of 
capitalism in Britain is to be attributed to the expropriation of 
surplus overseas how do we explain the efforts made by England 
to restrict trade with the colonies. Secondly, if an accumulation 
of capital was occurring, why was it not sustained into the
nineteenth century given that the Union, as Connolly remarked, 
was "absolutely unaccompanied by any legislative interference 
with Irish industry"(n.d:44). And thirdly, why after independence 
did an accumulation of capital not take place leading to economic 
industrialization.
This takes us back to Brenner's and Dobb's criticism of Frank 
et al. Brenner argued that only the outcome of a class struggle 
which increased the productivity of agriculture by increasing 
relative surplus value could lead to a transition. What Crotty 
and Cullen share in common with the world system theorists is the 
failure to appreciate the relationship between the manner in
which surplus is appropriated from the direct producers and the 
accumulation of capital. An increase in the appropriation of
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absolute surplus value does not force owners to accumulate 
capital. And cutting the links with capitalism, which is what 
Crotty and Frank argue, will not necessarily change this 
situation. It is only after the outcome of a class struggle which 
frees labour, that owners in order to compete must increase the 
relative surplus value by accumulating capital. In Ireland then 
the question to be asked is whether there were any obstacles to 
this transformation of social relations whereby relative as 
opposed to absolute surplus value would be increased. The answer 
to this question requires a closer look at the political 
situation that developed in Ireland during this time.
2. Colonial Social Relations and Political Liberalism.
It was upon the basis of this increase in output and rent 
derived from it that the new colonial Anglo-Irish society was 
established with Dublin as its headquarters. In this century 
Dublin expanded to become the second city of the Empire and most 
of the outstanding architecture of the city dates from this era. 
Dublin was also the political headquarters of this new society. 
As the century progressed, the country became increasingly 
homogeneous, politically and adminstratively speaking. The Anglo- 
Irish ascendancy was a thinly scattered ruling caste. This meant 
that regional or shire government and provincial society after 
the English pattern were impossible. What developed instead was a 
centralized political system which eventually crystalized in the 
establishment of a colonial parliament in Dublin in 1782. This 
parliament was the representative of the small Anglican rentier 
class. Its position rested on its power to exclude the native
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Irish from political or economic equality. For this purpose a 
system of laws known historically as the "Penal Laws" was 
established to maintain Anglican dominance.
The gradual commercialization of Irish society during the 
century began to place pressure on this system. The rigid 
exclusiveness of the colonial system clashed with the liberal 
demands of an increasingly complex commercial society. In other 
words the extension of the economic market called also for an 
extension of the political market. The socio-economic position of 
a section of the catholic population improved and with it their 
desire to participate in power. The development of Irish society 
was therefore caught in a contradiction in that its further 
development would have required the dissolution of the existing 
social relations. For this the Protestant ascendancy would have 
had to resign their privileged position. This, they were not 
prepared to do.
3. Colonialism, Catholicism and Liberalism.
The confessional situation created by the new colonial system 
contained a similar contradiction. The failure of the 
Reformation in Ireland has found many explanations, mostly 
unsatisfactory. Canny (1976) argues that the failure derived from 
the nature of Tudor policy and the changing international 
situation. While this no doubt has its importance, a much more 
important factor undoubtedly was the position of the church 
within Gaelic society prior to colonization. The principle of 
Cuis Regio Eius Religio could apply to a post-feudal society
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where the church was an integral part of the social structure. In 
the clan society of Gaelic Ireland on the other hand, political 
conquest in no way guaranteed church conformity. The 
ecclesiastical administrative structure, such as it was, differed 
from the political one. The segmented nature of the social system 
furthermore made uniformity difficult.. Combined with this the 
increasing association of the deposed Gaelic clan chiefs with the 
Catholic powers on the Continent reinforced the association in 
the minds of the colonial ascendency between Catholicism and 
subversion. The continuing threat of restoration of Catholicism 
in England and the undoing of the Reformation and liberal 
society, kept alive this association until well into the 
eighteenth century.
However religious liberty, like political liberty, had its 
complications in the colony of Ireland. Protestantism in Ireland, 
although it was associated with the modernization of society, was 
also bound up with repression of Catholics. To allow religious 
liberty to Catholics in Ireland was a step towards equality and 
the destruction of the system. This placed the Catholic church 
in an unusual position in Ireland in that its defense of 
Catholics rendered it a defender of political liberty while 
everywhere else it was a defender of aristocracy/ This 
religious situation became complicated as the century progressed 
due to the progress of liberalism on the continent and the 
growing strength of the Presbyterian population in Ulster. 
Although discrimination against presbyterians had traditionally 
been a feature of political life in Ireland, their position was
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nevertheless qualitatively different from that of Catholics. It 
was in Ulster, where development had been more intensive, that 
real contradictions of the colonial system became more apparent.
IV. SETTLER COLONIALISM IN ULSTER AND THE IMPORTANCE
OF PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION IN THE TRANSITION
The case of the development of the North-East of Ireland during 
this time also provides support for the Brenner-Dobb thesis about 
the fundamental importance of social relations in the transition 
to capitalist society. The early colonization of Ulster by 
Scottish tenants was based on a much more favourable relationship 
between landlord and tenant than existed elsewhere in the 
country. The implications of this special relationship known as 
the "Ulster Custom" basically meant, as a witness to the Devon 
Commission put it, that "their being Protestants, with arms in 
their hands, gave them strong claims on their landlord"(Devon 
Commission 1845:483) [2]. Thus the position of the tenant being 
more secure in Ulster meant that an accumulation of capital was 
more ' lightly. The fact that by the 1770s "the balance between 
landlord and tenant had swung towards the tenant" (Crawford 
1980:124) favoured the modernization of agriculture. It made 
possible the transition to an agriculture related industry such 
as happened in England. Linen in Ulster was to play a role 
similar to that which cotton had played in England.
1. Linen.
In the production of linen the technical developments 
facilitating centralization lagged far behind cotton which meant 
that the industry did not compete with British industry and did
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not itself suffer severe competition. In Ireland itself the 
growing of flax had many advantages over commercial crops. As 
Conrad Gill points out "flax crops were more attractive because 
they were exempted by custom from tithes. Moreover it was found 
that flax could be rotated satisfactorily with potatoes... which 
were also exempted from tithes"(1925:35). The Industry was not 
confined to the north-east. — It was as Cullen observes "far flung 
in the island, increasingly so as the century went by"(1972:63) 
However although the growing of flax was widespread "the weaving 
of cloth as distinct from the spinning of yarn was heavily 
concentrated in East-Ulster"(Clark & Donnelly 1983:144). This 
meant firstly that large areas of the country acted as a 
hinterland supplying raw materials and labour for the expanding 
industry in Ulster. It also meant that Ulster was involved in the 
most productive end of the industry.
Security of tenure in Ulster, combined with an accumulation of 
capital, had lead to the proletarianization of a significant 
section of Protestant weavers. The availability of this surplus 
labour population combined with the available capital meant that 
improving farmers could acquire a loom to put men to work 
manufacturing cloth. By such means, as Gill points out, "a 
peasant could become, in a few years time, both a substantial 
farmer and a substantial manufacturer"(1925:48). Only this can 
explain the phenomenal success of the linen industry in Ulster 
which outstripped other provinces despite the fact that the Linen 
Board spent four times as much on the industry in Leinster as it 
did in Ulster (Gill 1925:101). Exports grew from less than half a
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million yards in 1700 to 18,000,000 by 1800.(Clarke & Donnelly 
1983.144). Indeed Cullen declares it "the most remarkable 
instance in Europe of an export-based advance in the eighteenth 
century"(1972:53)
2. North and South Contrasted.
We have seen now that the establishment of colonial society in 
Ireland assumed two different forms. In the North-East the land 
was occupied by settlers, mostly from Scotland, and the natives 
moved to marginal land. In the rest of the country ownership of 
the land was transferred to a section of the English landed 
ascendency with the native Irish remaining on as tenants. 
Throughout the country, the era was characterized by an increased 
commercialization and production for the market. Along with this 
went the creation of the infrastructure of modern society; roads, 
villages, towns and markets. Ultimately however as we saw the 
nature of development in the two different areas of the country 
diverged. In the south the increased commercialization lead to 
the development of a simplified social structure of Protestant 
landlords and Catholic tenants. This placed the Anglican landed 
aristocracy based in Dublin firmly in control. In the north-east 
the substantial settler presbyterian class existed in a somewhat 
different relationship with their Protestant landlords in that 
they enjoyed a greater security of property.
It has been argued here that the different forms of development 
which occurred in Ireland during this era can be traced to these 
different social relations. This argument derived from the 
debate within development theory about the relative importance of
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/commercialization or class struggle in the transition from pre­
capitalist to capitalist society. The Irish case shows, as 
Brenner and Dobb argue, that the outcome of a class struggle 
which leads to an increase in the appropriation of relative 
surplus value and increased productivity is the only basis for a 
transition to industrial society. This contention is supported by 
Dieter Senghaas: "The common denominator of those development
paths successful in the long run was broad-based agricultural 
modernization with its interrelated industrialization, both of 
which supplied the basis for an opening up of the domestic 
market"(1985:57).
The response to the increase in the price of raw materials and 
food in the closing decades of the eighteenth century reveals 
clearly the importance of social relations in the process of 
appropriation and accumulation. From 1750 on, with the dramatic 
increase in industrial production in Britain, the demand for 
agricultural products to feed the growing urban population rose. 
This demand was further stimulated by the problems of supply 
created by the Continental and colonial wars. The immediate 
effect of this was to raise the price of corn and other imported 
commodities into Britain. This affected both areas in the country 
in different ways. Under conditions of landlordism the automatic 
response to an increased price in corn was to increase the rent. 
This in turn lead to an increased output of corn simply because 
the peasant was unable to resist landlord pressure for more rent. 
In the North-East however, where peasants were relatively strong 
the rent could not be increased indiscriminately. In this case
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the other response to increased price was to increase the 
productivity of agriculture. This in turn lead to a 
proletarianization of a section of the peasant class and the 
beginning of small scale industrialization.
V. THE FAILURE OF THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION
The political contradictions that this gave rise to must now be 
considered. In the North-East the development of the market and 
the creation of an embryonic bourgeoisie and proletariat fostered 
the development of political liberalism which had been so 
influential on the continent. The main thrust of this philosophy 
was the opposition to government interference in the property 
of the individual. Its main spokesman in Ireland was Theobald 
Wolfe Tone. Tone recognized that the movement to free property 
from feudal restrictions in Ireland would require the support of 
Catholics,"that the weight of the peoples scale be increased" as 
he himself put it(1973:122) . However Tone also recognized the
peculiarity of the social situation in which he was involved. He 
recognized the fear of the Protestant ascendancy that the entry 
of Catholics into the political process could undo the whole 
property system. He was thus prompt to reassure Protestants that 
concerning Catholics "The wealthy and moderate party of their own 
persuasion, with the whole Protestant interest, would 'form a
barrier against invasion of property"(1973:113). The landed 
aristocracy were hardly reassured however by Tone's threat, in 
the event of lack of support elsewhere, to ultimately enlist the 
support of "that numerous and respectable class of the community, 
the men of no property"(1973:175).
As the pace of events gathered momentum towards the end of the 
century the position began to become clear. The entry of 
Catholics into the political arena through the United Irishmen 
was combined with the threat of invasion from France. The 
Protestant bourgeoisie began to reappraise the possibility of 
enforcing a free market situation while maintaining private 
property. The support of sections of the Catholic clergy for
political change no doubt reinforced this fear. Matters came to a 
head in 1798. The outbreak of violence in the south-east and 
north-east was combined with a French invasion, albeit a somewhat 
farcical one. The Protestant bourgeoisie now withdrew en masse 
in support of the status quo and the poorly armed croppies, 
"shaking scythes at canon", were swiftly and ruthlessly crushed.
The Irish bourgeoisie therefore because of their weak position 
in colonial society proved incapable of repeating what their 
counterparts in England had done in 1642. It was this failure to 
transform the social relations on the island which was at the
basis of the economic failure in the nineteenth century. The
problem was, as Connolly rightly diagnosed later, that "the 
capitalist class did not feel strong enough as a class to hold 
the ship of state against the aristocracy on the one hand .and the 
people on the other"(n.d:47). They had to throw their lot in with 
one or the other and they chose the aristocracy. As a result 
they went down in bankruptcy with the people.
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NOTES
[1] The criticisms made of Raymond Crotty's work here are in no 
way intended to detract from the importance of his overall 
contribution to our understanding of Irish history. His 1966 book 
Irish Agricultural Production, performed a "Copemican 
Revolution" in the study of Irish history by placing it squarely 
within the realm of political economy. This work defined the 
terms within which the study of Irish history has subsequently 
been studied.
[1] The meaning of the Ulster custom was explained to 
W.E.Montgomery as "the claim of the tenant and his heirs to 
continue in undisputed possession of the farm so long as the rent 
is paid; and in the case of ejectment or in the event of a change 
of occupancy, whether at the wish of the landlord or the tenant, 
it is the sum of money the new occupier must pay to the old one 
for the peaceable enjoyment of his holding" (B.I.C.O. 1972.18).
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CHAPTER 4 .
CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT: THE WORKSHOP OF 
THE WORLD AND THE AGRICULTURAL DISTRICT
Safe in their bams, these Sabine tillers sent 
Their brethren out to battle- why? for rent!
Year after year they voted cent per cent 
Blood, sweat, and tear-rung millions,-why? for rent! 
...The peace has made one general malcontent 
Of these high-market patriots; war was rent!
Their love of country, millions all misspent,
How reconcile? by reconciling rent!
And will they not repay the treasures lent?
No: down with everything, and up with rent!
Their good, ill, health, wealth, joy, or discontent, 
Being, end, aim, religion- rent, rent, rent!
LORD BYRON: The Age of Bronze.
For a revolution is beginning which will leave 
Ireland without a people, unless it be met 
with and conquered by a revolution which will 
leave it without landlords.
FINTAN LALOR: The Irish Felon 1847.
The contradiction between the world-unifying 
and world-fragmenting tendencies of capitalism 
has been a central dynamic of world politics 
for half a millenium. Nationalism... is the 
ideological offspring of this contradiction.
JOHN EHRENREICH (1983)
I. COMPETITION AND ACCUMULATION:THE WORKSHOP
Once the conditions for capitalist development had been created 
in Britain an accumulation of capital and the expansion of the 
forces of production necessarily followed. It was the manner in 
which these conditions combined which brought into being the 
capitalist mode of production proper. Once the social conditions 
for the development of capitalism had been created, the 
accumulation of capital was a necessary consequence. Capital had 
to be accumulated because otherwise competition would put the
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producer out of business. In order to understand this better we 
must know something about the law of value in capitalist society.
In circumstances of capitalist competition the value of a 
commodity is determined by the ammount of socially necessary 
labour involved in its production. By this is meant the quantity 
of labour necessary under average conditions of labour 
productivity. The productivity of labour, output per man-hour, is 
determined by the ratio of capital to labour or the organic 
composition of capital in Marxist terms. In the production
process two elements of capital are combined. Constant capital
refers to that portion of the value of machinery and materials 
used up in production and added to the value of materials.
Variable capital refers to labour power which in the process of
production produced the equivalent of its own value plus a 
surplus value. It produces a surplus value because the labourer 
in the production process earns his wage in a fraction of the 
working day: the exact ammount depending on the relative
bargaining power of capital and labour. The emergence of the 
capitalist mode of production sees the reinvestment of the part 
of the surplus generated in production back into in the expansion 
of production.
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The crucial aspect of this for the expansion of the capitalist 
mode of production is that under circumstances of competition the 
surplus value appropriated by the capitalist cannot be entirely 
withdrawn from the production process. In order to survive the 
capitalist must compete. In order to compete costs must be
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reduced and output increased. This can be done either by 
increasing the ratio of capital to labour, by driving down wages 
or by extending the working day. All this requires the power of 
the state to achieve, both to ensure the operation of the market 
and to protect the interests of capitalists. The superior 
productivity of capitalist methods soon forces out of existence 
those pre-capitalist modes which are unable to compete. Similarly 
uncompetitive capitalists are forced out for the same reasons.
This competitive drive of capitalism creates different levels
and areas of productivity. There is thus a tendency as capital 
accumulates, towards a greater concentration and centralization 
of production: a greater output is achieved by fewer firms and a
greater quantity of capital is in the hands of a fewer number of 
capitalists. In Britain, as we have already said, it fostered the 
growth of a manufacturing sector geared towards export. In 
combination with this was created a powerful mercantile and 
financial sector involved in import and export. The availibility 
of this vast source of raw materials and market for manufactured 
goods although not responsible for the emergence of capitalism 
was crucial as we shall see for the later development of British 
capitalism.
1. Cotton, Capitalism and Empire.
Although in the context of world history laissez-faire seems 
less the norm than a brief aberration from a norm of government 
regulation of the economy, the label nevertheless has some 
relevance in the British case. The detailed division of labour
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which Smith rightly regarded as the source of greater 
productivity was developed first in Britain and there in the 
cotton industry. Between 1750 and 1770 alone British cotton 
exports increased tenfold (Hobsbawm 1969:57). The cotton industry 
was to be the main motor of British capitalism for the next 
century and its development mirrored in a manner the development 
of the entire economy.
The greatest of the early cotton industrialists Robert Peel was 
the quintessential English capitalist. The Peel's were a family 
of yeoman peasants who like others from Lancashire combined 
farming and domestic textile production. Sir Robert's father 
moved into the town of Blackburn to establish a calico-printing 
firm was to make him a prosperous merchant, made his son a 
captain of industry and his grandson a Prime Minister.
By 1815, cotton exports constituted 40% of entire British 
exports (Lilley 1970:224). Thus there was a continuity between 
the development of industrial capitalism and the pre-industrial 
era. The development of capitalism in Britain exhibited a number 
of characteristics which were the sine qua non of capital 
accumulation. Firstly, there was the modernization of agriculture 
supplying not only food but also raw materials for industry. 
Secondly there was the role of the state creating the conditions 
internationally for capital accumulation and regulating British 
society internally to facilitate development. For while the 
industry was for a time the best in the world, "it ended" says 
Eric Hobsbawm "as it had begun by relying not on its competitive
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superiority but on a monopoly of the colonial and underdeveloped 
markets.(1969:58).
2.Railways.
As in the previous century the expansion of textiles gave a 
boost to other industries, most notably iron and coal. Between 
the years 1830 and 1850 the output of coal in Britain rose from
16 million tons to 49 million, while iron output rose from
600,000 to 2 million tons (Hobsbawm 1969:71). Profits for 
industrialists were huge. In the twenty years following 1820 the 
net output of industry grew by about 40% while its wages bill
increased by 5% (ibid:69). The scene was now set for Britain to 
become "the workshop of the world". In no area was the 
international impact of British industry so great as in the 
construction of railways which during this period tied the world
together into one giant network. Between 1830 and 1850 some six
thousand miles of railways were opened in Britain alone. World 
railway construction followed at an even more frantic pace. 
Between 1840 and 1870 roughly 100,000 miles of railway was 
constructed in Europe and roughly the same in America; "the
railways were built to a large extent with British capital,
British materials and equipment, and often by British
contractors." (ibid:115).
3. Laissez Faire.
The superiority of British industry at this stage made a policy 
of free trade a practical one. Britain was the epicentre of the 
international expansion of capitalism, the "demiurge of the 
bourgeois cosmos" as Marx called it (1973:130). By 1860, Britain,
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with only 2% of the world's population, accounted for 45% of the 
world's industrial production (Senghaas 1985:18). The fact that 
it was contributing to the industrialization of other countries 
was not a necessary part of this expansion. This depended on the 
mode of production dominant in the society which capitalism came 
into contact with. In the meantime British society was itself 
totally transformed as it became predominantly urbanized and 
proletarianized. For example in 1850 there were 200,000 
coalminers, by 1914 there were 1.2 million (Hobsbawm 1969:116). 
The population of Britain doubled from 9 to 18 million between 
1800 and 1850, and doubled again to 36 million by 1900 (Williams 
1973:217).
The consequences of this were however that Britain was creating 
potential competitors through its own expansion. Whether British 
industry would remain more competitive depended both upon what 
happened in Britain and abroad. It depended firstly on whether 
British capital would be invested in increasing the productivity 
of British industry. This in turn was related to the capacity of 
other developing countries to respond to British competition 
through capital accumulation. As the rate of profit began its 
cyclical fall after 1870 and a twenty year deflation reduced the 
price level by one third, British industry should have entered a 
crisis. Britain escaped from this crisis as Hobsbawm observes 
"not by modernizing her economy, but by exploiting the remaining 
possibilities of her traditional situation"(1969:151). An 
indication of this is given by the fact that while exports to 
underdeveloped countries in 1820 stood at 32%, by 1900 they had
reached 86%.(Hobsbawm 1969:135)
4. Liberalism.
Politically the embodiment of the compact in the British social 
formation between commercialized aristocracy and industrialists 
was the Liberal party. The unique nature of the development of 
capitalism in Britain, its priority and the existence of the 
empire, had obviated the necessity, Nairn (1977) argues, of 
mobilizing against the landed aristocracy. The result was that 
the party of the bourgeoisie, the Liberal party, combined within 
its ranks interests which were ultimately contradictory. 
Everything from Irish landlords, ' to Cobdenite free traders, to 
Ricardian socialists supported it at one time or another. It was 
this compact which allowed the early development of the 
institutions of civil society in Britain.
One result of this was that the radical democratic ideology of 
the Liberals prevented a strong socialist party from emerging in 
Britain until the twentieth century. It also managed to 
incorporate Irish nationalist politics into it through its more 
democratic but non-socialist position. The Liberal party 
traditionally stood against landlordism and imperialism but they 
stood firmly for private property. The end of laissez; faire 
capitalism in the late nineteenth century and the beginning of 
imperialism finally shattered this compact within British 
politics. A cleavage now opened up in British politics between a 
socialist and a capitalist party. Private property and 
imperialism ranged on one side against democracy and the
abolition of property on the other. It was now increasingly more 
difficult to incorporate Irish nationalist politics within this 
system.
II. THE AGRICULTURAL DISTRICT: DESCRIPTION
Despite the prediction of Marx that "the country that is most 
developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the 
image of its own future"(1976:91), the fact remains that the 
capitalist mode of production did not extend itself globally even 
if its influence did. Ireland in the nineteenth century provides 
a good site for analysing why this was the case. Ireland was of 
course the first British colony and its subsequent experience can 
only be understood in this context. The begining of the 
industrial revolution in Britain coincided with the. movement 
towards free trade with Ireland after a century of restrictions 
on Irish imports. This was followed by political union in 1800 
after which the Irish economy was exposed to the full blast of 
competition from British industry.
From the perspective of classical political economy this
should have lead to the development of capitalism in Ireland.
The operation of the market should have increased the
productivity of agriculture and industry by forcing them to 
accumulate capital and thereby lead to the development of the 
capitalist mode of production. Instead of this however occurred 
the catastrophe of the famine and later in the century the
creation of peasant proprietorship, developments which seemed to 
run totally counter to the logic of capitalist development.
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Explanations for the failure of this transition to capitalism 
usually centre on the debate about the land question and the
relative merits of Landlords and tenants, or in other words
British capitalism and the Irish tenant. On the one hand, 
nationalists usually attributed the inefficiency of Irish 
agriculture to rackrenting landlords who, it is alleged,
appropriated the surplus and exported it overseas. This is a 
variation of Frank's and Sweezy's argument that 
underdevelopment is the result of the expropriation of the
surplus produced. On the other hand, political economists 
attributed it to fragmentation of holdings and the resistance of
peasants to the imperative of the market. Peasants, it was argued
were opposed to the entrepreneurial attitude necessary for the 
development of capitalism. "The two deficiencies in Ireland", 
argued Hutches Trower in a letter to David Ricardo in 1822, "are 
want of capital and want of Industry. By destroying small
tenancies you will obtain both"(Winstanley 1984:33).
Before taking an overview of the Irish situation some
important points should be recalled about the question of the 
transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist mode of production. 
The debate centres on the difference between those on the one 
hand who suggest that the increased commercialization of society, 
an increase in production for the market will inevitably lead to
an accumulation of capital and the transition to capitalism. On
the other hand it is argued that increased commercialization or
production for the market is no guarantee of transition. It can
instead lead simply to an increase in absolute surplus value
being produced without any increase in the productivity of 
agriculture, which is so necessary for the transition. The real 
transition will only occur if the class relations are such that 
an increase in agricultural productivity is the only option open 
for those wishing to continue in agriculture.
1. Agricultural Involution.
One of the more unusual aspects of the era of laissez faire 
capitalism in Ireland was the demographic change. The population 
doubled between 1750 and 1800, doubled again by 1845 but by 1900 
it was back to the 1800 figure (Clark & Donnelly 1983:26) [1].
The explanation of this phenomenon takes us to the heart of the 
agricultural system in Ireland. With the urbanization in Britain 
which accompanied the industrial revolution the demand for 
agricultural products grew. The Continental wars which coincided 
with this inevitably drove up the price of corn in Britain. The 
price of wheat doubled between 1770 and 1810. (Crotty:1966.) 
Ireland's integration into, and dependence on, the British 
economy by this stage meant that the repercussions of changes in 
the British economy would be felt directly in Ireland. The 
immediate effect of this in Ireland was to encourage the growing 
of wheat as against pasture.
Two possibilities lay open here. Either corn could be grown 
with the use of hired labour on extensive holdings or it could be 
grown on peasant plots with the use of family labour. This latter 
option was the one adopted in Ireland. The move to corn growing 
coincided with an explosive increase in the rural population. As
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the population increased competition for land became more 
intense. This competition increased the pressure for subdivision 
of holdings as new family units were established and it 
inevitably drove up rents. This meant in effect that a greater 
percentage of that which was produced on any holding went towards 
the rent, and a smaller percentage went towards subsistence.
The increased cultivation of the potato facilitated this 
contraction. Because it could act as a rotation crop and a 
subsistence crop the potato was ideally suited to this task. On a 
small plot of land a tenant could grow potatoes for subsistence 
and com for the rent and perhaps engage in cottage industry as a 
way of supplementing the diet. The precariousness of this 
system was exacerbated by the fact that competition from British 
industry was inexorably destroying whatever native industry there 
was. While the Irish woolen industry in the eighteenth century 
was self sufficient, by 1838 it only provided 14% of the home 
market (Cullen 1972:108). This forced people back on potatoes as 
the only source of subsistence and the frequency of minor famines 
prior to 1845 showed the dangers of this [2].
2."Up Horn, Down Corn"
This situation in itself boded ill for the Irish peasant but
/
the factor which was eventually to undermine the system was the 
fall in the price of corn after 1815 due to the cessation of the 
Napoleonic wars. Between 1812-1815 and 1836-1840 the average 
price of wheat dropped from 210 pence per cwt to 165 pence 
(Crotty 1966:35). As the population increased, the struggle for 
land was, as Nassau Senior put it, "like the struggle to buy
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bread in a besieged town"(Mansergh 1975:53). This decrease in 
price combined with increased rents due to competition for land 
meant that a much larger output was needed to simply maintain a 
stable living standard. In fact, exports of grain and flour 
doubled in the 1820s (Cullen:1972.109) so that by the 1830s, 
Ireland was exporting 400,000 tons annually.(Drake:1968.68). The 
fall in the wheat price coincided with a rise in meat price which 
made pasture farming a more profitable occupation relative to 
corn growing.
As pasture was a land extensive and labour extensive form of 
agriculture its gradual expansion came up against the problem of 
the surplus rural population created by corn growing. This 
problem was eventually solved by the famine and emigration which 
by de-populating the countryside opened the way for the 
consolidation of holdings. Between 1850 and 1910 the area under 
tillage halved (Kennedy:1981:181), while in roughly the same 
period the numbers of cattle exported more than 
quadrupled.(Jones:1983.376). As part of this process holdings 
were consolidated. Between 1851 and 1861 the total number of 
farms fell by 120.000 while the number of farms of over 15 acres 
actually increased, indicating a consolidation of holdings 
(Marx:1976.854).
3. Recovery.
The decades following the famine were a time of prosperity for 
Irish farming as the rise in rents fell well behind the rise in 
profits. Between 1850 and the 1970s farmers profits are estimated
to have increased by as much as 77% (Clark & Donnelly 1983:277)
[3]. One indication of this prosperity was the increase in bank 
branches from 170 in 1845 to 569 in 1880 (Lee 1972:12). This 
itself coincided with a fourfold increase in bank deposits in 
roughly the same period (Winstanley 1984.9). Irish society in 
general became much more commercialized during this era. A new 
network of retail outlets sprang up around the country which laid 
the basis for a new relationship between town and country. 
Between 1850 and 1914 there was a fivefold increase in imports 
(Lee 1973:14), mostly connected with the prosperity in farming. 
The stage was now set for the final assault on landlordism. The 
agricultural crisis of the early 1880s was the scene for this. 
The flood of cheap agricultural products from the colonies caused 
a sharp drop in the price of home products. The land question 
for the first time moved to the centre of Irish nationalist 
politics and with it the "strong" farmer and shopkeeper. The 
series of land acts which followed this removed the landlord in 
reality if not in mythology from centre stage.
III. THE AGRICULTURAL DISTRICT: EXPLANATIONS
A number of broad trends can be discerned here in the course 
of the nineteenth century. Firstly there is the rise and fall in 
population and the increase and decline in tillage connected to 
that. Secondly there is the change in the composition of the 
social structure resulting from depopulation. For example, as 
Larkin has pointed out, while in 1845 farmers of over 30 acres, 
who he labels the "nation-forming class", constituted one-seventh 
of the population, by 1900 they constituted one-third (1984:100).
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In other words the agricultural crisis effectively wiped out a 
substantial section of the labouring class. Following from this 
there was the destruction of Landlordism and the creation of 
peasant proprietorship. This transformation was to have important 
Implications not only for the economy but politically as well.
1. The Nationalist View.
The traditional nationalist view of nineteenth century Agrarian 
history saw it as a struggle between Irish tenants and English 
landlords for the land of Ireland. Michael Davitt's depiction of 
Landlords as "a brood of cormorant vampires that has sucked the 
life blood out of the country"(Winstanley 1984:18) sums up the 
nationalist view of the situation. From this perspective the Land 
War of the 1880s represented the final battle in a 300 year 
struggle to repossess the land. The darkest iniquity of this 
system and a major turning point was undoubtedly the Great Famine 
which occurred while Ireland was exporting food; something which 
could not have happened, so it was suggested, if the people 
themselves owned the land.
The first serious challenge to this theory was Crotty's seminal 
study of Irish agricultural history published in 1966. Crotty's 
major argument was that "The Great Famine was not a true 
watershed in Irish social and economic history; rather th£ change 
in demand conditions on the British market which was heralded by 
the battle of Waterloo represented such a watershed" (1966:64). 
An inversion was now underway in Irish historiography in line 
with the opposition to nationalism the conclusion of which was 
that the peasant and not the landlord was seen as the major
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obstacle to development. Low rents and not rackrents by 
"encouraging complacency and reducing their need to become more 
competitive" retarded economic progress, argues Winstanley 
(1984:21). Indeed Solow maintains that with the creation of 
peasant proprietorship "the Irish sacrificed economic progress on 
the altar of Irish nationalism" (1971:204).
2.Political Economy
The idea that peasant agriculture and the requirements of 
capitalist development are incompatible has been accepted 
traditionally [4]. The conventional wisdom of political economy 
in the nineteenth century was that small units of production 
were incompatible with high productivity. This contention flowed 
from an extension to the realm of agriculture of Smith’s eulogy 
on the division of labour in industry. The example of the British 
situation itself also seemed to support this. John Stuart Mill, 
for example argued that the tenurial system of inheritance in 
Ireland leading to subdivision was the source of the poverty of 
the country;"By these means the land has been prevented from 
passing out of the hands of the idle into those of the 
industrious" (1967:689).
A similar broadside at the peasant was delivered 'by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles Wood, "I do not expect to see 
much improvement in Ireland" declared he "til parties buy land 
for investment meaning to improve it and make it 
pay"(Lee:1973:36). The Encumbered Estates Act of 1849 was 
established to facilitate this process of transferring the land
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into the hands of those who would increase the surplus. A more 
recent example of this contrast between peasant and capitalist 
agriculture is the work of the Russian Economist A V Chayanov. 
Chayanov's argument basically was that peasants, unlike 
capitalists, aim to maintain a constant level of well-being. Once 
the peasants income rises above a certain level the work rate 
decreases "the annual intensity of labour declines under the 
influence of better pay"(1966:80).
3. Modernization.
A variation on this distinction between capitalist or modem 
and pre-modern forms of agriculture has been taken up again in 
contemporary Irish historiography as an explanation of the crisis 
in agriculture. Oliver McDonagh for example argues that "two 
world pictures..were in collision whenever property, and in 
particular landed property, was being considered"(1983:34). One 
concept, the market model, saw land as capital from which a 
certain profit was expected. The other concept, the communal view 
dominant in Ireland saw land primarily as a means of support and 
reproduction.
Another variation on this argument is the dual economy thesis 
of Lynch and Vaizey(1961) and supported by Solow (1981). These 
authors argued that the efficiency of the economy was retarded by 
a large self-sufficient peasant sector [5]. The backwardness of 
agriculture in Ireland is judged to have resulted from this lack 
of a modern capitalist approach to land. The traditional 
nationalist argument that development was retarded by the 
extraction of surplus is rejected in view of the amount of
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capital deposited in banks during this era which was not 
profitably invested. As Joe Lee put it, the failure to develop 
was less the lack of mineral than mental wealth (1973:35). From 
this perspective the intensity of agrarian strife and the 
eventual victory in the land war were a retrogressive step.
4. Underdevelopment.
Placing these arguments within the general debate on the 
transition we can see that the traditional nationalist 
interpretation bears some resemblance to the Frank-Sweezy thesis. 
This argument was basically that the cause of underdevelopment 
lies in the'impoverishment of peasants and the drain of surplus 
from the colony, in the Irish case via absentee landlords, which 
deprives the colony of the means to accumulate capital. On the 
other hand the modernization thesis bears a close resemblance to 
the classical political economy approach. The argument here is 
that peasant proprietorship and more particularly peasant 
mentality retarded the accumulation of capital in agriculture. 
Small farms were not suitable to the application of machinery to 
production and peasants themselves resisted the pressure from the 
market to modernize agriculture. They could do this by retreating 
from production for the market into subsistence agriculture.
Both theories contain an element of truth. The impoverishment 
of the Irish peasant during the nineteenth century is a fact 
universally acknowledged. The drain of capital and labour out of 
the economy is similarly difficult to refute. On the other hand 
the growth of a significant prosperous farming class during the
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century is well established, while the failure of this class to 
reinvest the considerable capital at its disposal is an evident 
fact. With regard to the market, it is difficult to argue, if we 
consider the oscillations in production, that Irish peasants were 
not responsive to the market! They seem in fact to have been 
remarkably responsive to it and Irish society was relatively well 
commercialized. The Irish peasant was, says O'Neill, "however 
reluctant, the most market-oriented peasant in Europe"(1984:34). 
Despite this, however, peasants gained control of a considerable 
section of the land and the productivity of agriculture did not 
increase. In other words the want of capital did not obstruct the 
transition any more than did the lack of the market or a market 
mentality. The development of the agricultural economy in Ireland 
then during the nineteenth century exhibits characteristics which 
seem contradictory within both of the conventional 
interpretations.
This brings us back to the Dobb-Brenner thesis about the
transition. Following Marx they argue that the independent
development of merchant capital can not by itself bring about the
transition: "all development of merchant capital tends to give
production more and more the character of production for exchange
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value and to turn products more and more into commodities. Yet 
its development..is incapable by itself of promoting and 
explaining the transition from one mode of production to 
another"(Marx 1972:327). Brenner showed in his analysis of the 
transition that the crucial factor was the class relations which 
determined whether in response to the market the absolute or
relative surplus value would be increased.
The Irish case shows clearly that the strategy of increasing 
the absolute surplus value from peasants was adopted when market 
conditions were favourable. This stalemate was the basis upon 
which other factors retarding development rested. It tied labour 
to the land and created a pool of cheap surplus labour which in 
turn retarded mechanization. The most appropriate form of farming 
for these social relations was in fact drystock. The production 
of beef could then be divided between the labour intensive aspect 
of calf rearing on the smaller holdings in the West and the 
labour extensive fattening aspect on the large holdings in the 
Midlands and East. This economy became the basis for the division 
of the country into distinct regions pursuing different aspects 
of a single process. The apparent contradictions between the 
communal and the commercial aspects of the Irish economy become 
much more intelligible now within this context. In an 
underdeveloped economy like Ireland the modern commercial sector 
of large landholders and merchants depended on a smallholding 
communal sector for their existence. These two sectors existed in 
tension as each sought to increase its share of the surplus. The 
only way this system could be transcended was through some form 
of revolution in the social relations.
IV. UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE DUAL STRUCTURE
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ASPECT
An important part of the functioning of this economy was the
establishment of an advanced infrastructure which could 
facilitate the extraction of agricultural produce and the
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distribution of manufactured goods. The contrast between the 
development of the state and the economy is revealing here. An 
expanding state apparatus, which by the standards of the time was 
"more than was being attempted in most of Western Europe" 
(O'Tuathaigh:1972:115) was accompanied by a systematic 
deindustrialization of the economy. Oliver Me Donagh argues that: 
"In contrast to the British, Irish government was remarkable for 
the extent to which centralization, uniformity, inspection and 
professionalism spread throughout the system before 1850" 
(1977:41). The elementary school system, established in 1831, 
preceded the British one, so that Ireland was "already a 
remarkably literate society by 1841" (Lee 1973:13), while by 1881 
there was 74% literacy (Hoppen 1984:457). The police force was 
also highly centralized: "Strong Measures" are visible in every
corner of the country", Fredrich Engels commented in a letter in 
1856, "the government meddles with everything, of so called self- 
government there is not a trace." (1956:112).
1. Railways.
The classic example of this uneven development was the 
development of the railways. The first line in Ireland, from 
Dublin to Kingstown was completed in 1834. By 1850 there were 475 
miles and by 1872, 2000 miles. (Lee:1973:13). Ireland was now
more closely integrated into the developing capitalist system 
than at any time previously. In 1850 goods travelling from Galway 
to Dublin took four to five days; by 1851 it took only five hours 
(Lee 1968:87). This meant in effect that the extraction of 
agricultural products and the distribution of manufactured goods
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was made much easier. It meant also that troops could be 
dispatched much quicker to put down peasant rebellion. The dual 
role which the navy historically played was now assumed by the 
railway. "Victory is the beautiful bright-coloured flower." 
Churchill later observed, but, "Transport is the stem without
which it could never have blossomed."(Strage 1977:282).
2. Nationalism: The Political Janus.
The analysis of Irish politics during the nineteenth century 
reveals a similar dichotomy between the modern and the 
traditional. Tom Nairn has argued that nationalism is "the 
pathology of modern developmental history" (1977:359). The nature 
of capitalist development is uneven and by creating areas of 
different levels of productivity, places areas and countries at a 
disadvantage. The popular response to this has been a massive 
popular or national mobilization to right the balance. This 
inevitably involved a contradiction, for as Nairn rightly points 
out, nations had to mobilize against "progress" in order to 
progress themselves: "They had to contest the concrete form in
which (so to speak) progress had taken them by the throat, ever,
as they set out to progress themselves" (1977:339). In other
words capitalism itself had to be challenged before capitalism 
could be established in Ireland. Needless to say the implications 
of this reculer pour mieux sauter were all too evident later in 
Irish history.
The nationalist view of Irish politics in the nineteenth 
century was of the gradual development of a strong nationalist 
movement which laid the basis for independence in the next
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century. The two major figures in this struggle were O'Connell 
and Parnell; the latter's success being derived from the 
unification of the political with the land question. Recent 
revisions of this theory have attempted to undermine its 
monolithic view of Irish politics by highlighting the class 
differences within Irish society. Samuel Clark (1978) has 
attempted to show how the character of politics changed 
significantly during the nineteenth century due to changes in the 
class structure of rural society.
3. Dualism: A Question of Evolution?
Historians at this stage have traditionally come up against the 
problem of whether class or community concepts are more 
applicable to the Irish situation since the society seemed to 
exhibit both characteristics simultaneously. This problem is 
usually resolved by using the concept of transition. The
presence of both class and communal features is accounted for by-
reference to the evolution from traditional to modern. This 
approach focuses on the evolution of political methods towards a 
more modern form. Tom Garvin (1981) sees Nineteenth century Irish
politics in terms of a transition from the traditional to the
modern. The politics of traditional society is local in nature, 
based on communal or kinship ties and often violent; its 'typical 
collective manifestation being the secret society. In contrast 
to this is the emerging mass political organization of the Repeal 
Movement lead by Daniel O'Connell . This form of political 
movement was national in outlook and utilized the resources of 
parliamentary democracy to achieve its ends.
Unfortunately however this transition was never fully 
completed with the result, as Garvin sees it, that Irish politics 
came to exhibit a peculiar combination of the modern and 
traditional. He explains this by reference to the fact that in 
Ireland by contrast with other European countries, political 
mobilization preceded industrialization. "This experience of 
early state-building and "premature" mobilization", he argues, 
"is a central determinant of the countries subsequent political 
development. The country shifted directly from subsistence farm 
to commercial farm economy with no intervening phase of 
industrialization, and the resulting political parties and 
ideologies echoed feudal and peasant loyalties and political 
perspectives".(1981:44).
Oliver Mac Donagh (1977), from a similar theoretical 
orientation, attempts to situate Irish nationalist politics along 
the axis of European political evolution. The three major stages 
along this way he sees as, the Enlightenment, Romanticism and 
Jacobinism. In Irish nationalist political terms the 
parliamentary tradition represents the Enlightenment; cultural 
nationalism stands for Romanticism; and Fenianism and Jacobinism 
are synonymous. In the passage from the traditional 'to the 
modern, all societies go through a process of shedding the more 
primitive Romantic and Jacobinist tendencies to give way to the 
Enlightenment. It was in effect the failure of the Enlightenment 
to consolidate its dominance on Irish culture which allowed for 
the persistence of what he considers primitive elements; "The
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roots of the rejection of modernization and the simultaneous 
search for and cultivation of the primitive and elemental in 
Irish life are to be found in the Romanticism of the 1840s" 
(1977:154).
The problem here once more is that the modernization model is 
unable to incorporate change other than the evolution of the 
modern out of the traditional. Thus while they both recognize the 
difference of the Irish situation in terms of the sequence of 
mobilization and industrialization, they have no concept of the 
specificity of the situation and see it instead as locked in a 
transition. We saw already how the development of industrial 
society fosters the growth of a strong civil society in the form 
of popular institutions which act as a corps intermediare between 
the state and the people. Such groups set limits to state power 
and further the interests of their members. In a country like 
Ireland however, the economic basis for this type of development 
did not exist. Ireland's economic underdevelopment retarded the 
development of collectivist groups competing within the political 
system. Instead the division of the economy into a developed 
state infrastructure on the one hand, and a low productivity 
peasant economy on the other, laid the basis for two very 
different forms of political organization. It is a mistake in 
this sense to see parliamentary nationalism as an evolution out 
of the secret society. They were instead part of the same process 
of colonial underdevelopment occurring in Ireland through the 
century. This had important implications for the later 
development of democratic politics.
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Nicos Mouzelis has addressed this problem of the transition to 
mass politics in what is termed the semi-periphery; Greece, 
Argentina and Chile. Mouzelis argument is that the absence of a 
strong civil society in underdeveloped countries enables the 
masses to be incorporated more easily into the project of the 
native bourgeoisie; "given that the demise of oligarchic 
parliamentarism occurred in a predominantly pre-industrial 
context..the new participants were brought into the political 
game in a more dependent\vertical manner, through populistic and 
clientelistic means" (1986:72). Mouzelis argues that the greater 
the commercialization of the peasant economy the greater is the 
dependence of peasants on bourgeois political and economic 
institutions and the more easy it is to incorporate them into 
those institutions (1976:98).
The case of the Land War of 1879-1886 is of relevance here. In 
opposition to the nationalist view of the community wide 
involvement in the struggle, Paul Bew (1978) argues that the 
conflict of interests between small western farmers and large 
eastern ones represented a fundamental class division. Despite
this, however, the outcome of the struggle favoured the larger
*
farmers. In terms of Mouzelis' theory this becomes much more 
intelligible. The commercialized small farmers of the West 
despite their different economic interests were easily 
incorporated into the political project of larger farmers and 
merchants.
4. Dualism: A Question of Civil Society.
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The ability of the Irish nationalist movement to incorporate 
these contradictions was the basis of its mass appeal. 
Nationalist politics was a symptom of the fact that Ireland was 
an underdeveloped country. This is to say that it combined an 
advanced infrastructure of administration and communications with 
a low productivity peasant economy. Because of this Irish society 
combined both elements of peasant and class society or industrial 
society. It was this economic underdevelopment which was at the 
basis of the problematic nature of Irish nationalist politics. 
The irony was of course that in order to lay the basis for
developing beyond the underdeveloped stage, the pre-industrial 
characteristics were eulogized in order to mobilize the mass of 
the people. Nationalist politics then found itself in the
position of promoting ideals which in a sense it was ultimately 
dedicated to destroying.
5. Catholic Church
In a sense the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century was 
caught in a similar contradiction. The close connection between 
national identity and catholicism is something which has been 
universally acknowledged by historians and sociologists. This, it 
was held, was the result of the oppression of Catholics which
created a strong sense of collective identity. Characteristically 
enough revisionist historiography has sought to stand this
picture on its head. There is no shortage of evidence 
indicating the support of the Church for the British regime. "If 
we were freed from the disabilities under which we labour" 
Bishop Doyle (JKL) assured the government, "we have no mind, and
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no thought, and no will but that which would lead us to 
incorporate ourselves most fully and essentially with this great 
kingdom"(Strauss 1951:90)
The question of the church in retarding economic development 
has already been commented upon as a negative influence. Emmet 
Larkin (1967) for example has claimed that between the years 1850 
to 1900, the Church absorbed 15% of the surplus available over 
subsistence for the Catholic population (1976:34). This no doubt 
explains how the Church was able to undertake the huge building 
programme during the century which created its modern corporate 
identity. Between the years 1800 and 1863 some 1,805 churches, 
217 convents and 40 colleges were built. (Larkin:1976:19). This 
however would not necessarily imply a negative influence on 
economic development. Liam Kennedy (1978) for example has argued 
that the church building programme can be considered to have made 
a contribution to economic development. However the real question 
for our purpose is the question of the extent to which the church 
contributed to the maintenance of the social relations.
The position of the Catholic church in Ireland derived, as we 
suggested in Chapter I, from the historical emergence of 
underdevelopment. Underdevelopment, as Mouzelis points out, 
retards the development of civil society. In Ireland the only 
developed institution which had historically represented the mass 
of the people was the church. It was no coincidence that the 
first great mobilization in the country was around the issue of 
Catholic emancipation. The Church's power then derived from the
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/weakness of other civic institutions and was symptomatic of the 
contradictory nature of underdevelopment. The contradiction of 
underdevelopment as we showed was that society became more and 
more commercialized and integrated into the capitalist system 
without ever crossing over into capitalist social relations. The 
Church in a sense depended on the maintenance of this system and 
embodied the contradictions o£ it. The extent to which the church 
sustained this contradiction while suppressing conflict which 
could have resolved it can be gauged from Gavan Duffy's
observation that "No priests in politics would set up Ribbon
Lodges again" (Strauss 1951:148).
Education is a good example. On the one hand the church's 
influence in this made it the agency through which colonization 
was carried out, especially in the area of the language. On the
other hand however by welding together a sense of collective
identity different from Protestant Britain it was a major element 
in the nationalist movement. The church attempted to hold its 
position between, on the one hand, British liberalism and on the 
other hand, militant Irish Republicanism. The triumph of either 
of these threatened ultimately to undermine its intermediary 
position. Thus the Catholic Church in its mediating role, 
actually served to maintain the social relations which were 
necessary to be changed before any development could take place.
V. ULSTER
The contradictions of the colonial situation were no less 
evident in development of the north-east despite the greater 
industrial development there. That development as we showed in
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Chapter 3, resulted from different social relations which 
facilitated a modernization of agriculture there. The subdivision 
of holdings, which was a feature of agriculture elsewhere in 
Ireland, was absent in the north-east as was intense agrarian 
strife. This no doubt was connected with the fact that emigration 
was heaviest from this area. Another factor undoubtedly was the 
availability of artisan employment for marginalized peasants. 
Upon that basis a transition was made to the cloth industry which 
was to be the backbone of industrialization in the province.
1. Industrialization.
The figures for industrialization and urbanization are 
impressive in comparison to the rest of the country. During the 
first half of the nineteenth century Belfast's population 
increased fivefold, reaching 100,000 by 1850. It was the 
introduction of the cotton industry which caused the initial 
expansion around Belfast. Control of production was in the hands 
of industrialists and its expansion attracted large numbers of 
workers from the province and beyond. Around this manufacturing 
industry sprang up an engineering industry based on the 
production of cotton machines. The prosperity of the cotton 
industry did not last due to the post Napoleonic depression and 
the severity of competition from Lancashire. However it provided 
a model for the reorganization of the linen industry which 
quickly superseded artisan forms of production. So rapid was its 
expansion that while in 1846 there were an estimated 1,000 
factory hands in the city, by 1875 there were some 60,000 (Gibbon 
1975:16).
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In the 1850s Belfast acquired its second major industry, iron 
ship-building. There are many explanations for the rise of this 
industry in Belfast. Lee (1973:17) holds that entrepreneurship 
was at the basis of the industry's prosperity and contrasts the 
situation in the rest of Ireland unfavourably with this. Crotty 
seems to come closer to the truth in attributing the success of 
the industry to the ability of capitalists to carry out 
continuous alterations in work practices. "The new city of 
Belfast, uncluttered with accretions of either urban sprawl or 
of craft regulation or tradition, offered both the space and the 
freedom to apply newly acquired local engineering skills to the 
higly innovative business of building iron ships" (1986:53).
On the basis of the needs of the linen and ship-building 
industries a host of smaller industrial concerns sprang up, 
making spinning machines, scutching and hackling equipment, steam 
engines and ropes. In this climate of expansion, local capital 
was reinvested and the concentration and centralization of 
capital became a dominant economic trend. Before the first world 
war, Belfast had a population approaching 400,000 and had 
allready outstripped Dublin as the largest city in the country 
(Lee 1973:9). While in terms of the country in general, Ulster 
with 28% of the population had 42% of the industrial 'workers 
(Parson 1980:77).
2. No Home Rule.
This economic development was the basis of a political 
development which differed significantly from that in the South.
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It was a pillar of nationalist political history that Unionism or 
Loyalism was an ideological weapon whereby the Protestants of 
Ulster were duped into compliance with British imperialism. 
Superficially there seems to be little basis for accepting this. 
The working class which had developed in Belfast seemed to have 
had little in common with land-hungry peasants in the rest of the 
country which would have induced them into an alliance. On the 
other hand they seemed to have had everything to gain from the 
Union with Britain since this seemed to be mainly responsible for 
the industrialization of the province. Working class militancy 
and not nationalism seemed to promote the interests of the 
working class.
Beneath this exterior, however, the true colonial nature of the 
society asserted itself. Fear of the Catholic enemy was an 
important unifying factor which facilitated innovation and 
adaptation in industry. These were easier to achieve when their 
costs fell mainly on Catholics. When trade declined or when 
innovation caused lay-offs, Catholics workers could be fired and 
the security of Protestant workers guaranteed. Like Nationalism 
then Loyalism involved a contradiction for its supporters. The 
contradiction of nationalism, as we said, was that the demands of 
economic development were incompatible with the interests of 
farmers and merchants who supported it. For Protestant workers 
the demands of socialism were ultimately incompatible with 
Unionism and imperialism. The short term interest may have been 
served by Unionism but its long term result was the Somme and 
sectarian conflict.
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NOTES
[1] The uniqueness of Irish demographic trends has given rise to 
a lively debate as to its likely cause or causes. The first 
serious study was by Connell (1950). He began by criticizing the 
accepted link between population growth and a lower mortality 
rate. He argued instead that increased fertility rate caused by a 
lower marriage age was the important factor. This lower marriage 
age was related to lack of foresight connected with 
impoverishment and was facilitated by the cultivation of the 
potato which could sustain an increasing population (p57-59).
Crotty (1966) argues against Connell's idea that poverty was 
the explanation. Instead he claims that "the proximate cause of 
the accelerated growth of population in Ireland after 1760 was 
the extension of the potato and tillage acreage in response to 
the increased British demand for food" (1966.31). The extension 
of tillage promoted subdivision of holdings which in turn enabled 
young couples to begin new family units while the potato enabled 
them to survive on increasingly small plots.
A number of points can be made about this general debate. 
Firstly the population explosion was not confined to Ireland but 
was a European if not a world wide phenomenon during this time. 
Armengaud (1970) argues that in a historical context: "Increases
on this scale were quite unprecedented"(1970.22). The real 
question then is ultimately not the population increase itself 
but rather the institutional context within which it took place.
Within the context of industrialization, population increase was 
& { necessary development. But as Cullen rightly points out: 
"accelerated population growth added to the social problem if it 
took place at a time when domestic industry was precarious. And 
this in fact proved to be the position in much of rural Ireland 
in the first half of the nineteenth century" (1972.119). This 
collapse of domestic industry was combined with a move to pasture 
which placed a barrier in the way of a further population 
expansion and was causing a population decrease even before the 
famine.
The relationship between demographic expansion and 
commercialized agriculture in Ireland shows some striking 
parallels with nineteenth century Java as explained by Clifford 
Geertz. Geertz explains this explosive population growth by 
reference to the combination of a subsistence and a commercial 
agriculture in a system which he calls agricultural involution 
Subsistence rice growing (Sawah) provided the population and 
therefore labour increase upon which an increase in sugar output 
from plantations was made possible.
"As there was virtually no variation in capital inputs 
in sawah agriculture from one part of the island to 
another, aside from irrigation works, the greater 
efficiency in cultivation derived almost entirely from 
a greater intensification of labour - an intensification 
made both possible and necessary by the increasing
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population...The concentrative, inflatible quality of 
sawah, its labour-absorbing capacity, was an almost 
ideal (in an ecological, not a social sense) complement 
to capital-intensive sugar growing...High level 
densities are offset by greater labour inputs into the 
same productive system, but output per head (or per 
mouth) remains more or less constant from region to 
region. (1971.320-321)
The difference between Java and Ireland of course is that 
whereas in Java the population continued to expand from 7 million 
in 1830 to 28 million by 1900, In Ireland the initial figure was 
halved during the same period. The explanation for this lies in 
the fact that in Java the same economy remained in place right up 
to recent times whereas in Ireland the move to pasture undermined 
the basis upon which the increase was taking place.
[2] It was during this era that the pig became important in 
Irish peasant life. A German traveller J.G.Kohl had never seen so 
many pigs in any other country "except perhaps in Wallachia; but 
the Wallacian pigs, feeding in the woods, are a much wilder race 
than the Irish pigs, which are literally the inmates of their 
master's home...What the horse is to the Arab, or the dog to the 
Greenlander, the pig is to the Irishman" and why? "The pig it is 
must pay the rent" is a speech you may hear repeated hundreds of 
times!" Quoted in Mansergh (1975.53). Crotty (1966) argued that 
an exact correlation could be made between the increase in 
population and the increase in pig numbers. The potato which was 
the basis of the population increase doubled as a food for pigs 
(16-20) .
[3] "In the growth of a country with two economies, one 
capitalist and the other subsistence, the primacy of the maritime 
capitalist economy with a heavy bias towards exports is a well 
established historical phenomenon. The problem is to explain the 
lack of contact between the two." Lynch and Vaisey, Guinness's 
Brewery in the Irish Economy 1759 1876 (1960). Quoted in Lee
(1971.193)
[4] The peasant question as it has been called can be looked at 
from a number of different angles. From the point of view of 
production for Marxists as for Liberal economists, large-scale 
production was destined to make peasant production unviable. As 
Engels said of the peasants "their position is absolutely 
hopeless as long as capitalism holds sway... capitalist' large- 
scale production is absolutely sure to run over their impotent 
antiquated system of small production as a train runs over a
pushcart." (Engels 1976.23).
From a political viewpoint, peasants presented an equally
difficult problem. In England, the country which was the basis of
Marx’ study of the transition, the peasant question had been 
solved: "it had no peasants" as Eric Hobsbawm pointed out
(1969.3). However in other European countries, France for 
example, the large number of peasants presented a potential
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obstacle to the establishment of bourgeois society. Marx
attributed the failure of the 1848 revolution in France to the 
role of the peasantry in supporting Louis Bonaparte.
"the Bonaparte dynasty represents the 
conservative, not the revolutionary peasant: 
the peasant who wants to consolidate the
condition of his social existence, the 
smallholding, not the peasant who strikes out 
beyond it. It does not represent the country 
people who want to overthrow the old order by 
their own energies, in alliance with the 
towns, but the precise opposite, those who are 
gloomily enclosed within this old order and 
want to see themselves and their smallholdings 
saved" (Marx 1973.240).
If the peasantry could have such an important impact on events
in relatively advanced France then its influence was destined to
be all the greater in those countries where the native 
bourgeoisie was relatively weak. Such was the case in Russia 
where the solution of the peasant question became all important 
for the success of the revolution. Trotsky gave a 
characteristically concise summary of the position when he 
observed that: "In order to realize the Soviet State there was
required the drawing together and mutual penetration of two 
factors belonging to completely different historical species: a
peasant war - that is, a movement characteristic of the dawn of 
bourgeois development- and a proletarian insurrection, the 
movement signalizing its decline" (Mitranyl961.80).
The role of the peasants in expropriating landlords was a 
crucial part of success of the October revolution. However once 
peasants were in possession of property they were in no mind to 
hand over its control to the state for the purpose of 
establishing socialism. As a result peasants simply cut down the 
area of land they sowed and ate more of what they did produce, 
thus starving the towns of grain. This made the requisitioning of 
grain necessary under the policy called War Communism. However 
after nine years of war and civil war (1914-1923) which had 
devastated Russian industry there were simply no consumer goods 
for which peasants could exchange their grain and requisitioning 
was not feasible in the long-term. The aim of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) was to restore the grain supply by allowing-a free 
market, and thereby expanding the production of consumed goods. 
The wisdom of this move was challenged, especially by Trotsky who 
saw that it could strengthen the position of the rich peasants 
(Kulaks) and form the basis for a counter revolution. The crash- 
collectivization programme initiated by Stalin in the late 
twenties finished the peasant question in Russia. See E.H. Carr 
(1966) for the definitive account.
With regard to Ireland the contradictions of the peasant 
question apply in an even more acute form. Marx recognized that 
the land-hunger of Irish peasants could act as a lever whereby
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the the landed aristocracy in Britain could be undermined: 
"Ireland is the bulwark of English Landlordism. If it fell in 
Ireland it would fall in England" (1971:161). He believed it 
would fall in Ireland because in Ireland the question of social 
justice, the redistribution of land, was also a national 
question since the land was owned, nominally at least, by English 
Landlords. Marx was under no illusion that this would lead 
automatically to socialism however. He shared Engels view that 
"A purely socialist movement cannot be expected in Ireland for a 
considerable time. People there want first of all to become 
peasants owning a plot of land, and after they have achieved that 
mortgages will appear on the scene and they will be ruined once 
more" (1971:343). Trotsky's summary of the contradictory role of 
the peasantry provides a good insight into the uneven or 
underdeveloped nature of the Irish situation. Ireland seemed to 
combine several historical eras into one movement, nationalism,
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CHAPTER 5
FINANCE CAPITAL AND PEASANT PROPRIETORSHIP
What has happened in Europe since the war
[1914-1918] has been a vast victory for the
peasants, and therefore a vast defeat both for
the Communists and the capitalists.... In a 
sort of awful silence the peasantries have
fought one vast and voiceless pitched battle 
with Bolshevism and its twin brother, which is 
Big Business, and the peasantries have won.
G.K. CHESTERTON (1922) [1].
I. ACCUMULATION: DECLINE OF BRITAIN AND RISE OF GERMANY
Imperialism, it need hardly be said was not a new thing 
for Britain. What was new was the end of the virtual British
monopoly of the underdeveloped world, and the consequent
necessity to mark out regions of imperial influence formally
against potential competitors. The pace of ■ accumulation of 
capital in Britain was not sustained into the twentieth century 
and Britain was to be surpassed towards the end of the century as 
the leading industrial power by both Germany and the United 
States. This decline was to have important implications for the
colonial territories, not least Ireland.
1. Entrepreneurial Ethos or Production Relations.
As the decline continued into the twentieth century 
explanations have been put forward to account for it. From the 
classical viewpoint the decline is accounted for in terms of the 
demise of the entrepreneurial spirit; "the British disease" as it 
has become known (Weiner 1981). Against this Anderson (1987) and 
Nairn (1977) argue that the decline is to be accounted for in 
terms of the original formation of capitalism in Britain which
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involved an alliance between bourgeois and merchant capital in 
the creation of the empire.
The existence of a vast empire under British domination meant 
that the logic of capitalist development was never allowed to 
operate to its full extent. The accumulation of capital under 
conditions of competition inevitably means a fall in the rate of 
profit. The rise of mass workers movements pressing for better 
wages plus rivalry between industries ensures this. The response 
to this usually takes the form of a concentration and 
centralization of production which increases the productivity of
industry. In Britain this fall in profit could be offset by
reliance on the colonies but the long term result was a fall in 
the productivity of British industry relative to other capitalist 
countries. Furthermore the City was not forced to raise the
venture capital necessary for the expansion of industry.
2. Lenin: Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
The basic characteristics of the era of imperialism, as it is 
called, were outlined by V.I. Lenin in his most famous pamphlet 
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917). These were
(1) The concentration of production and capital developed so 
highly that it creates monopolies.(2) The fusion of banking with 
industrial capital with the creation of Finance Capital. '(3) The 
export of capital as distinguished from the export of 
commodities. (4) The formation of international capitalist
monopolies sharing the world market among themselves. (5) The 
territorial division of the world among the capitalist powers 
(1917.84).
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The contrast between Britain and Germany provides a good 
example. Between 1880 and 1914 Britains' share of foreign trade 
dropped from 41% to 30% while during the same period Germanys' 
increased from 19% to 26% (Milward and Saul 1977:473). This 
period of sea change in the relationship between the "big powers" 
inevitably lead to a protracted conflict in Europe over a 40 year 
period from 1914 to 1945, as had the emergence of British 
dominance a century earlier. It also lead, as a side effect of 
this, to a process of colonization and decolonization as the 
emerging powers sought to undermine the influence of the 
established powers and to establish their own influence. Within 
this context the secession of southern Ireland from the United 
Kingdom becomes more intelligible. Before looking at this period 
in Irish history the socio-economic parameters of the 
international situation must be clearly staked out.
3. Banking: Concentration and Centralization.
As an indication of the trend of capitalist development in
general, Lenin's schema was accurate particularly in relation to
Germany. It was less accurate in relation to Britain, as
Fieldhouse (1961) pointed out, simply because Britain was
becoming less and less the typical capitalist country. Firstly
/
with regard to concentration and centralization Britain'- lagged 
behind Germany, especially in the vital electronics and 
metallurgy industries. Between 1900 and 1912, 28 different
companies in the German electrical industry merged into one 
(Lenin:1917:65). Nothing like this occurred in Britain.
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The large ammounts of money that this concentration and 
centralization of production required inevitably involved the 
Banks, and here again Germany differed from Britain. "There can 
be no doubt" argued Rudolf Hilferding contrasting England with 
Germany "that the different course of development taken by the 
banking system in England, which gives banks far less influence 
over industry, is one cause of the greater difficulty of 
cartelization in England" (1981:408). In Germany as one historian 
put it "the industrialists set out to conquer the credit 
establishments"(Gille:1970:285). George Siemens who eventually 
became head of the Deutsche bank was one industrialist who 
succeeded. This contrasted sharply with Britain, where the 
strictly banking functions of the City were effectively divorced 
from the accumulation of industrial capital. As Perry Anderson 
puts it: "the capital of world finance never witnessed the world 
of finance capital".(1986:44) As Britain withdrew from 
international competition her services as the world's shipper, 
trader and banker became more important. Vast sums of capital 
were exported to the colonies instead of being invested at home. 
British overseas investments increased fivefold between 1871- 
1911.(J.O'Connor 1970:109). This slowed down capital accumulation 
at home and thereby slowed down the uneven development of 
Ireland.
4. Eastern Europe as a Colony,
These two factors, the concentration and centralization of 
production and Finance Capital provided the basis upon which 
later developments can be explained. The concentration of capital
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in Germany and also France gave them a lead in productivity in 
Europe and this lead provided the basis for their penetration of 
Eastern Europe and Russia. The early industrialization of Russia 
for example was largely a German creation, Hoecht opened their 
first chemicals factory in Moscow in 1885. Likewise the Warsaw 
steelworks was another German creation (Milward & Saul 1977:62). 
Indeed 35% of Germanys1 agricultural machinery exports went to
Russia in return for which Germany imported vast quantities of
Russian wheat (ibid:477).
This exchange of agricultural products for manufactured goods
was in fact laying the basis for a colonial relationship between
Germany and Russia similar to what had happened already between
Britain and Ireland. The situation in south eastern Europe was
something similar. Huge loans were floated by the German, French
and British governments to Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in
return for purchasing manufactured goods which were often of
little long-term benefit. This left these countries under an
intolerable burden of debt, created national antagonisms and lead
eventually to war in 1914. Indeed Turkey became so indebted to
French banks that their power in that country has been compared
to the farmers - general of taxes in eighteenth century France
/
(ibid:501). Only in Russia, where the revolution enabled'them to 
sever the connection with imperialism, was development eventually 
possible during this era. It was the antagonism caused by this 
imperialist penetration of Eastern Europe by Germany which was at 
the basis of the European conflict up to 1945.
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II FINANCE CAPITAL AND AGRICULTURE:
CONCENTRATION AND FRAGMENTATION
It was for long a pillar of nationalist ideology that the Land 
Acts and the creation of peasant proprietorship represented the 
triumph of the Irish people over British imperialism. Such a view 
was even expressed by Joe Lee, otherwise the bete noir of 
nationalism, arguing that with regard to land and religion 
"England conceded defeat in these two crucial areas" (1973:139). 
This view however has undergone a considerable revision, if not 
total inversion in recent times. Indeed Solow goes so far as to 
argue that in this respect "the Irish sacrificed economic 
progress on the altar of Irish nationalism (1971:264). What then 
are the implications of the development of imperialism for the 
development of underdevelopment, and especially agriculture? The 
flood of cheap agricultural commodities from the colonies as we 
said earlier spelled the end of Landlordism in Ireland. The 
question which poses itself now is how peasant proprietorship 
could have survived at all in the era of imperialism and why when 
it did survive that it did not provide the basis for an 
indigenous industrial development.
1. Accumulation and Differentiation.
We argued earlier that the transition from an agricultural- to 
an industrial economy depended upon an accumulation of capital in 
agriculture creating a larger surplus with fewer workers which 
could provide the materials for an industrial development. This 
accumulation of capital in agriculture meant a concentration of 
small holdings into large ones and the transformation of peasants
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into wage labourers. In other words the industrialization of 
agriculture.
Lenin in his The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899) 
using the concept of "differentiation” argued that such a process 
was occurring in Russia. As Lenin saw it the pressure of the 
market was making it impossible for the smaller peasants to 
survive competition with the larger farmers so that they would 
eventually sell out and work for a wage. The validity of this 
explanation depends on whether the principles of political 
economy apply to peasant agriculture. One Russian economist 
A.V.Chayanov argued that they did not. Chayanov, writing in the 
1920s, argued firstly that statistics gave no indication of the 
rapid change Lenin was referring to. Instead he argued that "The 
dynamic processes of agricultural proletarianization and 
concentration of production, leading to large scale agricultural 
production units based on hired labour, are developing throughout 
the world, and in the USSR in particular, at a rate much slower 
than was expected at the end of the nineteenth 
century".(1966:257). Chayanov1s explanation for this was that 
peasants, unlike capitalists, aim to maintain a constant level of 
well-being and not to increase it constantly. The intensity of 
the peasants labour then, he argued, will simply decline under 
the influence of better pay.
2. Obstacles to Differentiation.
Chayanov's argument is of course as we saw a variation of the 
nineteenth century distinction between peasant and capitalist 
agriculture. Capitalist agriculture operates under the dictates
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of the market whereas peasant agriculture is concerned primarily 
with subsistence. The development of agriculture in Ireland 
however differs from either of these scenario. Irish agriculture 
was commercialized but it resulted in neither an accumulation of 
capital or a proletarianization of peasants.
It was a somewhat similar— problem which Karl Kautsky set out 
to explain in The Agrarian Question (1899). Kautsky noted that 
instead of a uniform concentration of land in the hands of 
capitalist farmers, a combined process of concentration and 
fragmentation was occurring. Due to the crisis in agriculture in 
the era of imperialism farmers could not afford to pay wages 
necessary to keep labourers from migrating to the industrial 
centres. The state in this case stepped in and settled peasants 
on small holdings on which they would be unable to independently 
reproduce themselves without supplementing their incomes with 
work on larger farms. The British smallholding act of 1892 had 
precisely this objective in view and its fruits can be seen in 
the programme of cottage construction carried out in the early 
years of the century in Ireland. This process of concentration 
and fragmentation can furthermore be seen geographically in
Ireland in the contrast between East and West. This is to say
/
that the division between regions of different productivity which 
was created during the nineteenth century was reproduced into the 
era of finance capital. It was this division which provided the 
basis later for a politics of peasant radicalism which had its 
source in peasant discontent in the West.
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In the circumstances of the imperialist phase of capitalism in 
Europe then the fall in profit retarded the accumulation of 
capital in agriculture. The capitalist had to consider the 
prevailing rate of profit in the economy whereas the peasant 
reckoned only his livelihood. However, as Kautsky noted, certain 
agricultural activities could be industrialized without actually 
expropriating the peasantry themselves. By taking hold of certain 
production processes previously located on farms, (butter, milk, 
meat) they could be industrialized without proletarianizing 
peasants. This was precisely the role played by cooperatives in 
Ireland in the early decades of the century; centralizing capital 
without centralizing farms giving us "capitalism without 
capitalists" as Djurfeldt puts it (1982:146). This explains the 
fact that while in 1889 there was only one cooperative creamery 
in Ireland by 1904 there were 200 (Kennedy:1978:50).
3. Failure of Accumulation.
Agriculture in Ireland then during the era of imperialism made 
the transition to finance capitalist style production not by 
expropriating peasants but by actually creating peasant 
proprietorship. This however did not lead to the development of 
the capitalist mode of production. Cheap labour firstly retarded 
the mechanization of production methods: a prerequisite for
development. Furthermore there was no urban bourgeois class 
strong enough to subordinate the interests of farmers to those of 
industry. Indeed even to this day farmers have been able to 
prevent the state from appropriating the agricultural surplus for
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productive purposes.
The prosperity of Irish banking during this time, which doubled 
its amount on deposit between 1877 and 1913 is a good indication 
of the surplus capital available but not being invested in 
Ireland (Lee 1972:11). Indeed the size of foreign investments of 
Irish natives at the time of independence has been estimated at 
250 million pounds (Cullen 1972:169) as against a total national 
income of 165 million.(Meenan 1970:58). This transfer of the 
surplus abroad, while it has been given as the cause of 
underdevelopment, was itself a symptom of the production 
relations in Irish society, and provides a good example of how 
the conditions of underdevelopment were reproduced in the Irish 
economy during this time.
The movement to independence and the change to a regime of 
import substitution after 1932 did not alter this in any 
significant way. Agriculture continued to be geared almost 
totally to supplying the British market with cheap meat and dairy 
products. This form of low productivity agriculture necessitated 
minimizing the cost of owning land which meant minimal taxation. 
To change this situation, to divert the surplus in agriculture 
into productive use, would have required a revolution in the 
social relations. The unrest which the peasant question generated 
in Ireland was a crucial element in the struggle for 
independence. The programme of land distribution under Finance 
capitalism created the conditions for a form of rural radicalism 
which was to provide the basis for the communal philosophy which 
was a major impetus behind the struggle for independence. Rumpf's
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research into the independence struggle confirms the importance 
of the social structure which developed around cooperative dairy 
farming. "The preconditions for co-operative dairy organization 
are developed dairy farming, combined with a fair degree of rural 
wealth, community spirit, and organization. It seems, 
therefore, that these factors had to be present in a farming 
community in order to stimulate active participation in the 
national struggle"(1977:49).
III. POLITICS, TRADITIONAL AND MODERN:
NATIONALISM AND SOCIALISM
Politically the era of imperialism in Ireland is dominated by 
the partition of the island into Irish Free State and the state 
of Northern Ireland. The establishment of these two states are 
believed to represent the triumph of nationalism and Unionism 
respectively. Political developments in Ireland during this time 
are generally interpreted within the context of these two 
movements and developments since then are believed to have been 
determined by the nature of the political settlement of 1920- 
1922. A common way of looking at developments during this time 
has been in terms of the opposition of Nationalisn and Unionism 
to socialism, or in other words the politics of pre-modern versus 
modern society. According to this interpretation the national and 
socialist movements co-existed uneasily in Ireland up to 1914- 
1916 when the upsurge of nationalist and imperialist sentiment 
eventually submerged them.
Erhard Rumpf expressed this view succinctly in his claim that 
"If 1913 marked the beginning, then 1916 marked the end of social
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revolution in Dublin"(1977:20). Indeed this author's work has 
prompted a whole new effort to uncover the class basis of 
politics during the early years of the century. Rumpf concluded 
that while there was evidence of a social division underlying 
the civil war it had more of a geographical and a cultural 
element than a purely class one: "the split between the
pragmatism of the Free Staters and the romantic idealism of the 
Republicans did coincide with certain lines of social division 
within the population. The small farmers of the West owed the 
preservation of their traditional Gaelic outlook to a remote 
situation and economic backwardness”(1977:61-62)
1. Cultural Nationalism.
One popular way of treating this distinction between 
nationalism or Unionism and socialism in the political history 
of this era is the contrast between the cultural movements and 
the economic. The beginning of this new political mood in Ireland 
is usually dated from the fall of Parnell: "all that stir of
thought which prepared for the Anglo-Irish war", remembered Yeats 
"began when Parnell fell from power in 1891. A disillusioned and 
embittered Ireland turned from Parliamentary politics" 
(1970:195).
From this time it is argued, the monolithic nationalist party 
disintegrated. In its place a number of quasi-political cultural 
movements developed into which Irish people invested their 
energies. Among these was the Gaelic Athletic Association founded 
in 1884, the Gaelic League (1893), the Abbey Theatre (1904) and
133
Sinn Fein (1905). These movements found a collective voice for 
their aspirations, it is suggested,in the "Irish Ireland" 
movement which Terence Brown argues was "a reactionary expression 
of the deep conservatism of mind that governed public attitudes 
during the period" (1981.67). Tom Garvin supports this thesis 
about the divisive nature of cultural nationalism, arguing that 
it sowed "the seeds of cultural apartheid"(1981.102).
Connected up with what is seen as the backward nature of 
cultural nationalism is undoubtedly the military tradition and 
one of the milestones of modernization is judged to have been the 
peaceful transfer of power in 1932 from Free Staters to 
Republicans. The thrust of this criticism of cultural 
nationalism is twofold. On the one hand it is seen to represent 
a rejection of internationalism and the beginning of a xenophobia 
which dominated cultural life in the country. It is also 
criticized in that by overlooking the class differences within 
the society it acted as an ideological weapon of the ruling 
classes to legitimize their position, and that this situation 
persists up to the present day. In support of this viewpoint 
Maurice Goldring argues that "the priveleged ideological weapon 
of those who were frightened by the new social forces was the 
outdated ideology of a green Ireland"(1987.67)
2. Class Struggle.
As against this cultural nationalism, the militancy of Irish 
trade unions in the early years of the century is contrasted. 
Indeed Irish socialism had in its leader James Connolly a figure 
of international standing. Subsequent research has established
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that the social revolution if it ended in Dublin in 1916 did not 
end in the rest of the country. As the work of O'Connor (1980) 
Milotte (1984) and others have shown that the trade union 
movement and rural radicalism contributed in no small way to the 
eventual establishment of the new state. In the light of this 
evidence it becomes even more difficult to account for the 
failure of a labour movement to emerge in the post-independence 
era.
The dominance of syndicalism in the labour movement and the 
absence of a strong party has often been given as an explanation. 
This has been connected with the failure of Labour to stand in 
the crucial 1918 election. O'Connor (1980) rejects this charge of 
syndicalism and argues instead that parliamentarism at a time
when labour was under attack from the forces of the Free State 
was the major problem. Garvin (1974) uses a model the East\West 
gradient developed by Rumpf to explain the emergence of Fianna
Fail which he sees as the most important factor in determining 
later developments. His argument is that Fianna Fail was a 
product of the Irish periphery where politics was less class
based and that the character of later Irish politics was
determined by the "invasion" of the centre by this populist
t
style politics. Thus "Irish politics during the period sirice 1932 
offers an example of a periphery-dominated centre" (1974:310).
3. Underdevelopment: Class and Community.
The dichotomy between the modern and the traditional then which 
characterized the understanding of Irish political development
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during the nineteenth century continues on into political 
analyses of the present century. This results from attempting to 
understand the Irish situation in terms of political development 
in the developed capitalist countries. However as we saw for the 
nineteenth century the socio-economic conditions which provided 
the basis for politics in capitalist society were absent in 
Ireland. Those institutions of civil society which were the 
product of an industrial infrastructure, provided the basis for 
socialist and capitalist political parties.
In Ireland that industrial infrastructure was absent. Instead 
the country was socio-economically underdeveloped. This is to say 
that an export based low productivity peasant agriculture was 
combined with a developed infrastructure of merchant capital. 
The political institutions which emerged in Ireland reflected 
this combination which was not transitional but a system in its 
own right. The combination of nationalism and socialism within 
Irish political parties is one such feature of politics in the 
underdeveloped country. The social basis for this politics was 
peasant radicalism. The essential contradiction within peasant 
radicalism was a faith in the institution of private property 
combined with an opposition to the capitalist market. "They all 
want competition without the lethal effects of competition" 
as Marx put it: "They all want the impossible, namely the
conditions of bourgeois existence without the necessary 
consequences of those conditions." (Marx & Engels 1956:48).It was 
this which laid the basis for a kind of populist politics which 
claimed to reconcile the best elements of socialism and
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capitalism [2]. Undoubtedly there was a substantial urban element 
which had helped "to wind the clock" as Yeats put it. However as 
Strauss has rightly pointed out they were the men in the shops 
more than the men in the workshops (Strauss 1951:145).
IV. IRISH NATIONALISM AND BRITISH LIBERALISM
1. Peasant Property versus Capitalism and Socialism.
The contradictions within the Irish nationalist political 
movement became apparent, as Strauss (1951) showed, once 
Liberalism in Britain began to break up towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. An Irish nationalist party representing the 
interests of merchants and farmers and dedicated to the cause of 
independence could no more support the imperialism of the Tories 
than it could support the socialism of Labour. It was agreed by 
political activists of all shades that severing the connection 
with Britain was a necessary prerequisite for development. In 
order to achieve this a mass cross-class mobilization was 
necessary. A purely working class movement could not achieve 
independence and without independence the social basis for 
socialism was not possible in Ireland. The cultural movement was 
a necessary aspect of this mobilization and should not be seen as 
something detachable from it.
Why then did economic development not follow independence? It 
did not emerge because independence did not alter the social 
relations under which the surplus produced in agriculture was 
appropriated. Only a change in the manner in which the surplus 
was appropriated would have lead to capital accumulation.
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Underdevelopment persisted because the social relations retarding 
the accumulation of capital persisted. It was these social 
relations which laid the basis for a populist style politics, 
neither socialist nor capitalist.
2. Vocationalism: Politics of Incorporation
In this context Mouzelis' theory about the transition to post- 
oligarchic politics becomes relevant. The argument was that in 
the underdeveloped country the absence of autonomous civil 
institutions made the incorporation of the masses into the 
political project of the ruling classes easier. Building on 
Huntington (1968) he argues that this lead to oscillations from 
wild democracy to authoritarianism. Although Ireland in many 
respects was similar to those countries socially and 
economically, it nevertheless has differed significantly 
politically in that parliamentary democracy continued. One 
explanation for this is offered by McDonagh who argues that the 
parliamentary tradition was too established to allow the 
emergence of a dictatorship: "the mass of the Irish people had
been too long pupils in the school of English liberalism to 
countenance political philosophies of might" (1977:113).
This is hardly a convincing explanation in view of the 
suspension of democracy during much of the twenties. 'A more 
fruitful line of inquiry is suggested by Mouzelis approach. If 
the mode of incorporation was such that the demands of 
discontented groups could be either determined by or incorporated 
within the system then the resort to authoritarianism would be 
unecessary. Such a system of incorporation was to be found in the
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ideology of vocationalism or corporatism which came to dominate 
political debate in Ireland in the thirties. This leads directly
to the role of the Catholic Church in this crucial phase of Irish
history.
V. CATHOLIC CHURCH
1. The Parnellite Compact.
The influence of the Catholic Church on Irish politics dates 
back well into the nineteenth century. The first great political 
mobilization in Ireland was around the issue of Catholic 
Emancipation. However Larkin (1975) argues that the crucial 
period politically were the years 1879-1886. During these years 
he argues the nationalist movement first found embodiment in a 
mass political party. This involved a compact between the 
Catholic Church and the Party about spheres of influence. This 
constitutional balance later became basic to the functioning of 
the Irish political system. The Church became in Mouzelis term a 
corp intermediare between the people and the state. Thus argues 
Me Donagh:
"What later saved the Irish state, both during and 
after the fall and death of Parnell, from the tyranny of 
either the leader, the party or even the majority was
that in the last analysis the bishops had enough real
power and influence in the country to resist effectively 
any attempt by either the party or the leader to impose 
its will unilaterally on others in the 
consensus"(1975:1267).
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2. A State Within A State.
Any analysis of political and cultural debate in these early 
decades of the century confirms the importance of the Catholic 
Church. In a century of cataclysmic change the Church was one of 
the few institutions which had maintained a continuity with the 
past. Indeed Terence Brown rightly remarks on the problem of 
"the lack of immediately obvious marks of Irish identity apart 
from a devout, loyal Catholicism"(1981:29). The role of the 
Church in the educational system is undoubtedly a crucial factor 
here. Not only was the access to a wide range of ideas closed off 
by the church but perhaps more importantly clerics often set the 
terms of debate on crucial issues; they created the intellectual 
climate.
An example of this intermediary role of the church was the 
establishment of Muintir na Tire. This association was founded in 
1931 by Canon John Hayes of Bansha Co Tipperary. It is to this 
organization that much of the responsibility for the rural 
electrification scheme must go. It also promoted local industry 
and the establishment of leisure facilities. However the 
principles of its charter indicate clearly its political 
orientation. It aimed "to unite the rural communities of-Ireland 
on the Leo XIII principle that there must exist friendly 
relations between master and man; that it is a mistake to assume 
that class is hostile to class, that well-to-do and working 
men are intended by nature to live in mutual conflict" (Hickey & 
Doherty 1980:377).
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It was perhaps not surprising in the international context that 
Pearse should have framed the 1916 insurrection in religious 
terms. What is more surprising and ultimately more important was 
that even the Labour party operated within the parameters of 
Irish Catholicism. The 1934 Labour Party conference undertook to
V/
"strictly oppose any attempt to introduce anti-Christian 
communist doctrine into tfrfe movement" (Rumpf:1977:94). The 
censorship and divorce debates of the 1920s were undoubtedly part 
of this gradual process of religious domination of political 
debate. The new Constitution of 1938 was the culmination of this 
process of the establishment of the Church as a state within a 
state.
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» NOTES
[1]. The quotation is taken from David Mitrany Marx Against The 
Peasant, New York: Collier Books, (1961:131).
[2]. Whenever predominantly peasant societies have been 
confronted with the possibility of industrialization, "populist" 
ideas seem to come to the fore. These ideas usually confront 
industrialization and urbanization with an alternative vision of 
development, focussing on small-scale enterprise, peasant 
agriculture and a world of villages rather than cities. These 
ideas became particularly important in Eastern Europe in the 
early decades of the century. In Bulgaria the Bulgarian Agrarian 
Union (BANU) with its charismatic leader Stamboliiski won a 
landslide victory in the election of 1923 on the basis of an 
agrarian populist programme. Stamboliiski was subsequently 
assasinated however and the power of the peasant party curtailed. 
See Nicos Mouzelis (1986).
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CHAPTER 6.
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT: PLANNING THE TRANSITION 
WITH "DEPENDENT INDUSTRIALIZATION" AND 
THE QUESTION OF NATIONALISM
The national bourgeoisie of the under­
developed country is not engaged in 
production, nor in invention, nor building, 
nor labour; it is completely canalized into 
activities of an intermediary type. Its 
innermost vocation seems to be to keep in the 
running and to be part of the racket...But 
this same lucrative role, this cheap-jack's 
function this meanness of outlook and this 
absence of all ambition symbolize the 
incapability of the national middle class to 
fulfill its historic role of bourgeoisie.
FRANZ FANON: The Wretched of The Earth
Falstaff: I can get no remedy against this
consumption of the purse: borrowing only
lingers it out, but the disease is incurable.
KING HENRY IV, PART II
Emigration is the voice of a nation that has 
fallen silent.
HEINRICH MANN.
I. GLOBAL PLANNING: THE INSTITUTIONS
In Europe the same problem which had lead to the first 
imperialist war began to reappear again in the 1930s, The 
expansion of the German economy into Eastern Europe came into 
conflict with the interests of nation-states. German Industry 
needed an investment outlet for capital which could not be 
invested in Western Europe. This eventually lead to an 
international conflict as the other imperialist powers sought to 
maintain their position against Germany.
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Already in 1944, before the war was ended the imperialist 
countries had met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to establish a 
new post-war economic order. The two most important institutions 
established were The International Monetary Fund and The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later The 
World Bank). The aims as outlined by the International Monetary 
Fund were: "to promote international monetary cooperation; to
facilitate the expansion of international trade...; to promote 
exchange stability...; to assist in the multilateralization of 
payments and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions 
on current transactions"(Hayter 1971.34). The basic idea 
therefore was to overcome those restrictions which had retarded 
the accumulation of capital internationally, previous to this. 
This lead however to significant changes in the nature of 
imperialist control which we must understand.
These new changes were (1) The further concentration and 
centralization of capital in the creation of giant multinational 
corporations. Since the war, for example, the share of the 200 
largest corporations in American manufacturing has increased from 
45% to 60% (Hunt and Sherman 1981.303). (2) The substitution of
state capital for private investment, by means of loans and aid 
which is strategically designed to benefit the donor country. (3) 
the increased collaboration between local and foreign capital by 
mobilizing local savings. (4) A shift in the composition of 
foreign investments against primary commodity sectors and in 
favour of manufacturing and related activities. (5) A decline in 
national rivalries through the creation of free trading zones,
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policed by the imperialist countries. All these factors manifest 
themselves in the post-war expansion of capitalism but the aim 
for which they were designed, the absorption of economic surplus 
and the maintenance of high profits was only temporarily 
achieved.
I started out this work by arguing that contemporary Ireland 
exhibits many characteristics which have been taken to be 
evidence of modernization but instead are a product of the 
process of underdevelopment. The earlier chapters traced the 
origins and cause of this through history. We must now look at 
the contemporary situation in more depth. Our main concern, in 
line with the question of the transition, is to see whether the 
social relations for capital accumulation have been or are in the 
process of creation.
II. IRELAND:THE INSTITUTIONS OF PLANNED DEVELOPMENT
While an international recovery was underway in the early 
fifties elsewhere, Ireland was experiencing a severe economic and 
social crisis. Irish GNP between 1953 and 1963 had increased 2% 
per annum as against a 5% increase in the OEEC countries (Crotty 
1966:164). The basic explanation for that crisis at the time was, 
as we said, that protection had prevented the free market from 
ensuring the most efficient use of resources through competition. 
Behind tariff barriers, so the interpretation went, a whole 
culture of "subsidies, feather-bedding and back-scratching" 
existed. Irish agriculture was particularly inefficient and any 
hope of building a native industrial base depended upon 
increasing the productivity of that sector. Dependence on the
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British market was believed to be the underlying problem here and 
when the possibility of Britain joining the EEC was mooted, the 
decision to seek membership was supported by the major parties.
Within the context of economic change in Ireland the year of 
1958 is the annus mirabilis of recent Irish history. In that 
year, so the story goes, the old policy of import substitution 
was finally abandoned and a new more forward looking policy of 
export lead growth was adopted. The Sinn Fein myth as Patrick 
Lynch called it, the "unfounded dogma which identified political 
independence with national self-sufficiency" (Chubb & Lynch 
1969:130) was finally laid to rest. The credit for this change is 
given to the publication of a Department of Finance report, 
Economic Development, penned by the then secretary Kenneth 
Whitaker.
We already saw how one of the major elements of the post-war 
economic expansion was the idea of government intervention in the 
regulation of the market. Long-term plans for development became 
the order of the day. The Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation was established after the war and Ireland was 
strongly pressured to join. A number of state sponsored agencies 
were also established, the IDA, Coras Trachtala etc in line with 
contemporary ideas about the importance of state planning. All 
this meant an increase in the size of the state in terms of 
numbers employed and money spent. We saw earlier how between 1960 
and 1980 public service employment expanded by 62% (Rothman & 
O'Connell 1982.67), while the ratio of state expenditure
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(current and capital) rose from 27% to 42% between 1958 and 1972. 
This increased involvement of the state was to be an important 
factor in the smooth transition from the import substitution 
regime to entry into the EEC.
An important part of this new development was the increased 
involvement of the state in economic planning. "I think we must 
now accept...at least for the transition period" argued Sean 
Lemass in 1961 "the planning of national economic expansion in a 
more definite and detailed way than we have hitherto attempted" 
(Bew & Patterson 1982:167). Lemass here was simply echoing, the 
economic orthodoxy of his day. To a large extent the economic 
development which occurred during the sixties has been attributed 
to this new approach to economic problems. Joe Lee along with 
Garret Fitzgerald and other pundits made careers for themselves 
out of identifying planning and economic development with 
individual initiative. Lee attributed economic development to a 
"small number of patriotic individuals" like Lemass and Whitaker 
whose policy "of opening up the economy and importing the 
entrepreneurial talent so sadly missing at home helped to pull 
the country out of the debilitating depression of the nineteen 
fifties" (1986:162).
t
Behind this rather bland assertion however, 'certain 
subterranean movements were shifting the centre of gravity of 
Irish politics. Even the myopic Dr Fitzgerald sensed in 1965 that 
there was developing "a vocational-bureaucratic system of 
government whose centre of gravity has shifted away from the 
politicians towards the civil service and vocational bodies" (Bew
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& Patterson 1982:145). The growth of corporate bodies around the 
state was one way in which this change was effected. The manner 
in which the small farmer constituency was incorporated into the 
new system, often against its own interests, is a good example of 
how the new system operated.
III. IRISH AGRICULTURE: THE WHITE REVOLUTION
The changes in Irish agriculture which followed in the sixties 
and seventies were dramatic. Between 1958 and 1980 employment in 
agriculture as a percentage of total employment dropped from 38% 
to 19% (Blackwell 1982.47). Agricultural policy during this time 
attempted to direct more farmers into intensive dairy production. 
The guaranteed prices for dairy products in the EEC was expected 
to be especially suited to the needs of small-scale farming units 
common in Ireland. Between 1970 and 1975 the number of dairy cows 
in the Republic increased at a faster than average rate for the 
EEC, while between 1975 and 1978 alone the annual increase in 
yield was more than twice that of the EEC. The fact remained 
however that despite this increase, Irish cows were still at the 
bottom of the milk-yield table (Tovey 1982.69).
Other more ominous trends have also been visible. While there 
has been an increase in the amount of milk produced there has 
been a continuous decline in the number of small producers. 
Between 1976 and 1979 the number of suppliers decreased from 
74,735 to 71,148 (Tovey 1982.70). This decline in small producers 
was originally thought to follow from a concentration of smaller 
holdings into more viable ones. However land ownership in Ireland
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continues to be as immobile as ever despite the economic crisis. 
Since the second World War Ireland has had the lowest rate of 
change in farm numbers in Europe (Duffy 1980.98). The migration 
process then which reduced the numbers employed in agriculture 
consisted of a depopulation of households rather than a depletion 
in house numbers. The irony of all this then was, as Tovey points 
out, that "during a period of expansion of a form of agricultural 
production promoted as most suited to the circumstances of small 
producers, these producers have been progressively marginalized 
within the industry (1982.71).
1. Dualism:Peasant Mentality or Logic of Underdevelopment?
The conventional explanation for this failure of Irish
agriculture is usually framed in terms of a peasant attitude. In 
a study commissioned by the agricultural institute, Kelleher and
O'Hara interpret the problem in terms of a "dualism" in Irish
agriculture: a low-income, low-productivity sector combined with
a dynamic expanding sector. Modern farmers have the 
entrepreneurial capacity necessary to expand whereas traditional 
farmers are apathetic and closed to new ideas; "Individual 
fanners have varying capacities to adapt to change, and those 
unable to meet the challenge fall behind" (1978.15). The low-
income farming sector in the West then are part of a traditional
world which has failed to become fully integrated into the modern 
world.
The explanation of the marginalization of small farmers in 
terms of a traditional orientation towards agriculture misses the 
fact that this marginalization resulted precisely from a closer
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integration into the international economy. With the gradual 
dismantling of the Common Agricultural Policy Irish agriculture 
has in recent years been subject to the same conditions of 
production that Irish industry has been subject to for some years 
before. As the price supports are systematically withdrawn in 
circumstances of open competition, the profit margins are 
decreased. In this situation only those with access to capital 
can increase their productivity.
2. Green Revolution
This situation in Ireland resembles somewhat the circumstances 
which surrounded the Green Revolution in the Third World. The 
Green Revolution was that part of the modernization movement 
concerned with the question of Agriculture. The basic idea 
behind it was that the way out of the Agriculture crisis in 
Underdeveloped countries was to increase output through an 
application of capital and technology. The ultimate effect of 
this however was to increase the dependence of the producers on 
capital inputs which only those who already had access to capital 
could afford. For the small producer this ultimately meant 
marginalization within an expanding capitalist agriculture. The 
situation in Irish agriculture is something similar. Development 
policies which promote the use of industrial technology and 
finance capital to increase productivity have different impacts 
on producers with different resources. The Irish farmer who 
wishes to join the 1,000 gallon cow brigade will require a level 
of investment which only the big producers can have access to.
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The logical outcome of this would seem to be a rapid 
centralization of holdings into more viable ones. The high level 
of debt and the general uncertainty however makes the larger 
farmers unwilling to expand. Changes in market prices do not 
exert enough pressure on them to leave farming. The Disadvantaged 
Areas Scheme on the other hand actually serves to maintain the 
system by supporting non-viable farmers with grants. In this 
situation small farmers may withdraw from or be made marginal to 
commercial agriculture, without necessarily giving up their 
ownership of land. Combined with this the division of labour 
between big and small farmers is roughly defined on a regional 
basis. The consolidation of small farms then in the west would 
have to take place through a differentiation among these farms 
themselves. The deep depression into which these groups have 
languished virtually rules this out. We have a situation in 
Irish agriculture then not unlike the situation at the turn of 
the century, which illustrates the extent to which nothing 
really has changed.
This brings us back to the question of the relative importance 
of the market in the transition to capitalism. The question which 
must be answered here is whether developments during the post-war 
period did anything to transform the social relations of Irish 
agriculture. The land tenure system since the creation of peasant 
proprietorship was based on a hierarchical division of labour on 
a regional basis between small and large farmers. The political 
dominance of large farmers enabled taxation on property, the cost
3. Marginalization or Accumulation?
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of land ownership, to be minimized. This reduced the need for 
reinvestment and encouraged low productivity beef production. The 
profitability of this in turn required access to the British
market which meant free trade. Free trade meant inadequate
tariff protection for native industry and the free mobility of 
scarce capital needed by Irish industry out of the country. The 
point here is then that the movement towards entry into the EEC
was in no way a departure from this system and because of this
its results were destined not to be any better.
The idea that a closer integration into the capitalist market 
would result in an accumulation of capital in farming has a long 
history in Ireland, as we have seen. The arguments for entry into 
the EEC were based on similar reasoning. However this 
modernization of agriculture depends as we saw upon the creation 
of an agri-industry supplying agriculture with inputs. In the 
circumstances of Irish agriculture inputs were reduced to a 
minimum and the power to utilize the surplus from agriculture was 
not available. The capital required to initiate an 
industrialization programme had to be sought elsewhere and this 
also had its problems.
IV. INDUSTRIALIZATION BY INVITATION!
The fortunes of the industrial sector during this time were no 
less ambiguous than those of agriculture. The post-war expansion 
of capitalism as we saw involved a massive export of capital from 
the capitalist world in the form of aid and the closer 
integration of all economies into the international system. This
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policy, administered by the Bretton Woods institutions, first 
made its appearance with Marshall Aid. Contrary to popular belief 
Ireland did receive Marshall aid. By 1950 Ireland had received 
$150 million (Lyons 1973:589). However: "Before any dollars were 
committed, negotiations took place about the preconditions which 
would make Ireland "worthy" of aid.... In particular, grants 
depended on efforts to make currency freely convertible, to 
liberalize trade and to integrate into the European economy." 
(O'Hearn:1986.3-4). Measures to proceed in this direction were 
soon adopted by the administration. Ireland joined the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The I.D.A. was
established in 1949: a "dollar exports advisory committee" in
1950: an export board (Coras Trachtala) in 1951. The Finance
Acts of 1956, 1957 and 1958 changed the laws relating to the
repatriation of profits, while Ireland joined the IMF and World 
Bank in 1957. The new economic regime was therefore well in place 
before the publication of Economic Development.
The main aim of the above institutions was to make Ireland an 
attractive location for the establishment of branches of
multinational industries. Attractive financial inducements in the 
form of capital grants and tax-free periods were part of this
programme. Indeed according to the European Commission for Europe 
these incentives went "further than those of any other country in 
Europe in encouraging export industries and attracting private 
capital for this purpose" (Long 1976:67). Perhaps the most 
important change in the nature of capitalist expansion was the
shift away from investment in raw materials production to an
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investment in manufacturing, a factor which has mislead many into 
identifying this development with the establishment of the 
capitalist mode of production. It has been estimated that between 
1929 and 1968 the percentage of American foreign investment in 
manufacturing rose from 7% to 34% (Cardoso 1972.89). This change 
is reflected in Ireland where in 1977 foreign manufacturing 
companies employed about 80,000 workers out of a total employment 
of 200,000 in manufacturing industry (Walsh 1980.60). While Irish 
manufactured exports as a percentage of the total rose from 17.1% 
to 54.5% between 1958 and 1980 (Wickham 1983.165).
1. Planning the Foreign Sector?
However as the slowdown in the international accumulation of
capital set in, the real nature of Ireland's position became
apparent. The multinational branches established tend to have 
what are called, low multiplier effects. "Little spinoff has 
occurred from multinationals in Ireland" the Telesis Report 
observed (1982.127). This is to say that they import the bulk of 
their input and export the bulk of their output. Hence they have
no organic ties in the economy and tend to form "modern"
enclaves within the traditional society. The attraction of this 
type of multinational investment tends to divert scarce local 
resources into activities which are in the long term little use 
to the economy since most of the production is export oriented. 
They supply only about one-third of the capital necessary to set­
up and are thus in competition with local industry for the rest 
(Kelly 1984.17). Because of the tax holidays they are guaranteed 
on undertaking the investment, the huge profits which these
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corporations amass cannot be put to productive use in the 
country. In the period 1975-76 profits for US firms in Ireland 
were estimated to have been nearly three times the world average 
(Walsh 1980:70). The free-trade environment which they dictate 
has caused a precipitous decline in traditional industries. Since 
this sector produces mainly for the domestic market the result is 
not only a decline in net jobs but also increased imports. On top 
of all this the government is virtually powerless to alter the 
situation through planning because, as O'Hearn rightly remarks 
"the foreign sector is precisely the sector which cannot be 
effectively planned" (O'Hearn 1986:11).
2. Mining
Foreign investment in Irish mining is a classic example of the 
multinational strategy. A number of internationally significantly 
mines were opened up by North American companies in the 1960s and 
1970s. The Irish Resources Study Group pointed out: "Ireland now 
possesses the largest zinc\lead mines in the world at Navan, the 
largest underground zinc mine in Europe at Silvermines, the 
largest producing lead mine in Europe at Tynagh, the fifth 
largest mercury mine in the world, one of the most important 
sources of manganese in Europe and the most profitable 
barytes deposit in the world." (Long 1976.62). This gave«the lie 
to the common view, expressed by Patrick Lynch, that it was the 
lack of mineral resources which prevented industrialization 
(Chubb & Lynch 1969:131).
The output of these mines, however, instead of being processed 
in Ireland, has been exported to the West European industrialized
155
countries for smelting and processing, thus reproducing the cycle 
of underdevelopment through the export of raw materials. But 
while the smelting of indigenous resources is avoided, a giant 
alumina smelter has recently been constructed on the Shannon 
estuary to process raw materials coming from the Carribbean. This 
illustrates the strategy whereby corporations distribute 
different segments of a “Sequential process among various 
countries as a hedge against government intervention. Crotty has 
shown how the various measures taken to attract the AAC to 
Ireland, by increasing the cost of labour, materials, fuel etc, 
has cost the country many more jobs than it has created 
(1985.95).
3. The National Debt: The Cost of Underdevelopment
The full reckoning with the results of a reliance on foreign 
investment is now being faced. It is in the crisis of the public 
finances that this problem is clearly illustrated. In Ireland 
there seems no remedy against the consumption of the purse. 
Between 1981 and 1986 alone, the burden of national debt doubled. 
Much of the controversy surrounding this has focussed on current 
spending. Total current spending rose from 4,792 million pounds 
in 1981 to 8,105 by 1986, while over roughly the same period the 
current budget deficit increased from 819 billion to 1,395 
billion pounds. In this time the proportion of GNP allocated to 
current government spending rose from 45% to almost 50% (Tansey 
1987). The current budget deficit has risen from zero in 1970 to 
8% of GNP by 1980 (Kelly 1984.18). It would seem then on the
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surface that economic experts are correct when they berate us for 
"living beyond our means".
However during the same period Ireland has experienced a 
phenomenal growth in capital formation. In the nineteen sixties 
it averaged 20% of GNP and has since risen to 50% (Kelly 
1984.18). Since this capital programme is financed by borrowing, 
the level of national debt has increased accordingly from 66% of 
GNP in the early seventies to 135% by 1986 (Tansey 1987). The 
reasoning behind this was that capital investment would increase 
productivity which would in turn increase revenue. Forced marched 
industrialization, it was believed, could provide the basis for 
increased spending. Since the multinationals were the major 
actors in this drama they received the benefits of this increased 
capital expenditure. It was precisely the failure of this 
industrial strategy and not current spending which is at the root 
of the debt crisis. The revenue base has shrunk due to the 
collapse of industry while the expenditure ceiling has widened 
due to an increase in welfare recipients. Even in spite of this 
spending on these services has not risen as a proportion of GNP. 
In fact as Tansey observes "all the rise in current government 
spending as a proportion of GNP has been accounted for by the 
rising cost of servicing the governments debt" (Tansey 1987). In 
other words the debt which was originally created through the 
multinational development strategy has been shifted on to the 
taxpayer in the form of interest payments.
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V. THE WAY FORWARD
1. Creating the "Achieving Society"
Only within the context of the international problem of 
underdevelopment does this problem in Ireland make any sense. The 
response to the economic crisis to date still seems to be 
confined within the modernization\nationalist terms of debate. 
Joe Lee has been a consistent advocate of the modernization 
solution in his advocacy of initiative and entrepreneurship: "few 
even of our best people are achieving their full potential" 
(1986:158). And this, despite the fact that as far back as 1942 
the foremost bourgeois economist Joseph Schumpeter had 
pronounced "The obsolescence of the Entrerpreneurial Function" 
(Schumpeter 1942). Beyond this assertion however Professor Lee is 
unable to come up with anything more than platitudes about the 
importance of talent and initiative: "Too many of our
institutional structures... give a built-in advantage to the 
limpets, enabling them to thwart initiative" (Lee 1986:158). 
Behind all this of course is the fundamental faith in the 
transformative capacity of the market. The function of planning 
from this viewpoint is to facilitate the efficient operation of 
the market, in labour as well as capital.
2.Back to Nationalism
Ironically enough the foremost nationalist economist, Raymond 
Crotty, ends up with a somewhat similar conclusion. Crotty's 
intervention in the current crisis can be understood in terms of 
the problem of the authentic national bourgeoisie. The central
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question here is, how can an indigenous industrial sector be 
created with an independent development dynamic? Crotty's main 
argument is that the outflow of the surplus from the country, in 
the form of debt servicing and export of capital, retards the 
process of accumulation at home. He argues furthermore that the
Sj
production factors, land, labour and capital are incorrectly 
priced due to the historical conditions of colonialism which 
distorted the operation of the market through monopoly 
(1986:115). He concludes from this that an accumulation of 
capital leading to industrialization can only take place through 
a lifting of government regulation of the market internally, 
combined with some form of detachment from the international 
capitalist system.
3.The Ultimate Problem: The Social Relations of Underdevelopment
The fundamental problem here is of course the failure to 
recognize the relationship between the social relations and 
conditions of accumulation. Both Crotty and Lee fail to recognize 
that the accumulation of capital is not simply a question of 
management but one of the relations between classes in society. 
Underdevelopment is determined, as Ben Fine rightly remarks, 
"not upon the forms it assumes--such as technological gaps and 
shortage of surplus available for accumulation--but 'on the 
obstacles to the transition both from pre-capitalist to 
capitalist relations of production and from a formal to a real 
subsumption of capital to labour" (Fine 1978:94). The conditions 
under which the surplus is appropriated in Ireland today are 
largely those of petty commodity production. Only when the social
relations themselves are transformed will a process of capital 
accumulation begin.
VI. THE POLITICS OF "DEPENDENT INDUSTRIALIZATION":
STATE CLIENTELISM AND POLITICAL INCORPORATION
In view of the dislocation that economic changes have 
occasioned in Ireland over the past few decades the political 
consensus which has been maintained looks remarkable. It seemed 
legitimate to expect that with the social changes which were 
occurring, Irish politics would come to resemble "normal" 
European politics. The "catch-all" parties however have still 
been able to maintain their position. Voting patterns, as Mart 
Bax pointed out seem to be remarkably stable from generation to 
generation: "Their parents before them voted for the party and
they vote the same ticket." (Bax 1976:72). The truth of this is 
evidenced by the fact that the two major parties can still 
command up to 83% of electoral support [1].
1. Cultural Explanation
The explanation for this remarkable continuity usually takes 
the form of either a cultural or a class analysis. Of the former 
the most influential have been Arensberg and Kimball (1968) and 
Rumpf (1977) whose influence can be traced to several others 
including Garvin (1974) and Bax (1972). The idea common to these 
works is that the divisions within the political system are the 
result of historical cleavages in society, linguistic, distance 
from the centre, suffrage extension, urbanization etc. On this
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basis Tom Garvin argues that "the division between the two 
parties actually reflects a profound distinction in Irish 
society, a distinction between those who, for class, cultural or 
other reasons, assume a natural affinity between Ireland and 
Britain and those who do not" (1981:135). Paul Sacks from a 
similar perspective argues that politics in Ireland reflects the 
dominance of the peasant mentality in the country at large: "It
is the countryman's set of ideas about the nature of the 
political process" he argues "that makes machine politics 
possible in Ireland" (Sacks 1976:7).
2.Class Explanation
As opposed to this, attempts have been made to explain the 
power of the two major parties in terms of class interest. James 
Wickham argues the the crucial factor here is the ability of the 
Fianna Fail party to represent integration into the international 
economy as being in the national interest. He discusses this 
within the general context of what he calls "the politics of 
dependent industrialization" the nature of which retards the 
development of workers movements (Wickham 1980). Another variant 
of this argument is that of Bew and Patterson (1982). They argue 
that the crucial political development in the post-war period 
resulted from the economic transformation away from raw material 
production to manufacturing. This transition was effected 
peacefully due to the ability of Fianna Fail, and Lemass in 
particular, to skillfully manage bourgeois factions by 
separating the issue of foreign capital from that of moves 
towards free trade (1982:193).
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3. State Incorporation
It can be fairly accepted I think that the conditions for some 
change in the Irish political system have been in place for some 
time. This is to say that the evidence shows that significant 
sections of the population vote for parties which do not
represent their interests. The question to be answered then is 
why alternative movements have not been successful in building up 
a popular opposition. The argument that the political system is 
somehow suited to a peasant mentality in the country can be 
dismissed in view of the ever increasing urbanization. It may be 
that this direct attention to political parties places rather
too much emphasis upon the political party and not enough
emphasis upon the state itself. The increasing influence of the 
state has already been mentioned in relation to economic
developments. Within the theoretical framework of incorporation 
which Nicos Mouzelis has developed, the role of the state in 
incorporating conflicts within the existing system can be 
explained. This role of the burgeoning state in the post-war 
decades, despite the changes, displays a marked continuity with 
the past.
Before looking at the the role of the state in Ireland, some
/
questions about the state as an institution should be raised. The 
assertion of Marx that "The executive of the modern state is but 
a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie" (1973.69) leaves unanswered the question of how this 
is actually achieved. Nicos Poulantzas argues that the capitalist 
state simultaneously organizes the dominant classes and
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disorganizes the dominated classes. One of the ways in which it 
does this is through the creation of a consensus around projects 
which serve the interests of the dominant classes. The state: 
"has the precise function of hiding the real contradictions and 
of reconstituting on an imaginary level a relatively coherent 
discourse which serves as the horizon of the agents 
experience"(1973:207). Looking at the role of the Irish state in 
this period provides an illustration of this.
4. The Agricultural Sector
We saw earlier how the politics of land distribution played 
such an important part in the development of the Irish political 
system. The Ireland that was dreamed of was the Ireland of the 
peasant holding. The extent to which the smallholder gained from 
the policies of successive regimes, is however debatable. I have 
already argued, after Mouzelis, that this political development 
involved the transference of patronage from landlords to the 
state and the incorporation of the peasant masses into the new 
system. The success of this system can be judged from the fact 
that, except for the emergence of Clann na Talmhan in the 
thirties, no major peasant party emerged as an opposition [2]. 
The failure of Irish peasants to formulate an alternative 
development policy was explained, after Mouzelis, by reference to 
the extent to which Irish peasants were integrated into the 
capitalist economy. The peasants "were brought into the 
political game in a more dependent/vertical manner, through 
populistic and clientelistic means"(1986.72). The transition to 
political independence then saw a shift from an oligarchic form
of patronage to a more centralized bureaucratic form. In line 
with the shift from political to state control of the economy, 
the new form of incorporation shifted on to the state level.
The increased involvement of the state in agriculture has 
continued the practice of incorporation. The Irish Farmers 
Association (IFA) has, since its foundation in the fifties with 
the support of government agencies like ACOT,presented itself as 
the representative of all Irish farmers, or the " agricultural 
sector" as it is called. Its organizational structure does not 
recognize differences among its members in terms of access to 
capital or land. However through the pages of the Irish Farmers' 
Journal as well as through its policies, it has been one of the 
strongest proponents of capital-intensive commercial farming. 
Despite the fact that these policies have lead to the 
marginalization of many small producers, the IFA's continued 
ability to mobilize large numbers of farmers in support of its 
policies is evidence of its incorporative capacity.
5. The Unions
Another aspect of this process of state clientelism was the 
incorporation of the trade union movement into the planning 
process. Economic Development (1958) had called for more joint 
consultation between unions, employers and the state. The 
National Industrial and Economic Council (NIEC) and the National 
Employer Labour Conference (ELC) were to be important 
institutions in this process. The theme of wage restraint very 
soon came to dominate the proceedings of these institutions. Bill
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Roche has shown how these state bodies through the ideology of 
"social partnership" created a "pragmatic acknowledgement" that 
"within the prevailing political economy, pay restraint was a 
prerequisite of economic expansion, and further that it required 
the imposition of controls on pay determination" (Roche 1982:65). 
This culminated in the so-called National Understanding of the 
nineteen seventies in which the autonomy of the workers movement 
from the actions of the state was effectively abolished. 
Clientelism in Ireland then was less a function of the peasant 
mentality peculiar to Ireland than an example of what Mouzelis 
has described as a shift to "a more centralized party oriented 
clientelism" (1986:48)
VII. NATIONALISM: ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE
AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
An issue centrally related to the question of clientelism in 
Irish politics is the question of nationalism. It was ironic that 
at a time when the national question had become marginal in the 
Republic for the first time, it should have exploded with such 
force in the North. It has been a truism of modernization theory 
that nationalism is a sentiment of pre-modern society. The 
economic development of the nineteen sixties undoubtedly 
undermined the social basis of Irish nationalism not to -mention 
its ideology. The whole idea of imperialism and partition as 
obstacles to development seemed unrealistic. The idea that 
economic development was retarded by foreign interference seemed 
totally misguided since it was foreign intervention itself which 
seemed to have caused development.The turning point in this
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attitude to nationalism was undoubtedly the historic meeting 
between Sean Lemass and Terence O'Neill in 1966. This meeting 
seemed to signal the beginning of a political realism in the 
country which understood the importance of economic welfare over 
anachronistic nationalist shibboleths. "We recognize that the 
Government and Parliament there exist with the support of the 
majority of the people in the Six County area" said Lemass, 
going on to assure that "We see it functioning within its powers 
and we are prepared to stand over the proposal that they should 
continue to function within those powers" (Probert 1978:91).
Political commentators in the Republic have, since the early 
sixties, ritually pronounced the end of nationalism in Irish 
politics. Sean Lemass was of course the arch pragmatist in this 
sense, one of the twentieth century men in the sense David 
Thornly described them. The halcyon days of the sixties however 
then gave way to the "me decade" of the seventies. Tough measures 
were called for and Charles.J.Haughey came to power amidst the 
general feeling that "If these the times,/ then this must be the 
man". However the clientelist tradition lived on under Mr 
Haughey's reign and real class politics had to wait. It had to 
await the emergence of The Progressive Democrats in the election 
of 1987 for this to finally occur. The stridency with which the 
gospel of privatization was now proclaimed was music to the ears 
of those yearning after a normal world. Fianna Fail of course 
have since upstaged the others by seemingly ditching its populist 
policy. However the sinking of nationalism out of sight seems in 
no way to have alleviated the economic problem. Nor does it seem
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Nationalism of course means many things to many people but the 
political expression of the nationalist position in Ireland at 
present is undoubtedly Sinn Fein. The Sinn Fein policy was 
expressed by the then leader of the party Ruari 0 Bradaigh in 
1973 as Comhar na gComharsan. This philosophy is based "on the 
right of worker-ownership and is native Irish as well as being 
co-operative or distributive in character" (Purdie 1980:85). The 
political evolution of Sinn Fein leftward since those years 
illustrates the problems confronting this nationalist view of
economic development. We already looked at this problem in
relation to the work of Raymond Crotty. The problem is basically 
that the structural contradictions within the Irish economy make 
the idea of a communal or cross class alliance in economic 
development non-sensical. It is every bit as non-sensical as the 
idea that integration into the capitalist system could lead to 
development.
1. Conor Cruise O'Brien and The British New Left
One of the most vociferous opponents of nationalism in the 
Republic over the past two decades has been Conor Cruise O'Brien.
Speaking from a first hand involvement in the post-war
f
decolonization process, O'Brien from early on set'’ about 
challenging the view that the conflict in Northern Ireland had 
anything to do with colonialism. One aspect of O'Brien's 
criticism is directed against those left nationalists who see 
imperialism as the obstacle to economic development both North 
and South. Indeed he went on to invert the argument by asserting
to be leading to the emergence of an alternative socialist party.
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that Irish nationalism was itself a colonial sentiment in its 
claims on the North. Underneath the veneer of academic 
objectivity O'Brien's argument can be fairly situated within the 
terms of the modernization debate about the conditions for 
economic development. O'Brien's argument reduces basically to the 
contention that social and economic development have little to do 
with class or national struggle and much more to do with good 
management. This argument holds basically that the conditions for 
the development of bourgeois society lie in the accumulation of 
capital and that this accumulation will proceed with the 
operation of the market.
Dr O'Brien has found a rather unlikely bedfellow here in the 
person of the British New Left Marxist Tom Nairn who quotes 
O'Brien approvingly. Nairn argues that the partition of the 
country in no way hinders the accumulation of capital. What 
retards that is the development of a strong bourgeoisie and this 
is possible within the confines of the two states in Ireland. The 
nationalism of a united Ireland in the North, and likewise in the 
the South, actually inhibits the growth of "socialist politics" 
by perpetuating divisions within the working class and by driving 
Protestant workers into the hands of their Orange bosses, and in 
the South, Catholic workers into the hands of nationalist bosses 
(Nairn 1977:232). The ultimate outcome of civil strife would, 
Nairn agrees with O'Brien, result in a worse form of Falangist 
type atavism than existed previously (1977:238). Nairn on the 
other hand argues that bourgeois society in the North contains 
the conditions for the continued accumulation of capital which
would so alter the economic structure of the Northern Ireland 
economy as to make sectarianism unworkable. Similarly in the 
Republic the coalition government of 1973 is seen to have been a 
milestone in the emergence of the bourgeoisie.
The question to be answered here is whether the resolution of 
the national question, in the sense of ending partition, is a 
precondition of social and economic development? Or does a
preoccupation with this question, as Nairn and O'Brien seem to 
suggest, simply retard the process of development? With regard to 
the Republic firstly, considering that the recent economic 
decline coincided with national quietism, nationalism can hardly 
be blamed. With regard to the North on the other hand, the 
economic decline of that province had begun long before the 
recent Troubles began. On the question of whether nationalism can 
contribute to economic development on the other hand we should 
reconsider briefly the whole debate about the conditions for
economic development.
I have been arguing here that a condition of economic
development historically was the creation of the social 
conditions for capital accumulation. The creation of these
conditions was originally the task of the native bourgeoisie as 
we saw in relation to Britain and Germany. However we saw that in 
the case of colonial Ireland, except for the North-East, the 
conditions of capital accumulation did not exist and the native 
bourgeoisie were unable to create them. With the development of 
monopoly capitalism the position of the national bourgeoisie in
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the underdeveloped countries became even more precarious. Any 
major structural reform of the property system inevitably 
encroached on the interests of foreign capital. The bourgeoisie 
were unable to lay the basis for economic development and the 
case of Chile showed what happened when it was attempted. 
Instead, the social relations of underdevelopment have persisted 
into present times. These social relations are based on a low 
productivity agricultural sector and a merchant trading 
industrial sector. The reproduction of this system depends upon 
dependent integration into the capitalist system. The ideology of 
planning here had an extremely important function in relation to 
nationalism. Its essential function was to separate the issue of 
economic development from that of political independence.
Any attempt to change this system will involve challenging the 
property system on which it is based. Since the Irish economic 
system is so integrated into the international system with all 
forms of commitments, any challenge to the property system will 
have an international and thus a national dimension. There would 
be strong moves to prevent it, internally and externally. In 
Ireland therefore, to paraphrase Marx, the social question is a 
national question. The issue of partition is central here. 
British occupation of the Northern province represents an 
important bridgehead for imperialism. The logical destination of 
the struggle in the North is undoubtedly some form of "united 
Ireland".
However, an Ireland which could accomodate the brethren from 
the North would have to be quite different than today. A social
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upheaval stands between here and there: one which could lay the
conditions for development. The national bourgeoisie at the 
moment is engaged in an effort to smooth over this contradiction 
through its latest Anglo-Irish accord. It is significant that 
this deal was accompanied by American "aid" to the tune of $500 
million. The determination of the imperialist powers to crush 
Sinn Fein lends weight to the contention that capitalist 
imperialism along with the national bourgeoisie has a direct 
interest in maintaining underdevelopment in Ireland.
VIII. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: SETTING THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE
Nowhere is the inability of the national bourgeoisie to 
transform the social relations more evident than in its relation 
to the Catholic Church. The continuing power of the Catholic 
Church and its ability to appeal to the traditional constituency 
of the "family" points to the extraordinary permanence of the 
basic petty bourgeois social relations. One of the most 
extraordinary aspects of the post-war era in religious terms was 
the reign of John Charles McQuaid, Archbishop of Dublin 1940- 
1972. The post-war era in religious terms was marked by the 
Vatican Council reforms in the 1960s. Although these reforms have 
been heralded from the perspective of the liturgy,- their 
importance in the long run may be seen more from their effect on 
the form of bureaucratic control. Certainly the corporate 
tradition suffered little during this time. Under the direction 
of the redoubtable Archbishop, thirty-four churches were built 
and twenty-six new parishes formed in Dublin between the years
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1940 and 1965 (Brown 1981:221). Indeed the era ended as it began 
with the capitulation of the government in the face of Church 
resistance.
This emphasis upon church-going, of course, leaves out of the 
picture the extent to which the church is part of the very 
functioning of society. Hospitals, social services and education 
are only some of the areas in which the church occupies the role 
of the state. One of the most important aspects of the change in 
the sixties was transition in the form of clerical control of 
education, the success of which became evident in the two 
referenda. Most of the study of Irish Catholicism from the 
modernization perspective has concentrated on the liberalization 
of the Church's teaching on sexual morality. The extent to which 
people heeded church teaching on this matter was believed to be 
a measure of Church influence. Although the Church through a 1975 
pastoral letter condemned "the contraceptive mentality" it was 
nevertheless felt, as Terence Brown expressed it, that "A major 
proportion of the younger generation were prepared in the 1970s 
to base their moral perceptions on things other than the Church's 
official teaching"(Brown 1981:303).
This rather instrumentalist view of the role of the Irish 
Catholic Church fails to comprehend the extent to which the 
church defines the terms within which intellectual debate takes 
place in the country and therefore predetermines the outcome. 
This fact was quite evident up to the sixties in that most 
"serious" social and economic debate was conducted through the 
pages of Catholic journals such as The Furrow, Doctrine and Life,
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Christus Rex and Studies. When this is recognized it comes as no 
surprise that Dr Whitaker could conclude what is considered the 
most important document of the era, Economic Development, with 
the reassurance that it was "a contribution, in the spirit 
advocated by the Bishop of Clonfert, towards a working out of the 
national good in the economic sphere" (Chubb & Lynch 1969:109). 
The question remains what effect this had on maintaining the 
existing social relations and in what, if any, is the new form of 
influence. From the perspective of a School of Communications 
there can be little doubt that this influence is still 
particularly strong. The example of the divorce referendum 
provides an illustration not because of its intrinsic importance 
but for the extent to which the debate became one not between the 
Church and those opposed’ to it but a debate within the Church 
itself. The interest of the Church became coextensive with 
society.
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NOTES
[1] In the general election of February 1987, Fianna Fail 
received 44%, Fine Gael received 27.1% and The Progressive 
Democrats got 11.9%. Out of 166 seats these three parties 
together got 146. See Richard Sinnott, "The General Election in 
The Republic of Ireland 17 Feb 1987, in IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 
vol 2 1987.
[2]. -Clann na Talmhan won 14 seats in the 1943 election but 
thereafter declined steadily-?*
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